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Chapter 1 
Introduction
I. Motivation
Natural disaster risk is a global concern and one that is particularly acute for members of 
the developing world. Unlike developed nations, developing countries often lack the 
resources to mitigate and recover from the economic damages caused by natural 
disasters. Governments, particularly o f poorer nations, are unable to invest much in 
disaster mitigation due to the pressing needs of other immediate development priorities. 
When a disaster strikes these nations are often ill-prepared to meet the humanitarian or 
economic costs.
At the micro-level, the economies of these countries have not developed to the point of 
offering affordable, or often any type of formal insurance (World Bank 2006), which is 
often the primary line of defense against disaster damages in the developed world. These 
economies are often also characterized by incomplete credit markets and as a result 
households must rely on informal mechanisms to meet the needs that arise in the post­
disaster environment or must take their chances with receiving sufficient amount of 
domestic or international aid. At the household level, the dependence on aid is 
problematic because it relies on aid to be both available and effectively allocated. In 
many cases, less publicized disasters do not receive aid proportionate to their impact. 
Disasters often also strike rural areas, which make the delivery of aid difficult. Micro­
level arrangements which households use to safeguard their welfare such as informal 
insurance networks or storing assets can also be rendered ineffective by disasters.
In relative terms, poor households in developing nations suffer the most acute losses 
when disasters strike. As the adage goes, the poor have less to lose, but when they lose 
that they lose everything. In the developing world, disaster-prone areas are populated not 
by the rich, but by the poor because they cannot afford to live in lower-risk areas. Unlike 
aggregate economic shocks, disasters can physically destroy assets held by the poor be 
they livestock, crops, tools or even their home not to mention kill household members. 
Frequently disaster damage strikes the poor doubly hard: first, with the direct losses due 
to the disaster, and secondly, by potentially disrupting loan-financed development 
programs (Freeman et al., 2003: 37). In the wake of disaster a household may find its 
assets destroyed and lives of family members lost. All this makes for a recovery process 
that may be difficult at best.
For the poor in the developing world who do not hold financial assets, the destruction of 
physical assets and loss of work opportunity can be particularly crippling. As Sen (1982) 
has argued, the ability to avoid starvation and destitution hinges on ownership and
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exchange entitlement.1 As he and subsequently Ravallion (1987) demonstrated it is 
possible to reduce welfare either by a decline in ownership or loss in exchange ability. 
Natural disasters may simultaneously reduce a household’s ownership assets and its 
exchange possibilities. These, in turn, hold implications for a household’s non-durable 
consumption, which includes food. This is not a study about subsistence and hunger, 
however, they are particularly salient concerns given the deleterious effects of hunger and 
starvation (Dreze and Sen 1989). Events such as natural disasters, which may severely 
disrupt household consumption and threaten household welfare, merit consideration.
Only by better understanding the degree and nature of disaster impact at the household 
level will more effective preventive and response measures become possible.
From an economic perspective the incidence of natural disasters provides a unique 
research opportunity to investigate several important themes in development economics 
such as risk and informal insurance, the usage of non-market risk coping mechanisms and 
the benefits and efficacy of aid targeting. This dissertation argues that the incidence of 
large-scale natural disasters places extreme stress on informal coping mechanisms and 
generates exogenous, one-off flows of “windfall” aid transfers. The confluence o f these 
factors offers fertile ground for research into how these mechanisms perform in the wake 
of a large, unanticipated exogenous shock.
The unpredictability of disaster occurrences makes compiling panel or even cross- 
sectional data around the pre and post disaster period difficult since the disaster must fall 
between scheduled surveys. Fortunately a series of surveys conducted as part of the 
World Bank’s Living Standards and Measurement Surveys captures valuable data on 
household behavior before and after Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua in 1998. The impact 
of disasters on informal coping mechanisms and the role o f aid in sustaining welfare is 
the focus of this dissertation. To engage this research question I seize research 
opportunities which arise in the post-disaster period to analyze the behavior of informal 
insurance mechanisms in response to damages caused by Hurricane Mitch. The 
remainder of this section will orient the reader to themes in development economics 
which are relevant to the topics of risk coping and the role of post-disaster aid that are 
touchstones of this dissertation.
II. Introduction
In many of the world’s poorest countries the population is rural and relies on agriculture 
for a living. The poorest households may often be close to subsistence level poverty and 
in the poorest countries welfare is not measured in currency units but by caloric intake. 
Even those agricultural households which are not characterized by extreme poverty 
remain vulnerable to disruptions of their income and consumption. They are beset by 
numerous risks such as illness or personal injury and more general risks such as a 
downturn in crop prices, insect infestation or drought.
1 “The set o f all the alternative bundles o f commodities that he can acquire for what he owns may be called 
the ‘exchange entitlement’ o f what he owns” (Sen 1982: 4).
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Unlike households in the developed world these households must endeavor to safeguard 
their income and consumption levels without many of the market mechanisms that are 
taken for granted in the developed nations. Access to complete credit and insurance 
markets is often severely curtailed in developing countries. In addition legal institutions 
which exist to enforce contracts are not found or ineffective due to reasons such as 
illiteracy or corruption. Despite these obstacles economists have found that households 
in developing nations manage to develop informal, “nonmarket” institutions which mimic 
formal credit and insurance markets. Households are able to use informal institutions to 
mitigate risk and guard against drops in income and consumption levels. In agricultural 
societies weather risk is a prevalent concern. It is here we begin our discussion as there 
are several parallels which emerge between weather risk and natural disaster risk.
III. Weather Risk and Natural Disaster Risk 
III. A. Weather Risk
Earlier work on weather risk vulnerability chiefly focuses on agricultural households, 
which are vulnerable to adverse shocks affecting both crop price and yield. These studies 
typically examine the seasonal aspect of weather (usually rainfall or lack of) or the 
impact of weather on investment decisions. As for weather risk, some studies present 
weather risk as covariate, while others caution that it may be less covariate than 
anticipated. Obviously, the scope for local and informal insurance will decrease as 
weather risk becomes increasingly covariate.
III. A. 1. Weather Risk and Investment Decisions
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) investigate the relationship between wealth, weather 
risk and the composition and profitability of agricultural investments. They use panel 
data from India (ICRISAT survey) to “(i) measure the riskiness of farmers’ investment 
portfolios in terms o f their sensitivity to weather variation, (ii) test the existence of a 
positive association between average returns to individual production assets and their 
sensitivity to weather variability, and (iii) estimate how the influence of exogenous 
weather risk on portfolio riskiness and on farm profitability varies with total wealth.” The 
authors argue that an emphasis on weather-related risk is useful due to the availability of 
weather data and that:
although weather is not the only factor exogenously affecting the variability in farm 
output and profits, it is the factor contributing to income variability that is most likely to 
influence welfare. This is because weather risk is spatially covariant. Unlike fo r  
idiosyncratic risk, it is difficult fo r  farm ers to undertake arrangements that insure against 
risk factors such as rainfall that affect everyone in their local environment similarly.
Only to the extent that risk is not insurable will risk be reflected in ex ante production  
decisions, and weather risk appears to be uninsured in most low-income settings (italics 
mine) (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993: 57).
The authors find that farmers living in riskier environments choose asset portfolios that 
are less sensitive to rainfall variation and that uninsured weather risk exacerbates income
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inequality. They also find that common weather shocks to income have greater 
consequences for consumption than idiosyncratic risk. Thus, weather related profit 
variability may be less insurable than idiosyncratic profit variability. As an example they 
describe how credit becomes difficult to obtain following a late monsoon and how the 
timing of a monsoon has a significant effect on total farm profitability. But, given that 
not all households are affected equally by the shocks there appear to be gains from 
weather insurance. Yet, the authors suggest that since a portion of profit risk remains 
idiosyncratic and since weather variations adversely impact the poor, the wealthy are 
unlikely to wish to participate in such an insurance program.
III.A. 2. Weather Risk and the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH)
Intertemporal mechanisms allow households with different time preferences to consume 
now or trade current for future consumption. Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis 
(PIH) often serves as a foundation for intertemporal analysis (e.g. Wolpin, 1982; Paxson, 
1992). The PIH decomposes income into permanent income and transitory income.
With respect to the consumption smoothing, the PIH indicates that consumption is 
smooth because it responds to changes in permanent income.2 Households will save 
(dissave) out of positive (negative) shocks, with the marginal propensity to save 
theoretically equaling the portion of income devoted to saving (consumption).
Paxson (1992) uses Thai data and demonstrates that the marginal propensity to save out 
of transitory income (due to transitory rainfall) is not one, but is relatively high. Paxson 
(1993) investigates Thai consumption and income seasonality. She finds that seasonal 
variations in consumption are the result of seasonal preferences or prices and not a failure 
to use savings as a means of smoothing consumption. Saving behavior does not follow 
that exactly predicted by the PIH, but it may come close. An earlier study by Wolpin 
(1982) tests the impact of weather on the income and consumption of rural households 
vis-a-vis the PIH. The idea is that income is determined by a portion related to “normal” 
weather events and a component related to random weather shocks. Wolpin finds, using 
district-level rainfall data from India, households observe and respond to weather when 
formulating consumption decisions. He demonstrates that the permanent income 
elasticity falls between 0.91 and 1.02 and shows that this value is sensitive to 
consumption.
III. A. 3. Weather Risk and Natural Disaster Risk: Idiosyncratic?
In most cases weather risk is considered to be covariate, however work by Townsend in 
India shows that households at disparate points in villages receive varying amounts of 
rainfall. Townsend argues that:
the development literature typically portrays risk as covariate, imagining that most people
are doing the same thing and experiencing the same weather, for example . . .  evidence on
2
Campbell and Deaton (1989) challenge this view and argue that consumption tracks lagged income 
changes.
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actual households from a number o f developing countries suggests that the incomes o f  
households in a village or region move together much less than expected (1995: 84).
To support this view, Townsend cites data from India, Thailand and Cote d’Ivoire, which 
suggests a significant amount of household-specific, idiosyncratic risk (and thus the 
possibility for insurance). In India, ICRISAT data in three villages that shows that 
“incomes do not commove across households in each of the villages because households 
earn their income in different ways, subject to different risks and do not diversify much.” 
Townsend mentions that, for example, Lim (1992) finds that 25 percent of income- 
variance is household specific. Wolpin (1982) offers a concrete example: irrigation. 
Clearly farms without irrigation are vulnerable to an additional risk. Not only are they 
concerned with how much rain falls, but when it falls as well. As such assuming that low 
rainfall levels will affect all households equally is not necessarily true.
Thai survey data shows, despite common fixed effects for certain regions, the presence of 
sizeable idiosyncratic shocks even across counties in the same region. Townsend also 
draws on Angus Deaton’s work in the Cote d ’Ivoire to demonstrate idiosyncratic income 
variability. Idiosyncratic income variability may yield fertile ground for risk pooling, 
although as mentioned idiosyncratic income variability need not lead to risk pooling (for 
reasons discussed later). On the whole, Townsend (1994) indicates that:
if  the risks are largely idiosyncratic, as the empirical evidence argues, then risk-averse 
households should group together to share risks. These risks will include the weather, 
that is, rainfall, temperature, humidity, and the like; shocks associated with incidence o f  
crop disease and human illness; shocks associated with changes in prices outside the 
group or the local economy; and random factors helping to determine births, deaths, 
migration, division o f extended families and other endogenous demographic states.
Following Townsend, although not explicitly enumerated, natural disasters may qualify 
recognizing certain caveats. The characterization of natural disaster risk as idiosyncratic 
must be qualified. Risk posed by extreme weather events such as low-frequency, high- 
impact natural disasters may be idiosyncratic depending upon the type and severity of the 
disaster and the size of the risk pool relative to the total population. The degree to which 
informal mechanisms extend beyond the at-risk (or affected) area will impact the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms at smoothing consumption. That is to say informal 
mechanisms, which do not pool risks across distinct covariant groups, are unlikely to be 
effective against natural disaster risk. It is likely that the reduction of consumption 
variability will still require that risk be spread someplace other than the local community. 
In this respect, informal networks that include inter-regional or international transfers are 
more likely to be able to effective depending upon monitoring capabilities and 
information asymmetries.3 One means of coping with risk is risk pooling.
3 Rashid (1990) found that risk pooling deteriorated with distance in Pakistan, however Townsend (1995) 
does not find conclusive results to support this in Thailand.
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III. B. Risk Pooling
III. B. 1. Why Pool Risk?
In much of the developing world, rural populations are vulnerable to erratic and 
unpredictable swings in income and consumption. Such swings may be the result of 
changes in agriculture prices, weather, changes in the general price level, and other 
exogenous shocks. Given that households are assumed to be risk averse such swings are 
undesirable. Risk averse households will prefer steady income and consumption. In 
order to achieve these aims households can use income smoothing and consumption 
smoothing strategies.
III. B. 1.1 Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing
Income smoothing minimizes income variance, but in doing so often reduce future 
expected future income streams. An example of income smoothing would be to plant 
low-risk, low-profitability crops or to work at a fixed wage rate to guarantee income 
security. These measures sacrifice higher income (and in turn higher consumption) for 
income stability. Income smoothing may be considered a second-best option (Morduch 
1994), although income and consumption smoothing are not mutually exclusive options. 
While income smoothing is a viable means o f managing income risk, the emphasis in this 
dissertation is on consumption smoothing vis-a-vis risk pooling.
Consumption smoothing is preferable to income smoothing because it allows 
consumption to be maintained even in the face of income fluctuations. Consumption can 
be smoothed across states of nature (e.g. insurance) or across time (e.g. saving). Risk 
pooling allows consumption to be smoothed by sharing risk across households in a given 
state o f nature. Risk pooling may take a number o f forms including state-contingent 
transfers (e.g. remittances or reciprocal gift giving) in addition to “disguised” insurance 
mechanisms such as share tenancy, credit contracts with state-contingent repayments, and 
long-term labor contracts (Alderman and Paxson, 1994: 49).
III. B. 2. Managing Risk without Insurance
In addition to intertemporal smoothing in accordance with the PIH, credit markets offer 
another consumption smoothing alternative. Udry (1994) details informal, rural credit 
markets in northern Nigeria, which function as insurance. The loans are state-contingent 
and the parties often do not agree on the interest rate or repayment date prior to 
disbursing loans. An option for credit constrained households is to buy and sell assets to 
smooth consumption. Selling unproductive assets may not have adverse economic 
consequences for future periods, but the sale of productive assets will lower expected 
future income. This is an imperfect solution for another reason since assets are often not 
divisible (e.g. a cow). The seller may then have to part when the whole asset, when the 
amount she requires is less than the sale price. Furthermore, asset prices may become 
depressed due to a simultaneous sell off following a covariate shock.
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Multi-period consumption models can be used to model this behavior. They assume the 
individual will adjust current and future consumption levels to maximize utility given her 
rate o f time preference. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) construct a finite horizon model 
using longitudinal data to track asset sales and purchases relative to income shocks.
Their model captures income uncertainty in each period, constraints on borrowing and 
renting productive assets (bullocks), returns to experience, and the use of assets to 
generate income and smooth consumption. At the end of each period, the farmer 
determines asset allocation for the next period so as to maximize profit, but also requiring 
a minimum amount of consumption in each period. In this fashion, their model allows 
them to solve for the profit-maximizing number o f productive assets (bullocks). 
Comparing the optimal to the actual quantity guides further study towards explaining the 
discrepancy as well as assessing the impact o f policies targeted to improve farmer 
welfare. It should be noted that, in practice, intertemporal and risk pooling strategies 
may be enacted contemporaneously.
III. B. 3. Characteristics of Risk Pooling
Given the desire of households to smooth consumption and the option to smooth across 
states o f nature, we may expect some risk pooling to occur in the absence of formal 
insurance markets. The absence of complete credit markets is also assumed for risk 
pooling to take place. If households had complete access to credit they could simply 
borrow and save to adjust to transitory shocks and smooth consumption over time 
(Morduch 1995).
There are several distinguishing factors which characterize risk pooling networks. First, 
households forming a risk pooling network will have a relatively unimpeded flow of 
information on other households in the network. This reduces the moral hazard problem 
of households making claims on the network due to negligence rather than ill fortune. 
Second, there must be a credible enforcement mechanism to punish households if  they 
renege on their obligations (Coate and Ravallion 1993). This could be a pecuniary 
measure or social exclusion or reputation effects. Third, households must be sufficiently 
forward looking (discount factor). If households are insufficiently worried about future 
income flows they will renege on their obligations. Fourth, risk pooling networks must 
weigh the costs and benefits of geographic proximity o>f the member households. A 
village of agricultural households, for example, will beaiefit from lower information costs 
since all households are fairly close together and easier to observe (e.g. similar crops, soil 
types, etc.). The same village also suffers from the disadvantage o f highly covariate 
income streams.
Tests o f risk pooling began to increase in frequency in the economic literature in the early 
1990s and continue to the present. Irac and Minoiu (2005) offer a useful review of risk 
pooling studies which is summarized here. The theoretical foundations for risk pooling 
are rooted in work done by Cochrane (1991), Mace (19^91) and Townsend (1994). The 
theoretical and econometric contributions of these piecies are amplified in Chapter 3. On 
the whole, studies by scholars using data from across tlhe developing world find that full 
insurance is not achieved, but household consumption iis reasonably smooth despite the
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expected variation in income associated with income risk. In many studies (Deaton 1992; 
Townsend 1994) risk pooling is studied at the village level although others have found 
risk pooling to take place through cast ties (Morduch 1990 and 2003), ethnic groups 
(Grimmard 1997) and friends and relatives (Fafchamps and Lund 2003). Most studies of 
risk pooling use data from rural, agricultural villages where poverty, income risk and the 
lack of formalized market mechanisms is particularly pervasive.
Although tests of risk pooling are frequently confined to rural villages there is no reason 
why urban households can not engage in risk pooling. Studies of risk-sharing typically 
focus on agricultural households at the village level for several reasons. In rural areas 
credit markets are less likely to be established and functioning. Monitoring and 
information costs are lower as all households share common information about farming. 
As a result they have more intimate knowledge of occupational hazards which can reduce 
moral hazard problem. In addition, analyses of risk sharing in rural areas contain a game 
theoretic component of repeated interactions. In a rural environment it is realistic to 
expect that households will have repeated interactions across generations. In urban areas 
where the households and individuals may move frequently repeated interactions and the 
threat o f sanctions may become less credible if information flows poorly and legal 
mechanisms operate slowly. Households in urban environments also differ in several 
other respects. There is substantial diversification of income streams in the urban 
environment. This could decrease risk sharing since it raises moral hazard concerns. A 
plumber can not know if a baker has taken steps to minimize his own ill fortune. On the 
other hand, the reduced income covariance in the urban environment is a desirable trait 
for partners in the risk-sharing network (Cox and Jimenez 1998).
Cox and Jimenez study urban households in Cartagena, Colombia. The authors find 
evidence o f insurance motivated risk sharing in the urban environment. The probability 
o f receiving transfers is sensitive to network quality. Those households with large 
networks mostly comprised of better-off members have a higher probability of receiving 
transfers. They also find strong evidence that transfers are targeted to female-headed 
households. When all other characteristics are equal having a female headship raises the 
probability of transfer receipt by 33 percent.
Much o f the work on informal insurance typically assumes that the risk pooling network 
is formed by households often at the village level or across the family. In these cases the 
risk pooling network is exogenously determined based upon geography or family ties. 
Work by De Weerdt (2006) shows the formation of risk pooling networks in Tanzania is 
complex and dependent upon several factors including kinship, geographical proximity, 
common friends, clan membership, religious affiliation and wealth. The wealth factor is 
particularly interesting since it clearly shows that not all links are equal. Total household 
links are correlated with its livestock and land holdings (wealth). Simply put, the rich 
have denser networks than the poor do. Rich households are more desirable as network 
partners and select other rich households to be in their network. Poor households are less 
desirable network partners. Thus although many households may be linked in a risk 
pooling network, the strength of each individual household’s ties may exhibit variation. 
For this reason the impact of a covariate shock will vary with the strength of the
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networks. Unfortunately, the LSMS data does not contain information on household 
networks. As a result this has not been a focal area of this dissertation. Nevertheless the 
role o f networks will be useful in interpreting the results in later sections. We now 
review a method for evaluating the degree of risk pooling.
III. B. 4. Testing for Risk Pooling: Theory of Full Insurance: Advantages and 
Limitations4
A common test for the degree o f risk pooling uses the theory of full insurance. Empirical 
work has its foundations in models specified by Debreu (1959) and Arrow (1964). When 
risk is fully pooled, household consumption depends only upon average village 
consumption. Since households are perfectly insured, household income shocks should 
not affect household consumption. Thus, if there is full insurance, in equation 1 B] will 
equal 1 and B2 will equal 0. Although we know Bi will likely never equal 1, we use this 
as a benchmark with which to compare the actual level of risk pooling. The exact 
equation may vary across studies, but the basic idea is:
(1) Cjvt Bo “I" Bi C yri~  B 2 Y jv t  "t" 6jvt>
where c** = consumption in house i, in village v, in time t; c = average consumption in 
village v in time t; Y = income of household i; and e = error term to allow for 
idiosyncratic shocks (Alderman and Paxson, 1994: 65). A number of studies use this 
premise to test the full insurance theory, although the equation may undergo slight 
modifications. The consumption equation is highly flexible and adaptable. Additional 
independent variables can be added as appropriate and the model allows for comparison 
of sub-unit to unit (e.g. household to village; village to county; etc., Townsend, 1995).
While the consumption equation can be a useful approach, there are several caveats that 
must be heeded. From an econometric perspective, it is necessary to show that:
(i) comovement in consumption is due to risk pooling;
(ii) measurement error is minimized; and
(iii) correlation between income and the error term is addressed.
Results yielded by the consumption equation must be critically examined since any 
situation where household consumption and average village consumption comove for 
reason unrelated to risk pooling will indicate an artificially high level of risk sharing. For 
example, household and village consumption may co-move due to the nature of village- 
level and idiosyncratic shocks, not because people pool risk.5 Ravallion and Chaudhuri 
draw on Deaton (1990) to note that in a manner consistent with the PIH, if all households
4 A fuller treatment o f econometric tests for full insurance is given in Chapter 3.
5 E.g. village-level income shocks, a change in prices for example, are permanent because the village all 
faces the same prices and idiosyncratic income shocks are transitory (Alderman and Paxson, 1994: 68). 
Under such a scenario, consumption would co-move as households simultaneously recalculate the expected 
value o f  their income stream. Over time the expected value o f  transitory income shocks should average to 
zero.
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received simultaneous information about future income shifts, this could lead to co­
movement in consumption, which is unrelated to risk pooling.6
IV. Post-Disaster Behavior: The Impact of Aid
Since risk pooling entails the distribution of positive as well as negative shocks it is 
important to consider the role of post-disaster aid. Donations of aid following a large 
disaster can be sizeable and it is important to consider the impact of these transfers on 
consumption. Differences in the patterns of aid distribution may emerge among official 
and unofficial, inter-household transfers. Before proceeding to a discussion of aid and 
consumption we briefly review economic explanations for charitable behavior after a 
disaster.
IV. A. Post-Disaster Charitable Behavior
In the post-disaster environment, simple economic theory would predict that as goods 
become scarce and demand increases prices will rise. Nevertheless, economists have 
repeatedly observed an increase in charity giving and cooperation following a disaster. 
There are two dominant theories which explain the rise in charity after disasters: shifting 
utility and the alliance hypothesis. The conclusions in this dissertation are insensitive to 
the underlying motivations for why aid transfers occur. The focus is on whether they do 
occur, in what magnitude and through what mechanisms. Nevertheless it is useful to 
consider the prevailing theories on post-disaster behavior to put the research in this 
dissertation into a broader context.
Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) and Douty (1972) argue that the rise in charity and relative 
price stability is attributed to a shift in utility functions which increases preferences for 
charity. Charity is preferred because of an interdependence of utility functions in which 
the giver values the welfare of the recipient. When the recipient’s utility crashes, the 
donor receives a proportionally greater increase in her own utility with each donation. 
This is the principal argument although a corollary is that a disaster causes a shift in 
relative prices and the price of charity falls (lower search and information costs to 
identify the needy). As charity becomes cheaper the supply increases.
De Alessi (1975) and Hirshleifer (1967) argue it is possible to explain this behavior 
without any adjustment in utility functions. De Alessi draws from the collective action 
literature to elaborate upon an “alliance hypothesis” proposed by Hirshleifer. The 
alliance hypothesis states that the continued functioning of a society in a well ordered 
manner is a collective good. When the stability is jeopardized even the most selfish will 
engage in altruism to support the society’s continued stable functioning. In short,
6 Ravallion and Chaudhuri observe that while Townsend (1994) finds a high comovement o f  consumption 
in Indian villages, this is not due to risk pooling and may indeed indicate a lack o f  consumption insurance, 
(p. 183). To demonstrate this they argue that “if  comovement in consumption is being driven by risk- 
sharing, and if  the correlation between individual consumption changes is due to endogeneity o f  labor- 
leisure choices, then individual household consumption changes ought to be correlated as well with 
aggregate income changes since risk-sharing implies the pooling o f incomes”, however their results do not 
support this assertion.
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disasters increase the marginal effectiveness of individual efforts to preserve society. As 
the fruits of individual efforts increase, the collective action problem begins to dissolve 
since there are clear returns to individual behavior. However a tipping point exists 
beyond which individuals will prioritize their own wealth preservation and antisocial 
behavior will begin to dominate. The recent example of New Orleans post-Katrina 
suggests a situation in which antisocial behavior temporarily dominated.
IV. B. Aid Transfers
IV. B. 1. Official Aid
The role o f aid in sustaining consumption emerges as a strong theme in Chapter 3 and 
throughout the dissertation. Empirical work on the benefits of aid transfers is large and 
typically shows that aid is effective at raising consumption. There are of course 
questions o f targeting, but poorly targeted aid can still provide positive benefits for 
consumption. Using data from Ethiopia Dercon and Krishnan (2002) find that despite 
food aid being poorly targeted, it contributed to improved consumption which is largely 
attributed to intra-village risk sharing. Since a third of all aid received by sampled 
Nicaraguan households was food aid it is useful to quickly review the work of Dercon 
and Krishnan and the relationship between food aid and intra-village risk sharing.
Food aid (and aid in general) is subject to targeting problems: errors of inclusion and 
exclusion. In practice errors of inclusion dominate as people and households are 
unnecessarily included due to cultural or political pressures. As a result a finite amount 
o f food aid becomes thinly stretched across too many recipients and its impact is 
minimized (Sharp 1997). An alternative to food aid distribution is work-for-food 
programs which require self-screening by the recipients. Dercon and Krishnan find that 
participation is highly sensitive to idiosyncratic crop shocks (statistically significant at 1 
percent) in Ethiopia. The authors also find that having a male headed household is 
statistically shown to increase receiving aid (at 5 percent, although food aid declines as 
the number of household adult males increases).
Food aid may have a deleterious effect on risk pooling networks if food aid crowds out 
informal mechanisms (Albarran and Attanasio 2002; Cox et al. 1998; Cutler and Gruber 
1996). This is manifested by a change in relative values of participating in the informal 
network. If formal aid makes foregoing participation in informal risk-sharing 
arrangements an optimal decision there will be less informal insurance, which can make 
some households worse off. Furthermore, risk-sharing dictates that the impact of both 
positive and negative shocks is shared. Even with imperfect risk-sharing food aid should 
still be shared. In a network with complete risk-sharing the distribution of food aid does 
not matter. The positive shock will simply be distributed by the recipients. However, no 
studies have found full risk sharing, which makes such a scenario unlikely. Thus the 
distribution of aid will hold implications for exclusion and coverage of needy households. 
The combinations of risk sharing and targeting are succinctly summarized by Dercon and 
Krishnan (reproduced in Table 1.1 below). Based upon earlier studies which show an 
absence of full risk pooling and assuming aid is imperfectly targeted this produces the
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outcome in the middle grid. When risk is imperfectly shared some risks will be 
imperfectly insured and some state-specific outcomes will be excluded. Similarly when 
aid is imperfectly targeted errors of inclusion will dominate giving excess aid coverage.
Table: 1.1 Targeting and Informal Risk-Sharing
Perfect Targeting Imperfect Targeting No Targeting
Full Risk-Sharing No exclusion; Full 
excess coverage
No exclusion; Full 
excess coverage
No exclusion; full 
excess coverage
Imperfect Risk- 
Sharing
Possible exclusion; 
Possible excess 
coverage
Possible Exclusion; 
Possible excess 
coverage
Possible exclusion; 
excess coverage
No Risk-Sharing No exclusion;
No excess coverage
Some exclusion; 
some excess 
coverage
No exclusion; Full 
excess coverage
Source: Dercon and Krishnan 2003
Note: Exclusion refers to poor households who did not benefit from the transfer (in terms o f higher living 
standards); excess coverage refers to non-poor households who benefited from the transfer scheme.
After empirical tests Dercon and Krishnan find that food aid is shared albeit to a limited 
extent. They also find that evidence that food aid crowds out informal risk-sharing 
mechanisms. The results from Ethiopia are interesting compared to post-Mitch 
Nicaragua since food aid in the surveyed villages is formalized and distributed on a 
regular basis. By contrast the aid which arrived after Mitch for Nicaraguan households 
was unanticipated. This may not lessen the problem of excess coverage, but could hold 
implications for a household’s decision to maintain participation in risk-sharing 
networks. If a household expects that formal aid distribution will occur in perpetuity this 
must be weighed against the costs o f participating in the informal network. By contrast 
unanticipated aid disbursement which is clearly state-contingent is unlikely to be 
similarly priced into a household’s decision making function.
IV. B. 2. Private Aid Transfers
Private transfers also play a role in sustaining post-disaster household welfare and are 
motivated by two reasons: altruism and exchange (Cox et al. 1998). The altruism model 
(Becker 1974) presumes an interdependence of utility functions and argues that donors 
derive utility from the welfare of the recipients. The exchange model states that one 
party gives because it expects reciprocal behavior in the future. Reciprocal giving could 
include cash or non-monetary assets such as labor. A key implication of these theories is 
the relationship between transfer motivation and public sector insurance programs.
Under the altruism model donors give to raise the welfare of the recipients and to satisfy 
altruistic motivations. Thus if public sector transfers increase we can expect private 
transfers to reduce by an equivalent amount (Becker 1974; Barro 1974). The 
implications are different for the exchange model, which need not lead to a crowding out 
of private transfers. Using data from Peru Cox et al. (1998) find that transfer behavior 
can not be explained purely by altruism. Instead results suggest exchange motives since 
there is a positive relationship between transfer amounts and recipient income.
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Private transfers can be either inter-household transfers or remittances from family 
members living outside the home areas (urban migrants) or migrants abroad. Since the 
Nicaraguan data set does not disaggregate the two types the role of remittances is not a 
focal point of the dissertation. Nevertheless it is useful to acknowledge the motivations 
for remittances and their potential role as an insurance mechanism. Using data from 
Botswana Lucas and Stark (1985) show that the two prevailing theories for remittance 
motivation, altruism and self-interest, are incomplete. Instead remittances are better 
explained by a model o f ‘"tempered altruism” or “enlightened self-interest” which 
considers both theories when modeling remittances. It is important to note that 
remittances may occur for reasons other than risk pooling. For example, remittances may 
be part of a life-cycle process in which children abroad are repaying parents for money 
invested in their education earlier in life. Alternatively, remittances may also occur to 
fund investment, maintenance or upkeep of property or assets at home for which the 
remitter anticipates inheriting or may already own. In these cases remittance flows would 
not occur for reasons of risk pooling. In other situations sending household members 
abroad (or even from rural to urban environments) offers risk diversification by virtue of 
diverse income streams in heterogeneity of risk. In response to a widespread shock 
Lucas and Stark show that during a drought in Botswana the remittances are not targeted 
to maintain recipient welfare, but instead to protect those families with more cattle.
V. Non-M arket Coping Mechanisms
In addition to financial arrangements households may also use non-market mechanisms 
to cope with risk. Lacking access to savings, credit or informal market risk coping 
mechanisms, one method of coping with risk is to alter household size. Early work on 
the economic formation of the household (Samuelson 1956, Becker 1981) states that 
households may benefit from forming to take advantage of economies of scale and from 
sharing public goods. Similarly, adjusting household size can be an effective mechanism 
to improve household per capita consumption. There is some evidence from the 
developing world to suggest that larger households are poorer on a per capita basis 
(Lanjouw and Ravallion 1995) although results are not consistent across the countries 
surveyed. In theory, adjusting household size can impact household per capita 
consumption depending on how the household is restructured (Atkinson 1992). One 
example of how household composition impacts per capita welfare is with the amount of 
children in a household. Since adults and children have different nutritional and welfare 
requirements adding or removing can impact welfare vis-a-vis food costs.
VI. Gender and Risk Coping
Across the developing world women frequently encounter inequalities which leave them 
economically disadvantaged and often marginalized (UN 2006, World Bank 2002). 
Lacking equal economic opportunity female headed households may potentially be 
constrained as they seek to execute the same risk coping strategies as male headed 
households. Evidence from the development economics literature tends to suggest that 
female headed households are favorably targeted by inter-household transfers (Cox and 
Jimenez 1998; Cox et al. 1998, Cox et al. 2004). Female headed households are often
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targeted as recipients of inter-households since the donors are frequently migrant 
husbands who are working abroad. Since female headed households have comparatively 
fewer economic opportunities they have a higher income risk (Cox and Jimenez 1998). 
Private transfers may contain a risk coping component. As mentioned earlier the post­
disaster period is accompanied by exogenous aid flows, which are distributed through 
organized, formal channels. Although explicitly designed to help cope with risk, gender 
inequalities in the allocation decision making process may diminish the effectiveness of 
post-disaster aid for female headed households (Bradshaw 2004).
VII. Analytical Focus
The dissertation builds on risk-sharing themes and the research is focused in three areas: 
household response to covariate risk, adjusting household size as a non-market coping 
mechanism and coping behavior of female headed households after Mitch.
VII. A. Household Response to Covariate Risk
Nicaraguan household panel data surrounding Hurricane Mitch presents an opportunity to 
examine the impact of covariate shocks on household consumption and the role of aid in 
maintaining household consumption. Chapter 3 analyzes the performance of informal 
insurance when the risk pooling mechanisms designed to handle idiosyncratic risk are 
confronted with widespread damages across the risk pooling group. This chapter also 
explores post-disaster aid targeting. Results indicate that aid played a critical role in 
sustaining Nicaraguan household consumption. Official aid was targeted around harvest 
losses, but inter-household transfers were not targeted based upon hurricane damages and 
were insufficient to act as adequate means o f insurance. Results suggest that household 
consumption was sensitive to harvest losses and damage to income-generating assets, but 
relatively insensitive to other hurricane damage types.
VII. B. The Impact of Hurricane Mitch on Household Size
Deprived of the ability to turn to well functioning market mechanisms households may 
utilize other non-market mechanisms to cope with Mitch damages. Chapter 4 studies the 
decisions of households to adjust household size as a non-market coping mechanism.
The actual process by which a household adjusts size could take many forms. To reduce 
household size parents may send a child to live with grandparents or other relatives. 
Alternatively elderly parents may move to reside with another child. In other cases adult 
members may separate and form their own household. Young adults (or other members) 
may migrate to urban areas in search of employment. To increase household size the 
household could absorb relatives from other households.
The analysis in this chapter is rooted in economic work on the relationship between 
household size and welfare (as measured by household per capita consumption). Starting 
from the simple premise that more affected households may decrease size in order to 
increase household per capita consumption, we explore this hypothesis and also identify
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the probability of altering household size based upon Mitch damages and demographic 
characteristics.
Using panel data from the LSMS surveys it is possible to analyze patterns of household 
change during two periods. The first period (1998 -  1999) begins several months prior to 
Mitch and ends the next year. The second period (1999 -  2001) offers an additional 
period for comparative and analytical purposes. This chapter tests for (i) factors which 
significantly affected the probability that a household would alter size after Mitch and (ii) 
that households adjusted size as a coping mechanism to increase per capita consumption 
after Mitch. Results suggest that the incidence, but not the size, of agricultural losses 
significantly increased the probability of reducing household size after Mitch. 
Demographic factors such as the gender of the household head and household size 
strongly influenced the probability of changing household size. We also find evidence to 
suggest that households with agricultural losses adjusted size as a post-Mitch coping 
mechanism.
VII. C. Aid Distribution to and Behavior of Female Headed Households
In the development literature it is widely reported that female headed households are 
economically disadvantaged. They tend to be poorer and are often socially or politically 
marginalized. Research from disaster anthropologists suggests that female headed 
households also have less access to post-disaster relief. Chapter 3 demonstrates that 
female headed households received less official aid than male headed households. 
Chapter 4 shows that female headed households were more likely to increase household 
size after Mitch. These conclusions raise two questions about the female headed 
households which are the focus of Chapter 5: (i) Were female headed households 
disadvantaged in receiving official aid because of their gender? (ii) Why were some 
female headed households more likely to increase household size after Mitch?
Analysis of survey data shows a mixed pattern of aid distribution to female headed 
households. On the whole, female headed households received less aid, but having a 
female household head is not a statistically significant determinant of aid received. 
However, when focusing on agricultural households we find evidence of a gender bias in 
official aid distribution. After Mitch households with female heads were likely to 
temporarily add members. A closer look at the welfare and Mitch damage indicators for 
female headed households offered no clear evidence as to why some female headed 
households added members, while others did not. Tests to identify why certain female 
headed households increased household size are inconclusive.
VII. D. LSMS Data
Before proceeding it is useful to quickly review the applications of this data set for its 
suitability for use in this dissertation. The World Bank LSMS data from Nicaragua has 
been used in a number of research papers. A listing of these papers is maintained on the
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World Bank’s web site.7 The LSMS data has been used for departmental research papers, 
papers published in peer-reviewed journals as well as Master’s and Ph.D. Theses. The 
themes of these papers are diverse. Topics include labor choice, ethnic wage 
differences, unemployment and education. At the time this dissertation was submitted 
none of the papers using the Nicaragua LSMS data focused on the impact of Hurricane 
Mitch. After submission, an additional internal World Bank study was listed on the 
World Bank website entitled “Hurricane Mitch: A Study of Vulnerability in Nicaragua” 
(Cha 2006).8 A review of these papers revealed no data insufficiencies which would 
preclude the use of the LSMS as the data source for this dissertation. Based upon the list 
o f peer-reviewed papers and Ph.D. theses which use the Nicaraguan LSMS and 
discussion with my advisors the data was deemed suitable and reliable to investigate the 
research questions posed in this dissertation.
The dissertation refers frequently to household consumption, harvest losses and long­
term losses and other damage metrics caused by Mitch. Before proceeding we briefly 
review how these variables are constructed. Household consumption as reported by the 
LSMS is aggregate household consumption divided by the number of household 
members to yield per capita household consumption. Consumption includes durables and 
excludes large purchases of “one o ff’, big ticket non-durable items. Consumption is 
weighted to account for regional price differences. Consumption is constructed 
consistently across surveys before and after Mitch. Price levels were fairly consistent 
between the 1998 and 1999 survey periods and the implicit price deflator actually 
declined by 2%.9 Harvest losses are reported by the household and estimate the total 
value of crops destroyed by Hurricane Mitch. Long-term losses are also reported by the 
household and estimate the total value o f agricultural assets destroyed by Mitch. These 
assets may include, but are not limited to, irrigation networks, farm tools, livestock, 
bams, seeds and fertilizers.
It is important to address how the construction of these variables may impact the results 
before advancing. The construction of the LSMS consumption variable ensures that 
consumption can be compared consistently across regions and survey periods having 
consistently addressed the composition of consumption and the impact of price changes. 
Since the dissertation deals in great detail with agricultural households and in particular 
harvest losses as well as consumption it is important to ensure that the survey 
construction does not impact the analysis.
A key issue is whether the timing of harvest sales impacts consumption. Our principal 
concern is whether 1999 consumption is financed out of the 1998 harvest receipts and 
thus any impact on consumption in the post-hurricane period would be minimized. If 
1999 consumption is heavily dependent upon 1998 harvest receipts we would expect 
1999 consumption to be relatively unaffected by Mitch losses. The impact of harvest
7 http://www.worldbank.org/LSMS/research/country4.html/#njcaragua
8 The author attempted to locate a copy o f this paper (unavailable online or in print), but was unable to prior 
to the revision submission deadline.
9 United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates Database 
http://un stats.un .org/un sd/snaama/Introduction .asp
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losses due to Mitch would then be evident in 2000 consumption. This scenario assumes 
that consumption patterns are largely derived from earned harvest income. In theory and 
practice it is possible that consumption decisions are based both on past income and 
expected future income. Nevertheless, this scenario represents a valid concern. 
Fortunately there are several checks that enable us to know that this possible scenario will 
not adversely affect the analysis.
The 1998 and 1999 surveys measure consumption at the time of their respective surveys. 
The resources to finance household consumption are constantly accumulated over the 
course o f the year whether the source be crop sales or other sources (e.g. labor income, or 
remittances). The principal harvested crops include com, beans, wheat, sorghum, coffee 
and rice. Other crops such as various fruits and vegetables are grown to a lesser degree. 
Obviously the harvest season will vary according to the crop(s) each household grows. 
Particularly, as households grow a diverse range of crops for sale and self consumption 
there is no singular fixed sale date. There are no receipts if  the food is for own 
consumption and harvest receipts may be received on a rolling basis. Thus, there is no 
uniform harvest date that can be applied to all agricultural households as the date is 
sensitive to the type of crop grown as well as if the crop can be stored. In addition 
households which grow crops for their own consumption can not store these (e.g. fruits 
and vegetables) and they can not be financed out of past receipts since they would have 
also been grown and consumed in the previous period.
Clearly, it is difficult to argue that consumption is not financed to some degree out o f past 
earnings. At issue is whether the degree is such that the impact on next period 
consumption is minimal because of a heavy reliance on pre-Mitch harvest earnings to 
finance post-Mitch consumption. In this case the rolling nature of harvests implies that 
crop income is a stream rather than an annual or seasonal event. Secondly, consumption 
is both forward looking as well as backward looking meaning decisions are not made 
entirely based upon past harvest receipts (as elaborated upon in the discussion of the 
permanent income hypothesis in Chapter 1). Finally, households which grow their own 
food obviously do not receive revenue for this food, but losses to these households still 
has a fiscal value which can impact post-Mitch consumption decisions. Considering 
these factors the structure and design of the LSMS survey is deemed not to adversely 
impair the author’s ability to answer the research questions posed here.
VII. E. Outline
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides background information on 
disasters and development, Nicaragua and Hurricane Mitch. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
performance of informal insurance networks in the face of Mitch and the targeting 
efficiency of post-Mitch aid allocation. Chapter 4 explores the decision of many 
households to adjust household size after Mitch as a possible post-Mitch, non-market 
coping mechanism. Chapter 5 examines the role of gender in receiving post-Mitch aid 
and focuses on the behavior of female headed households following the hurricane. 
Chapter 6 concludes.
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Finally, all financial losses in the dissertation are quoted in Nicaraguan cordobas unless 
otherwise indicated. At the time of Hurricane Mitch, the official exchange rate was 
approximately 10.8 cordobas per USD. The currency depreciated to 11.5 per USD in 
April 1999 (the outset of the second survey round).
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Chapter 2 
Disasters, Development and Mitch
I. Disasters and Development
I. A. Global Economic Loss Trends from Natural Disasters
In recent years, there has been a common perception that disaster losses have been 
increasing at a rapid rate. Recently some organizations have published figures to 
illustrate the rapid increase in disasters losses, particularly in the last 30-50 years (e.g. 
Swiss Re 2005). Figures from the United Nations, for example, indicate that global 
economic losses attributed to natural disasters have increased from US $75.5 billion in 
the 1960s to $659.9 billion in the 1990s (UNDP, 2004). More recent events such as 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 have reinforced the perception of an increasing loss trend 
associated with natural disasters.
However, such a perception may be inaccurate. Recent work questions the accuracy of a 
rapidly increasing trend in losses (Pielke 2005, Van der Vink et al. 1998). Earlier work 
on loss trends likely overstates losses because they only control for changes in inflation 
over time. Rising loss trends are also driven by two other important dynamic 
components: changes in population and changes in wealth. It is only natural that as 
societies become larger and wealthier over time that there will be more assets and people 
in vulnerable areas. New work on normalizing loss trends by controlling for changes in 
inflation, wealth and population over time and finds minimal evidence of an upward trend 
for US hurricane (Pielke and Landsea 1998, Collins and Lowe 2001, NOAA 2005) and 
flood losses (Pielke et al. 2002). A subsequent global survey of weather-related losses10 
over time that adjusts for all three factors finds evidence o f an upward global trend of 
approximately 2% per annum (Miller et al. 2007, Figure 2.1 below) -  which while 
notable is lower than rates previously implied (Swiss Re 2005).
10 Weather related losses exclude losses from geophysical phenomena such as earthquakes, volcanoes and 
tsunamis.
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These trend results are encouraging in that they no longer imply an exponential increase 
in global disaster losses. However, the losses in Figure 2.1 are in nominal USD and do 
not capture the relative impact of losses. The weight of a large loss event can be almost 
negligible in a large economy such as the US or Japan. By contrast losses in developing 
regions may be felt more severely in relative terms.
I. B. Disasters and Development
The impact of disasters varies based upon the level of economic development. The least 
developed countries are the most vulnerable and have the highest losses relative to the 
country’s wealth. Lower-middle and middle income countries can also be increasingly 
vulnerable in different ways. As the economy develops, the breakup of family support 
networks and traditional coping mechanisms can leave the poorest groups even worse off. 
Wealthy countries typically experience high financial costs with disasters, but in relative 
terms the impact is often negligible on growth when compared to poorer countries (ODI 
2005).
The economic impact of natural disasters can be broken down into three types: primary, 
secondary and indirect effects. The primary impact of disasters can be summarized by 
the cost of physical assets or capital stock destroyed. Examples may include housing, 
roads, utility distribution networks, factories and crops. Secondary effects refer to 
include the costs of disruption to normal economic activity as well as. Indirect effects 
include an increase in public sector borrowing, inflation, changes in housing prices and 
any change to pre-planned development projects (Benson and Clay 2000).
There are differing methodologies to evaluate the impact of disasters on development. 
One means is to use a post-event approach and analyze the movement of macro- 
economic indicators in the periods before and after the event. Albala-Bertrand (1993) 
analyzes the movement of key macro-economic variables in 28 disaster situations for 26 
countries (24 developing and two developed) over the twenty year period from 1960 to
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1979. In general, there is neither a fall in GDP due to disasters nor a decrease in the 
growth rate of GDP. The impact of disasters on these variables is usually positive if 
anything. The positive relationship between disaster losses and GDP is one which is 
frequently observed. Since GDP is a measure o f economic activity it is natural that GDP 
will increase following a disaster (particularly due to reconstruction activity). However, 
focusing only on GDP ignores the value of destroyed assets that must be replaced as well 
as disrupted economic activity that would have otherwise occurred (Cobb et al. 1995).
In Albala-Bertrand’s study he used post-event analysis to show that most other indicators 
such gross fixed capital formation, the public deficit and the performance of the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors either improve in the year of the disaster or remain 
neutral and improve in the following year. The trade deficit tends to increase in the year 
o f the disaster, but this increase moves towards pre-disaster levels in the years following 
the event. Overall, “there is no dramatic loss of current GDP due to natural disasters 
even if there are some people, groups or sectors which bear important income losses on 
these occasions.”
An alternative to a post-event analysis is to use simulated probabilistic models to project 
the impact of large disasters and chronic vulnerability on macroeconomic performance. 
Since the most destructive disasters strike only once every 100 or 500 years a 
probabilistic model can capture hypothetical impacts that can not be captured solely by 
using historical data. Furthermore, focusing only on one event ignores the cumulative 
impact of disaster vulnerability and losses. Work by the International Institute o f Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA), the World Bank and the Swiss Reinsurance Company models 
the impact of chronic disaster incidence on the Honduran economy.11 Researchers 
considered the expected frequency and severity of disasters, vulnerability and the 
expected macroeconomic conditions when the disaster occurs. Using Monte Carlo 
simulations the researchers find that the incidence of infrequent (occurring between every 
100 or 500 years) but possible disasters could destroy between 12 and 31 percent of 
Honduran capital stock. More regular, smaller-scale events indicate that Honduras 
requires an annual average of USD $170 million to meet disaster costs. If these financing 
needs are not met growth is projected to follow the triangled line in Figure 2.2. Whether 
and how financing needs are met is a separate avenue for discussion, which falls outside 
the scope of this thesis. We will however touch briefly upon this in a discussion of multi­
lateral institutions in the next section.
11 This work is summarized in Freeman 2000.
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Figure 2.2: Projected Honduran GDP 1999 - 2008
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Overall, the macroeconomic impact of disasters can be limited if large amounts of 
productive capital stock are not destroyed and external financing is available if needed. 
While aggregate macroeconomic performance may be only mildly disturbed by a 
disaster, the people and groups which are most strongly affected are the poor. Albala- 
Bertrand summarizes: “the people and activities most affected by natural disasters are 
bound to be those belonging to the poorest and most powerless social sectors of less 
developed countries.” The struggles of low-income citizens of New Orleans after Katrina 
are a recent reminder that this relationship holds even in the world’s largest economy.
We now review the impact of disasters on international financial institutions.
I. C. Impact of Disaster Losses on International Financial Institutions: Evidence 
from the Inter-American Development Bank
Even with a more muted trend in global disaster losses, the economic and social impact 
of disasters in the developing world remains a real concern. Disaster losses continue to 
impact the development efforts of multi-lateral institutions such as the World Bank 
(WB), Asia Development Bank (ADB) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 
The costs associated with natural disaster damages present several problems for 
international development lending institutions. The IDB has explicitly enumerated 
economic damages from disasters as a threat to its mission (IDB 2004.
Disasters threaten the development process advanced by international institutions in 
several ways. One example is the destruction of loan-financed projects. For example, in 
2000 over 500 schools were damaged or destroyed by flooding in Mozambique. Many 
were financed by World Bank loans (World Bank 2006). A second concern is that the
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funds are often diverted from approved development loans to meet reconstruction needs. 
Loan reallocation is a useful mechanism due to its flexibility which allows post-disaster 
needs to be met, but by definition entails a diversion of funds from a scheduled 
development project to address disaster costs. Disasters can also have adverse 
consequences for local development initiatives such as microfinance programs (Pantoja 
2002) which slows the advancement of development programs.
Using data from the IDB we can examine the economic impact of disasters from the 
perspective of an International Financial Institution (IFI). In Latin America and the 
Caribbean estimated regional losses from disasters occurring between 1975 and 2002 
approximated USS92 billion, or an annual average of around USS3.4 billion (IDB 2004. 
Economic losses in the region are attributed to the interaction of several factors, 
including: (i) the location of geophysical phenomena in Latin America and the 
Caribbean; (ii) increased population growth and human activity in disaster-prone areas;
(iii) a low use of mitigation and preventive measures; (iv) regional underdevelopment, 
which limits government resources available to meet disaster costs; and (v) 
environmental degradation and unsustainable land use policies (Miller and Keipi 2005).
To address the impact o f disasters, the IDB allocated nearly US$4 billion to prevention 
and mitigation and disaster-related response loans between 1975 and 2002 (Table 2.1). 
On an annualized basis IDB disaster-related loan activities since 1995 were roughly 
US$475 million per year and amounted to only a fraction o f the annual regional losses 
(IDB 2004. While the amount spent on response and reconstruction provided vital aid to 
safeguard economic and social programs, the need might have been reduced if additional 
mitigation spending and risk transfer instruments had been implemented. Of the $3.8 
billion in loans the share directed to emergency response and reconstruction outnumbers 
prevention and mitigation by roughly three to two (59 versus 41 percent, IDB 2003a). 
Since the annual costs of disasters in the region far exceeds the funds available from the 
IDB minimizing losses through prevention and mitigation is an important task (Miller 
and Keipi 2005).
Table 2.1 Total Losses Due to Natural Disasters in Latin America and the 
___________  Caribbean (1975 -  2002, in nominal amounts) _________
Total Loss 
(US$ bn)
Total Loss per 
capita in 2001
Highest Annual 
Loss (US$ bn)
Average 
Annual Loss 
(US$ bn)
Caribbean 7.07 322 2.54(1998) 0.47
Central
America*
15.43 268 3.30(1998) 0.77
Mexico 15.69 158 6.67 (1985) 0.92
South America 533.84 65 8.56(1983) 1.92
Total 92.03 - - -
♦Includes Panama
Source: EM-DAT (2003), OFDA/CRED (2002), LaRed (2003) (As it appears in IDB 2004).
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Some nations may be able to manage their disaster losses with domestic resources, but 
that ability diminishes as the severity of disasters increases which creates a resource gap. 
Cardona (2005) estimates the potential resource gap for 12 countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean using the probable maximum loss in the event of an extremely severe 
(once a century) disaster. Half of the countries are projected to have resource gaps.
These gaps would be even larger if expected aid from the IDB and World Bank would 
not materialize.
The IDB and the international community will continue to offer post-disaster aid. Yet, the 
IDB and other IFIs are not disaster relief organizations and, as such, narrowing the 
resource gap with increased IDB (and other external) assistance is not a sustainable long­
term strategy. The emphasis must be on reducing losses. This is a task that the IDB 
continues to embrace. If losses in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to rise, the 
IDB’s direct and indirect exposure will also increase. For this reason the IDB continues 
to push more forward thinking initiatives to reduce disaster damages. Focal points in this 
strategy are (i) contributing to the improvement o f country risk management strategies 
and programs, (ii) strengthening its internal capacities and organization to facilitate risk 
management, and (iii) evaluating existing financing instruments and possibly introducing 
new IDB instruments (Miller and Keipi 2005). If successfully implemented, a balanced 
risk management approach can reduce the threat that disasters pose to the Bank’s mission 
as well as to the economic and social development of Latin America and the Caribbean.
II. Nicaragua and Hurricane Mitch
II. A. Nicaragua: Socio-Economic Background
Nicaragua is located on the Central American isthmus and is bordered by Honduras to the 
north and Costa Rica to the south. The country is divided into 15 departments and two 
autonomous administrative regions. In 2005 the population was estimated at 
approximately 5.5 million (UN Population Database). Nicaragua is one of the poorest 
countries in the Western Hemisphere with a GNI per capita of US$ 710 and a total GDP 
o f US$ 4 billion (World Development Indicators 2004). Agriculture makes up roughly a 
fifth of GDP. In 2001 49.1% of the country survived on less then $1 a day. 
Approximately 75% of households live in poverty. Nicaragua ranks 121st out of 175 
countries in the Human Development Index (HDI) and 98th out of 144 countries in the 
UNDP Gender related Development Index (GDI, UNDP 2003). A sizeable cash transfer 
program, Red de Protection Social, exists in Nicaragua. This program did not begin until 
2000 so household behavior after Mitch is unaffected by these transfers.
In addition to its poverty, Nicaragua is extremely vulnerable to a myriad of natural 
disasters including volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, floods and landslides. Since 1970 
Nicaragua has been the hardest hit country by disasters in Central America. It has the 
highest ratio o f fatalities per capita and the ratio of cumulative losses to GDP over this 
time is 338.4% (Charveriat 2000). Historical evidence suggests that Nicaragua’s hazard 
vulnerability contributed to the eventual construction of the Panama Canal in Panama 
rather than in Nicaragua (McCullough 1978). Several large disasters have impacted
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Nicaragua in the past century. In 1931 an earthquake (6.5 magnitude) struck Managua 
and killed an estimated 2,000 people. Although the quake was not exceptionally strong 
the epicenter was below Managua and much of the city was destroyed by the quake and 
ensuing fires. In 1972 an earthquake (6.2 magnitude) struck Managua on December 23rd. 
Significant aftershocks followed and the death toll approached 6,000. Much of the 
building stock was destroyed and service to communications and utilities was disrupted. 
In 1998 Hurricane Joan struck Nicaragua along the Caribbean coastline and affected 
approximately 300,000 people and caused an estimated US$ 400 million in damages. A 
series o f lesser hurricanes and tropical storms have also struck Nicaragua in recent 
history but their impact was negligible compared to Hurricane Mitch in 1998.
II. B. Hurricane Mitch
Mitch was identified as a tropical depression on October 22, 1998. The storm slowly 
built strength and by October 26 it was classified as a Category 5 hurricane with winds in 
excess of 180 miles per hour. Mitch moved in from the Caribbean coast and made 
landfall on October 29th. It passed over Nicaragua and Honduras and slowly weakened 
until it diminished on November 1st. Mitch easily classifies as one of the most intense 
Caribbean hurricanes in the past 200 years. Its effects were felt in five countries across 
Central America. Mitch brought with it extremely high winds and tremendous rainfall 
(Figure 2.3). Between the 25 and 31st of October parts of Honduras received three feet 
of rainfall. Approximately 19,000 people in Central America were classified as dead or 
disappeared following the storm, with the bulk of these concentrated in Honduras and 
Nicaragua (IDB 1999).
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Figure 2.3 Precipitation Caused by Mitch in Nicaragua (in mm)
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Source: Instituto Nicaraguense de Estudios Territoriales (INETER) Direction General de Meteorologia.
The overall economic damage caused by Mitch in Nicaragua is estimated at 
approximately US$ 1 billion (EM-DAT). Lost production was estimated at US$ 100.6 
million (approximately 5% of annual GDP). The macroeconomic impact of Mitch is 
visible across several indicators. GDP growth slowed from an estimated 6% prior to 
Mitch to 4% for 1998. Inflation increased from 13% to 18.5% for 1998. Unemployment 
increased from 12.2% to 13.3% after Mitch. This increase is largely attributable to the 
displaced agricultural workers. The value of exports decreased by US$ 54 million 
although this may be partly attributable to the effects of the Asian Crisis, which made 
Nicaraguan exports less competitive. The decline in exports combined with an increase 
in imports after Mitch led the balance of payments deficit to increase to 41% of GDP. 
Public sector finances decreased as tax revenue slowed after Mitch due to lower levels of 
business activity. Public sector finances were further strained by the need to provide 
post-disaster assistance.
32
Agriculture was the most affected sector and its forecasted share of GDP fell from 14.8% 
to 6% in 1998. Official sources estimate the agricultural losses translate into 27.3% of 
lands ready for harvest (or 67.8 thousand hectares) having their crops lost to Mitch. 
Production of key crops for domestic consumption and for export such as rice, beans, 
sorghum, com and soy beans were heavily affected. In addition to crop loss some 
farmlands were rendered unusable due to heavy accumulation of mud, sediment and 
rocks on the fields caused by the intense rain and flooding.
The impact on Nicaraguan infrastructure was severe as 114 municipalities (78% of the 
total) were affected by Mitch (CCER 1999). Of these 72 were strongly affected. These 
areas also experienced substantial damage to water distribution networks, which exposed 
the population to diseases associated with unclean drinking water. In many 
municipalities schools and community centers were also destroyed which had a perverse 
impact on the education of children in those areas. Damage to infrastructure was 
widespread and included the loss of 1,500km of paved roads, 6,500km of unpaved roads, 
3,800 bridges, and 31,737 destroyed homes. The education and health sectors lost 1,600 
classrooms and 90 health centers and 416 more rural puestos de sa lud  as well as the 
medical equipment these facilities contained. Damage also extended to fire stations, 
potable water systems, latrines, hydroelectric power generation facilities and electricity 
distribution networks (CCER 1999).
After Mitch the provision of food, shelter and health care were pressing concerns. From 
January to March 1999 the Coordinara Civil para la Emergencia y la Reconstruccion 
(CCER) carried out a survey on the distribution o f aid and welfare o f people after Mitch. 
This survey found the following notable responses at the time of the survey:
• 50% of households said no household member had a “stable” household income;
• 46% of households indicated the harvest was their most important loss;
• For every 10 families suffering losses three did not receive aid;
• Food aid was the most useful type of aid;
• NGOs were identified by 41 % as giving the most community support (as 
perceived by the population) followed by local governments (21%), Catholic 
Church (16%), Red Cross (16%), Other Churches (4%) and the National 
Government (2%);
• 46% found the distribution of aid to orderly compared to disorderly (36%).
Analyzing the impact of Mitch several patterns are evident. Poverty in Nicaragua is 
widespread and as most household are rural, poverty is concentrated in rural areas. 
Agriculture is an important means of income for Nicaraguan households. We can expect 
that households heavily engaged in agriculture will be most strongly affected by Mitch. 
After the hurricane households relied on outside aid since income stability was a concern, 
inflation pushed prices up and the provision o f public services was curtailed. Of the 
factors affecting Nicaraguan households after Mitch two are emphasized throughout this 
dissertation: agricultural losses and post-disaster aid. With these antecedents in mind, 
the focus of this dissertation moves to a household level focus.
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Chapter 3
Household Response to Covariate Risk: 
Nicaragua and Hurricane Mitch
I. Introduction
Households in developing nations must manage risk without many of the formal 
mechanisms established in the developed world. Since many of the world’s poor rely on 
agriculture for a living, they are subject to weather risk as well as an array of 
idiosyncratic risks that may affect household production, investment decisions, income 
and consumption. Households are often, but not always, able to use informal insurance 
and second-best coping mechanisms to mitigate idiosyncratic income risk and smooth 
consumption fluctuations. Studies of risk pooling have found evidence to suggest high, 
but less than perfect, levels of risk pooling (Deaton 1990, Townsend 1994, 1995) across 
the developing world. Despite a failure to achieve Pareto efficiency, risk pooling can still 
achieve a high degree of effectiveness in smoothing household consumption from 
idiosyncratic household income risk.
In cases where risk pooling is ineffective due to covariate risk or impossible due to social 
or organizational reasons, households must rely on second best coping strategies. 
Evidence from the developing world shows that households are able to utilize risk 
pooling and coping mechanisms to mitigate the impact of idiosyncratic risk. Household 
coping strategies may include saving (dissaving) during transitory positive (negative) 
shocks (Paxson 1992), the accumulation o f buffer stocks (Fafchamps et al. 1996), asset 
sales, as well as altering the composition of agricultural investments (Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger 1993). In India, for example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) found that 
credit constrained households smooth consumption by accumulating livestock as a buffer 
stock. While contributions in the literature have provided excellent insights as to how 
households respond to idiosyncratic risk, comparatively less is known about a 
household’s ability to smooth consumption against covariate risk. This question is 
particularly relevant since covariate shocks can not only overwhelm informal insurance 
arrangements, but may weaken or remove second best coping options as well. This 
scenario plays out regularly in the developing world when a destructive natural disaster 
strikes.
If informal insurance mechanisms are sufficiently broad households may be able to 
mitigate severe drops in consumption. In this case it would be essential for the risk 
pooling network to extend beyond the afflicted area. Given that risk pooling is likely to 
dissipate with distance this is unlikely (Rashid 1990). Indeed, the basic premise of
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insurance dictates that risk pooling is ineffective at mitigating highly covariate risk. At 
the extreme, when all households are affected mutual insurance arrangements are 
ineffective as all households simultaneously require insurance payments in excess o f the 
pool’s ability to pay. When a large-scale natural disaster strikes insurance arrangements 
in the developing world (and often the developed world) are overwhelmed by the 
magnitude o f losses.
The ineffectiveness of informal insurance arrangements may not be problematic for 
consumption smoothing if households have access to other effective coping mechanisms. 
But, large scale disasters are both disruptive and destructive. They frequently wash away 
crops, flood homes and farm land, destroy stores of grain and income-generating assets, 
damage homes and kill livestock. Coping strategies founded upon these assets can have 
their effectiveness radically reduced. A third line of defense is the influx of post-disaster 
transfers in the form of disaster relief aid provided by governments, NGOs, international 
organizations and inter-household transfers (both domestic and from abroad). These 
mechanisms are likely to be less efficient than risk pooling networks given increased 
asymmetric information and monitoring challenges that confront donors and remitting 
households. Despite these imperfections, these mechanisms may assume paramount 
importance after large-scale natural disasters, particularly when assets are destroyed. The 
occurrence of Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua in 1998 combined with panel survey data 
provides an opportunity to investigate the ability of households to mitigate consumption 
against covariate risk.
With these antecedents in mind this chapter has three objectives. The first is to test the 
ability of households to effectively insure against specific types of quantitative and 
qualitative hurricane damage (enumerated in the next section). The second goal is to 
evaluate the relationship between aid transfers and shocks. Although transfers are by 
definition part of an informal insurance strategy, the incidence of windfall aid transfers 
from government, relief organizations, etc. does not typically occur in response to 
idiosyncratic or even other types of covariate risk and merits attention. Whether donors 
were able to effectively target these transfers is an important question. Well targeted 
transfers could play a crucial role in moderating the impact on household consumption, 
while poorly targeted transfers may be at best inefficient and at worst, do nothing to 
ameliorate the impact o f Mitch, especially for the neediest households. The final 
objective is to investigate alternative coping mechanisms.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II reviews the data set and background 
information. Section III presents the impact of Mitch-specific shocks on consumption. 
Section IV discusses the relationship between shocks, transfers and coping strategies. 
Section V concludes.
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II. Data and Background
II. A. Data
In the past, the evaluation of the household impact of natural hazard shocks has been 
complicated by the lack of ex-ante and ex-post panel data closely surrounding the hazard 
date. Fortunately, the LSMS in Nicaragua offers an opportunity to test the impact of 
covariate disaster shocks. A few months prior to Mitch INEC executed a scheduled 
national household survey as part of the World Bank’s LSMS. Following the hurricane 
INEC revisited 595 households in 1999, which, among other goals, assessed the impact 
of Mitch on panel households in affected regions.
In the 1999 survey, survey selection was weighted to give a higher probability of 
selection for households in areas affected by the hurricane. The sample was drawn using 
a two-stage stratification process, with the population stratified geographically.12 Of the 
595 households approximately 10% (55) could either not be located or had incomplete 
interviews, with the majority not located. An additional 48 were “split” households from 
1998. Split households were substituted back in depending on where the head resided. Of 
the 48, 23 were substituted and 25 removed. The direction of a possible bias this 
elimination may introduce will be discussed further in Section V. This yields 528 total 
households for analysis here. Some regressions (presented in the next section) which use 
agricultural losses as the dependent variable use 321 households since not all households 
were engaged in agricultural activity.
II. B. Background
In October o f 1998, Hurricane Mitch caused numerous deaths and large-scale economic 
losses to Nicaragua and much of Central America. Mitch caused a wide range of 
damages to household assets, homes, and household infrastructure. To capture the range 
of possible idiosyncratic damages five damage metrics are considered: (i) damage to 
current harvest; (ii) damage to long-term (income-generating) assets13; (iii) days 
homeless due to Mitch; (iv) housing damage; and (v) damage to the household water 
source. Together these shocks account for the bulk of household-specific damage a 
household could have received from Mitch, with the exception of injuries and fatalities. 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.1.
12 The 1998 survey was administered between April and August, while the 1999 survey was administered 
between May and June. Although the dates are not identical, the driving concern is whether variation in the 
survey periods is correlated with consumption. Since both periods fall largely within the third quarter, 
seasonal issues, which might correlate with consumption, should be minimal.
13 Long-term assets include all agricultural damages other than harvest losses. Examples include damages 
to irrigation infrastructure, tools, machinery and work animals.
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Table 3.1: Survey Summary Statistics
Households:
Total 528
Engaged in Agriculture 321
By Poverty Line:
Extreme Poverty 127
Poverty 197
Not Poor 204
Female Headed 103
With Composition Change Between Surveys 266
Mean Per Capita Household Consumption (in 
cordobas):
1998 4746
1999 4756
Mean Shock Values:
Lost Harvest (in cordobas) 3865
Long-term Losses (in cordobas) 1369
Days Homeless 4.8
Aggregate Shock Values:
Households with Wall Damage 120
Households with Water Infrastructure Damage 92
Mean Aid Values (in cordobas):
Official Aid 611
Unofficial Aid 143
Total Aid 754
Source: Author’s calculations
From the data in the table we can observe that many of the surveyed households were 
relatively poor. It is interesting to note that despite the distribution of Mitch damages and 
in particular the high mean harvest loss, mean household consumption marginally 
increased. The increase appears somewhat counterintuitive, but may be explained by 
mean aid which accounted for roughly 16% of mean household consumption. We 
investigate this possibility later. Descriptive statistics provide a useful starting point, but 
a more rigorous analysis is required in order to more fully understand the impact of Mitch 
damages on consumption and the relative role o f aid in the recovery process. The models 
presented in parts III and IV explore the relationship between hurricane damages and 
consumption, and aid and damages, respectively.
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III. Effect of Mitch Shocks on Consumption
III. A. Data Diagnostics
Before proceeding to a discussion of regression results we present plots of consumption 
change for the survey as a whole and for specific shocks. Figure 3.1 presents a frequency 
distribution of consumption change. The distribution shows that the consumption change 
for most households was relatively mild in nominal terms, although any drop could have 
serious consequences for poorer households.
Figure 3.1: Frequency Distribution of Consumption Change
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Source: Author’s calculations
Figure 3.2 considers the relationship between our first shock, harvest losses, against 
consumption change (both measured in cordobas). Since a harvest loss is by definition a 
negative value the x-axis terminates at zero on the right-hand side. The data is fairly 
clumped with the impact of several outliers quite apparent. The mean harvest loss is 
-3,865 cordobas with a standard deviation of -6,708. There are two outliers which are 8.5 
standard deviations above the mean with a reported harvest loss of -60,000 cordobas. Of 
these two households, one household changed composition and the other did not. There 
are an additional five observations which lie between 3 and 4.5 standard deviations above 
the mean with reported losses between -24,400 and -33,200 cordobas. Excluding the two 
extreme outliers alters the mean loss size by approximately 350 cordobas to -3,513.
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o Figure 3.2: Consumption Change and Harvest Loss
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From the slope of the best fit line we would anticipate a small, negative coefficient due to 
the relatively flat slope of the line. The flatness of the slope is a function of a large 
number of households with a positive consumption change.
Figure 3.3 plots the distribution of long-term losses against consumption change. The 
mean long-term loss is -1,369 cordobas with a standard deviation of -8,293. The mean 
value is influenced by an outlier with a loss value of 137,625 which is 16.5 standard 
deviations from the mean. With this observation excluded the mean long-term loss drops 
by over a third to -943 cordobas. Figure 3.3 suggests a “best fit” regression line being 
relatively flat with a slightly positive coefficient.
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The scatter plot of days homeless and consumption change is given below in Figure 3.4. 
The mean time homeless is 4.8 days and mean consumption change for all surveyed 
households is 89 cordobas. The positive slope in Figure 3.4 supports these statistics. 
However, when we distinguish between households with non-zero days homeless mean 
consumption change for households whose time homeless is non-zero is 691 cordobas 
while the mean consumption change for households with a reported time of zero days 
homeless is surprisingly -168. Also, several observations for time homeless seem quite 
high, however days homeless refers to time displaced from the primary residence and 
should not literally be interpreted as a household sleeping without shelter.
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Figure 3.4: Consumption Change and Days Homeless
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Table 3.2 summarizes mean consumption change for the final two shocks. In the case of 
wall damage and damage to the household water supply we can observe that affected 
households experienced an increase in consumption while unaffected households 
underwent a modest drop.
Table 3.2: Mean Consumption Change (in Cordobas)
Shock
Mean
Consumption 
Change (W hole 
Sample)
Mean
Consumption 
Change (Affected)
Mean
Consumption
Change
(Unaffected)
Wall Damage 58 251 -14
Water Supply Damage 58 450 -45
or Categorical Shocks
Source: Author’s calculations
In reviewing all five shocks, a general trend emerges which suggests that the impact of 
shocks may be relatively mild and the coefficient may actually be positive in some cases, 
This trend also appears to hold for the binary outcome variables which report an overall 
increase in mean consumption change for the whole sample. This is somewhat 
counterintuitive, as we may be inclined to speculate that a stronger negative relationship 
would hold between shocks and consumption change.
Before implementing statistical analysis, we can consider what explanations be driving 
this result. One possible explanation could be that so far we consider only shocks in
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isolation. For example, a household may have been unaffected by one shock type, but 
experienced another shock which caused a drop in consumption. This is a rather 
unconvincing explanation since the mild relationships appear to hold for all shocks.
A more plausible explanation could be that affected households received more aid than 
unaffected households which facilitated higher consumption growth. When total aid is 
subtracted from each household’s 1999 consumption, the mean consumption change 
drops from 126 cordobas to -803 cordobas. To address this scenario in more detail Table 
3.3 presents descriptive statistics on consumption change for affected and unaffected 
groups with and without total aid received. For continuous variables unaffected 
households are defined as those reporting a loss of zero.
Table 3.3: Impact of Aid on Mean Consumption Change
Shock Affected Households Unaffected Households
Mean
Consumption
Change
Mean
Consumption 
Change with Aid 
Removed
Difference
(Absolute
Terms)
Mean
Consumption
Change
Mean
Consumption 
Change with Aid 
Removed
Difference
(Absolute
Terms)
Lost Harvest 46 -915 961 781 110 671
Long-term
Losses
319 -776 1095 63 -812 875
Days
Homeless
691 -234 925 -168 -789 621
Wall Damage 251 -955 1206 -15 -528 513
Water Supply 
Damage
450 -572 1022 -45 -661 616
Source: Author’s calculations
With aid removed the swing from mean consumption change with aid to mean 
consumption change without aid is always greater for affected households. For example, 
mean consumption change falls for both affected and unaffected groups in the case of 
harvest loss. But, the drop is much larger (961) in absolute terms for the affected 
households than for the unaffected (671). This result is consistent for all shock types and 
suggests that mean consumption growth for affected households was heavily buoyed by 
aid.
Despite the difference highlighted in Table 3.3 it is interesting to note that even with aid 
factored out slightly more than half of the households vulnerable to harvest losses (116 of 
321) had positive consumption growth. Table 3.4 summarizes consumption change 
statistics for those households with harvest losses.
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Table 3.4: Harvest Loss Diagnostics
Mean Harvest Loss (in cordobas) 3,865
Households with Consumption Increase (Aid 
Included)
168
Mean Consumption Change (Aid Included) 125
Households with Consumption Increase (Aid 
Excluded)
116
Mean Consumption Change (Aid Excluded) -803
N = 328
Source: Author’s calculations
The diagnostics presented in this section suggest that the impact of aid on consumption 
may be pronounced, however we have also provided evidence to suggest that, in the case 
of harvest losses, more households had positive consumption growth than negative even 
with aid removed. In order provide more concrete conclusions we model the relationship 
between shocks and consumption.
III. B. Theoretical Background
In theory we would expect hurricane damages to affect household consumption to the 
extent that income is disrupted. When income is disrupted, insurance and coping 
mechanisms should be utilized to smooth consumption. The theory of lull insurance 
offers a useful starting point to assess household response to idiosyncratic risk. The 
theory states that when risk is fully pooled, household consumption depends only upon 
average village consumption. In other words, since households are perfectly insured, an 
income shock to a single household should not affect its consumption. This is because its 
consumption is effectively pooled with all other village households. The exact equation 
may vary across studies, but the basic idea is:
( 1 )  Cjvt — Bo “t” B iC v t +  B 2 Y iv t 6ivt>
where Cjvt = consumption in house i, in village v, in time t; c = average consumption in 
village v in time t; Y = income of household i; and e = error term to allow for 
idiosyncratic shocks (Alderman and Paxson, 1994). If there is full insurance, Bj will 
equal 1 and B2 will equal 0. Although we know Bi will likely never equal 1, we use this 
as a benchmark with which to compare the actual level of risk pooling.
This approach has been widely used, perhaps most notably by Townsend in his study of 
risk pooling in India (1994). Townsend found evidence to suggest that the hill insurance 
hypothesis holds up reasonably well and that household income exerted a minimal 
influence on household consumption. Townsend specified the change in the difference 
between household consumption growth and mean consumption growth on the left-hand 
side. The change in income and the error term are on the right-hand side.
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Townsend starts from the premise that the utility function of individual (k) in time (t) can 
be expressed by components of consumption (c), leisure (1) and their age and sex (A). He 
assumes that the utility function is separable. This is evident with c and 1 separated in 
equation 1 below. He then assumes that each household is equally risk averse and that 
the utility function expressed indicates that total household consumption is arranged so 
that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across individual household members.
( 1) Wk[c! , l*,A)\  = Vk{c*,Ak, )  + Vk(ll; , A kl )
Given the supposition that total consumption is shared and allocated to equalize marginal 
utility o f consumption Townsend addresses Pareto-optimal allocation o f consumption 
under conditions of shocks and random weather-related variables. The expected utility of 
an individual over a fixed time period (a lifespan for example) can be shown as the 
summation of probability of an event and the associated consumption and leisure for such 
an event. He assumes that the objective is to maximize the sum of utilities according to 
combinations of consumption and leisure as well as resource constraints. The sum of the 
expenditures on consumption and leisure in the village economy must equal full income. 
The next step is to consider the consumption of a given household j. Solving for 
consumption in household j maps to the reduced form equation shown below which is 
used to test for full insurance (Townsend 1994, pp. 553 -  561). In the reduced form 
equation consumption (c) of household j in time t is determined by the average village 
consumption per adult equivalent (cbar), the demographic term and an X is used to 
represent any other variable(s) of interest related to income. Under full insurance 6 will 
approach one and ? will approach zero.
c f J = a 1 + p  'c, + 8JA{ + &Xj + uj
However, Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) question this approach.14 They revisit the 
specification used by Mace (1991) and Deaton (1990, 1992) and in which the dependent 
variable is only the change in consumption for household / in time t. A dummy variable, 
D, is introduced on the right-hand side, which is set equal to 1 if the household is located 
in the village of interest. The introduction of the village fixed effect allows for the 
separation o f aggregate village risk from idiosyncratic household risk. Ravallion and 
Chaudhuri demonstrate that excluding the village dummy from the model will cause the 
income coefficient to be biased downwards if there is a common element to income 
changes across households. The specification used by Deaton (1990, 1992) and 
Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) is:
(2) ? Cit = ? k akDkit + B? Yi, + ? U i „ 15
14 Townsend’s paper has generated subsequent analysis using the ICRISAT data. For example, Morduch 
(2002) has also analyzed the ICRISAT data and found that households can reduce total income risk by as 
much as 90%, but risk-sharing remains imperfect and functions with limited effectiveness as a substitute 
for formal credit markets.
15 The supporting work for this reduced form equation is detailed in Mace 1991.
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where ? C is the change in consumption of household i in year t, Dkit is a dummy as 
described above and Y is the change in income for household i in year t, and u is the error 
term. After retesting the village India data Ravallion and Chaudhuri find that this results 
in an increase in the income coefficient which is less indicative of risk pooling.
The authors are also concerned that Townsend’s specification fails to account for 
measurement error which will bias the conclusion towards full insurance. Their 
discussion focuses on the method for estimating consumption since the ICRISAT data set 
does not measure consumption directly. Since the LSMS measures consumption directly 
we move on to address three concerns raised by Cochrane (1991).
Cochrane carries out tests for full insurance against specific household shocks in the U.S. 
As before the dependent variable is the change in household consumption. However, he 
makes three observations. First among these is exclusion of income on the right-hand 
side. He excludes income on three grounds: (i) most income is labor income, which will 
likely be related to preference shifts; (ii) reported income also includes consumption 
insurance related payments; and (iii) the high correlation between income and 
consumption measurement error. Economic theory tells us that when full insurance 
prevails consumption growth should be cross-sectionally independent of exogenous 
shocks caused by Mitch (Cochrane 1991). This foundation, along with the exclusion of 
income, yields the model in equation 3 below.
(3) log(cit+] / cj t) = a + ftSjjt+i + eV i;
Including the shock variable (S) as the only explanatory variable is based upon the 
proposition that with full consumption insurance, consumption growth should be cross- 
sectionally independent of idiosyncratic variables. In other words, if household 
consumption is independent of household shocks the shock coefficient should be zero.
The second observation is the impact of demographic changes on the estimates. Including 
households with composition changes could introduce bias by virtue of their shifted 
utility function (Cochrane 1991). In the case o f Hurricane Mitch, a household decision to 
adjust composition is a plausible response to hurricane damages. Households that add or 
drop members may likely exhibit altered total household consumption. The change in 
household composition may impact household preferences, which could translate into 
changes in income and consumption levels. This may be particularly acute for 
households which add or lose multiple members. Failure to account for this possibility 
could potentially bias estimates of consumption growth due to correlation between 
explanatory variables and the possible preference shifts will introduce bias in measuring 
the change in consumption. However, if shocks are not correlated with the preference 
shifts, the inclusion of those households is not only acceptable, but beneficial due to the 
increased sample size. The role of changing household size as a coping mechanism is the 
focus of Chapter 4.
The third observation Cochrane makes concerns the nature o f analysis using cross- 
sectional versus panel data. He cautions that when using panel data the right-hand 
variables must be uncorrelated with variations in preference shocks and measurement
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error. Variables such as individual income generally do not satisfy these criteria. One 
remedy is to include aggregate consumption growth on the right-hand side, but this may 
be inadequate for similar reasons. Although taking aggregate consumption reduces the 
impact of household preferences on individual household’s consumption, this does not 
eliminate the possibility that homogenous preference shifts will impact aggregate 
consumption. By definition the individual household’s consumption would also be 
affected by a preference shift.
III. C. Specification
Given these antecedents we can construct an appropriate model specification.
Deaton (1990, 1997) also uses panel data and his approach offers a useful starting point. 
However, since our aim is to test household insurance against specific shocks instead of 
general levels of insurance some modifications are required. The inclusion o f income is 
problematic for the reasons given above. In addition, many households received aid 
payments which could be used for consumption but may not be recorded as income. We 
retain the village fixed effect since it allows a distinction between aggregate and 
idiosyncratic risk components. This gives the model in equation 4 below:
(4 )?C it = ? kakDki, + 6Xit + ui„
where ? C is the change in household consumption, D is the village dummy fixed effect, 
and X is the impact of a given shock on household i. This approach tests for the impact 
o f a given shock on household consumption while controlling for village level effects.
We are first concerned with whether the shock is significant for consumption. If this is 
the case we turn our attention to the coefficient. A shock coefficient that is significant for 
consumption, but not significantly different from zero would support the notion that 
household consumption is unaffected by Mitch shocks. In contrast a shock that is 
significant for consumption, but closer to 1 is indicative of a strong relationship between 
consumption and the shock. In order to separate idiosyncratic household risk from 
aggregate village risk a village fixed effect was used.
As a final concern, we address the issue changes in household composition. O f the 528 
households, 262 had no change in composition. The remaining 266 had a change in 
composition with a median loss of one member. Table 3.5 provides descriptive statistics 
on mean consumption change by household composition change.
Table 3.5: Percentage Change in Household Consumption 1998 - 1999
No Change in 
Household 
Composition 
(n = 262)
Change in Household
Composition
(n = 266)
Sample 
(n = 528)
Mean
consumption 
growth (%)
19.72 22.63 21.19
Standard deviation .7511 .8424 .7978
Source: Author’s calculations
46
The difference of nearly 3 percent indicates houses with modified composition having a 
higher mean consumption growth. Regressions were run on both the full sample to 
benefit from the reduced standard error and on the static group to allow for the impact of 
preference shifts on consumption.
III. D. Results
Discussion o f regression results in this section is consistent with the model outlined 
earlier which incorporates village fixed effects. Regression results without fixed effects 
are also provided in the bottom half o f all tables for completeness and comparative 
purposes. The model results without fixed effects do not capture the difference between 
aggregate village risk and idiosyncratic household risk (see discussion above). Also the 
aim of the regressions is to test hypotheses of risk sharing and shock impacts (emphasis 
on t-stat and significance levels) and not to “explain” changes in consumption. For this 
reason the discussion of the results does not focus overly on the R2 values. Nevertheless 
it is worth noting that the fixed effects models all yield much higher R2 values than when 
the fixed effects are excluded.
III. D. 1. Harvest Losses
We first consider the relationship between harvest losses and consumption since harvest 
losses represent the largest nominal losses attributable to Mitch. Table 3.6 presents the 
regression results. The results suggest several interesting conclusions. The first is that 
over the entire sample harvest losses are not significant for consumption at any loss 
threshold. However, harvest losses are significant for static households for all loss 
thresholds above 1,000 cordobas. In other words, loss size matters. Losses become 
significant above a threshold of 1,000 cordobas at 10% and at 5% above 2,000. 
Significance levels then fall back to 10% when the loss threshold increases to 3,000 
cordobas. At higher thresholds results are not significant and the sample size becomes 
prohibitively small to draw meaningful conclusions.
We also note the difference between households which change composition and those 
that do not. Harvest losses are never significant for households that change composition. 
This may be indicative of composition changes as a possible coping mechanism. If this 
were the case we could expect harvest losses to be a significant determinant of the 
decision to adjust household composition. We will address this possibility in the next 
section.
The results in Table 3.6 also show low harvest loss coefficients all less than 0.05. At face 
value this would indicate that households are highly effective at pooling risk and that 
consumption is independent o f harvest losses. While it is reasonable to expect that 
households can overcome small scale losses using a range o f informal mechanisms, the 
contention that they were able to almost perfectly insure against widespread crop 
damages caused by one of the most destructive hurricanes in recent memory is more 
difficult to support. In order to support a risk pooling conclusion we must be able to rule 
out econometric reasons which could falsely indicate high levels or risk pooling.
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As discussed earlier in this section there are several factors which could bias the shock 
coefficient towards zero and give a false indication of risk pooling. Among these is the 
co-movement of consumption. Any factor that causes consumption to co-move across 
households will generate a false impression of risk pooling. Such factors could include 
shifts in the price level, changes in factor endowments, technology or other events that 
impact all households across the risk pooling network. The impact of natural disasters 
and of Mitch in particular certainly fits this criterion. Given the widespread impact of 
Mitch not only across Nicaragua, but Honduras as well the co-movement in household 
consumption is not surprising and can account for the low value of the shock coefficient. 
It is entirely plausible that the widespread damages of Mitch were significant for 
consumption and  caused consumption to co-move among the surveyed households. This 
is a more convincing explanation which does not rely on the ability of hyper-efficient 
Nicaraguan households to approximate perfect risk pooling.
Table 3.7 presents the regression results with the exclusion of the two outliers 
(households with losses equal to 60,000 cordobas). As we discussed in the Data 
Diagnostics section there are two high loss households (losses of 60,000 cordobas). To 
illustrate the impact of these outliers on the overall results we rerun the regression with 
these households excluded. When compared to the results in Table 3.6, we can observe 
three effects of the outliers. The first is to depress the significance of harvest losses 
across the whole sample for households with losses above 1,000 cordobas. Regression 
results in Table 3.6 were never significant for the whole sample at any loss threshold. 
Removing the outliers shows that harvest losses are significant for consumption for all 
households at 1% or 5% depending upon the loss threshold. A second difference is that 
harvest losses are no longer significant for consumption for the static grouping. This 
grouping was the only one in Table 3.6 to show statistical significance. Finally, at the
1,000 and 2,000 loss thresholds harvest losses are now significant for consumption for 
those households with a change in composition. Previously results were not significant 
for households with a change in composition. The results in Table 3.7 are not intended to 
replace those in Table 7 nor somehow imply that the results in Table 3.7 are 
unrepresentative, but rather illustrate the impact of these two large losses on the overall 
results and provide some information on what the results would have been in their 
absence.
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression of Consumption Change on Harvest Losses with Village Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Household Per Capita Consumption Change 1998 -  1999 (in cordobas)
Harvest Loss 
Size (in 
cordobas)
< 0 < -1 ,000 < -2,000 < -3,000
Harvest Losses -0.02
(0.035)
-0.016
(0.049)
-0.028
(0.037)
-0.04*
(0.021)
-0.011
(0.048)
-0.026
(0.038)
-0.043**
(0.021)
-0.006
(0.052)
-0.027
(0.032)
-0.044*
(0.025)
-0.01
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.03)
Constant 138.75
(274.82)
-27.13
(284.5)
16.99
(201.96)
105.78
(155.36)
190.84
(400.73)
136.95
(250.76)
114.25
(194.61)
593.24
(519.01)
337.26
(290.62)
141.96
(291.88)
229.15
(762.11)
162.6
(414.8)
Household
Composition
Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
Fixed Effects 
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-
Harvest Losses -0.01
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.03)
3.34**
(1.32)
-0.69
(0.79)
1.36*
(0.8)
0.77
(0.56)
0.34
(0.40)
0.55
(0.34)
0.13
(0.31)
-0.49
(0.41)
-0.18
(0.26)
Constant 223.88
(348.86)
-134.49
(283.91)
46.56
(224.64)
1502.3*
(759.99)
-622.22
(428.13)
422.21
(448.21)
677.25
(573.17)
-240.67
(428.92)
223.68
(359.36)
276.3
(613.58)
-740.3*
(430.05)
-215.14
(384.21)
Household
Composition
Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
Fixed Effects 
Included
No No No No No No No No No No No No
R- 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01
N = 161 160 321 62 57 119 91 83 174 115 105 220
Robust standard error in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
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Table 3.7: OLS Regression of Consumption Change on Harvest Losses with Village Fixed Effects (Outliers Removed)
Dependent Variable: Household Per Capita Consumption Change 1998 -  1999 (in cordobas)_____________ _________
Harvest 
Loss Size 
(cordobas)
< 0 < -1,000 < -2,000 < -3,000
Harvest
Losses
-0.02
(0.035)
-0.016
(0.049)
-0.03
(0.04)
-0.05
(0.04)
-0.095*
(0.053)
-0.10***
(0.036)
-0.064
(0.044)
-0.10*
(0.059)
_  jo*** 
(0.038)
-0.08
(0.06)
-0.096
(0.076)
-.10**
(0.047)
Constant 138.75
(274.82)
-27.13
(284.5)
16.99
(201.96)
70.37
(212.53)
-240.82
(401.3)
-242.43
(231.1)
24.64
(293.25)
-12.91
(530.59)
-101.62
(299.98)
-64.08
(535.05)
-497.89
(810.74)
-406.21
(465.24)
Household
Composition
Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
Fixed
Effects
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes • Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R- 0.40 0.40 0.32 0.89 0.51 0.49 0.93 0.52 0.69 0.95 0.64 0.78
N = 160 159 319 106 110 216 87 75 162 59 62 121
Harvest
Losses
-0.01
(0.04)
-0.1**
(0.04)
-0.07**
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.04)
-0.1**
(0.04)
-0.07***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.05)
-0.11**
(0.05)
-0.07*
(0.04)
0.01
(0.08)
-0.07
(0.06)
-0.05
(0.05)
Constant 169.45
(359.62)
-335.61
(282.22)
-108.28
(227.87)
52.31
(433.69)
-229.97
(429.05)
-126.2
(307.02)
464.05
(717.17)
-387.67
(587.68)
-67.45
(453.98)
513.52
(1058.88)
182.01
(831.16)
251.5
(654.47)
Household
Composition
Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
Fixed
Effects
Included
No No No No No No No No No No No No
R- 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
N = 160 159 319 106 110 216 87 75 162 59 62 121
Robust standard error in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
50
III. D. 2. Long-term Losses
Results for long-term losses are presented below in Table 3.8. Long-term losses are 
measured in cordobas and exhibit similar results to harvest losses. Among the static 
households long-term losses are significant at 5%, but not significant for any other 
groupings. We do not present the results by loss threshold because the sample size 
becomes prohibitively small. As with harvest losses the coefficient suggests an 
extremely high level of risk pooling, which is again likely to be more attributable to the 
covariate scope of the hurricane damage rather than a highly attuned level of risk pooling.
Table 3.8: OLS Regression of Consumption Change on Long-term Losses with
Village Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: Household Consumption Change Per Capita 1998 -  1999 
________________________________ (in cordobas)________________________________
Househo d Composition Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both
Long-term Losses -0.11** 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.02
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 125 101.99 155.39 168.9 99.89 160.07
(271.99) (225.1) (174.58) (322.62) (243.9) (196.47)
Fixed Effects 
Included
Yes Yes Yes No No No
R2 0.40 0.38 0.30 0.01 0.01 0.01
N = 160 161 321 160 161 321
Robust standard error in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
III. D. 3. Days Homeless, Water Supply Damage and Household Damage
Regression results for days homeless and qualitative shocks are presented in Table 3.9. 
Days homeless is measured as a continuous variable. Home damage and water damage 
are dummy variables. Overall, these shocks appear relatively benign towards 
consumption. Days homeless and damage to the household water supply are both 
significant at 10% for the whole sample. However, none of the shocks are significant for 
consumption for either sub-sample. For all three shocks the coefficients are larger than 
one, which is attributable to the coarseness of the variable measurement units.
In contrast to harvest losses and long-term losses, which are relatively precise 
quantitative indicators of hurricane damage, days homeless and the qualitative variables 
in particular offer comparatively lower resolution. Wall damage and damage to the water 
supply are qualitative in nature. They allow for breadth in the degree of damage. One 
household may be only mildly damaged while another may be uninhabitable. Yet both 
would register as damaged. Days homeless, while a quantitative indicator does not 
quantify the relative impact (fiscal or otherwise) on a household. Unfortunately, these 
variables are the best the LSMS has to offer on non-agricultural Mitch damages.
The relative lack of statistical significance for these shocks is not to imply that the 
ensuing damage is completely benign. For example, damage to water infrastructure 
could easily have tangible effects that do not show up in short term consumption such as 
increased labor to acquire clean water or negative health effects due to prolonged 
exposure to impure drinking water. Additional labor to retrieve water reduces labor 
hours available for domestic tasks or external employment. Illness and disease not only 
reduce income-earning ability, but may require the allocation o f household income to 
purchase medical care. Nevertheless, tftBse are long-term impacts and the focus here is 
on short-term risk pooling.
III. E. Review
The principal goal of this section was to test the relationship between shocks and 
consumption in order to evaluate the effectiveness of risk-pooling against Mitch-related 
shocks. We first plotted survey data and reviewed theoretical foundations in order to 
develop a model to test the impact of shocks on consumption. Results showed that 
harvest losses and long-term losses represented the most significant disruption to 
consumption, while days homeless, wall damage and water supply damage tended to be 
not significant, or significant only at 10%.
Results also showed that harvest losses and long-term losses demonstrated a significant 
impact on consumption, but only for households that did not change size. The tendency 
of the shock coefficient to approach zero is surprising as this would imply highly perfect 
levels of risk pooling. However, this is unlikely and such a conclusion was rejected 
based upon alternate theoretical explanations which could induce co-movement in 
consumption and be mistaken for risk pooling.
As a word of caution we acknowledge the possibility that results have been biased by 
households that left the survey group. An argument could be made that poor households 
left the survey area since their assets were destroyed, which would bias the results 
upwards. An equally compelling argument could be made that the wealthy possessed the 
resources to leave and the results are biased downwards. However, neither scenario 
meshes well with the disaster anthropology literature, which has traditionally found 
survivors reluctant to leave their home in the post-disaster period (Doughty 1999).
Analysis in this section also yielded interesting results concerning the possibility of aid- 
financed consumption mitigating the impact of shocks. When aid-financed consumption 
was excluded we found that the impact of shocks on static households appears to have 
been greater. Static households also have a smaller shock coefficient than their 
counterparts. These results call for an analysis o f the determinants of aid and an 
examination of the possibility that either household reformation may have been a coping 
strategy or aid was targeted towards households that changed composition. These 
questions are examined in the next section.
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Table 3.9: OLS Regression of Household Consumption on Shocks with Village Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Household Consumption Change Per Capita 1998 -  1999 (in cordobas)
Shock
Days Homeless Home Damage Water Supply Damage
Shock Coefficient 9.241
(10.238)
24.35
(15.72)
14.855*
(8.569)
92.01
(428.741)
-231.04
(614.57)
182.995
(318.219)
-177.561
(472.195)
1094.44
(752.62)
675.855*
(389.962)
Constant 321.117
(249.931)
-312.6
(295.23)
17.763
(184.464)
304.132
(305.082)
-175.64
(320.96)
8.243
(221.202)
369.821
(288.129)
-445.14
(338.5)
-82.138
(222.608)
Fixed Effects 
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R- 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.17 0.13
Shock Coefficient 8.83
(10.61)
23.21
(13.72)
14.29
(9.18)
257.17
(420.91)
200.47
(496.17)
264.29
(321.13)
-196.75
(418.6)
1248.94**
(588.02)
494.15
(352.8)
Constant 323.16
(260.13)
-307.38*
(286.78)
20.45
(193.1)
255.81
(340.29)
-281.52
(344.75)
-13.68
(242.13)
374.01
(312.13)
-475.18
(316.38)
-44.57
(222.85)
Fixed Effects 
Included
No No No No No No No No No
R~ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Household 
Composition Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
N = 227 218 445 227 218 445 227 218 445
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IV. Relationship between Aid and Shocks
Attention to the relationship between shocks and transfers is of interest for at least two 
reasons. In the first instance, the resiliency of consumption to hurricane shocks may be 
strengthened by aid-financed consumption. Focusing on the relationship between aid and 
shocks allows us to analyze the counterfactual of the potential shock impact on 
consumption without aid. Secondly, identifying significant determinants of transfers 
allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of transfer targeting. In theory if transfers are well 
targeted based on shocks (as opposed to other objectives), we would expect that the 
shocks that are significant for consumption should also be significant determinants of aid. 
In practice such a relationship may not hold for a variety of reasons. For example, the 
effectiveness of official aid transfers may be limited due to monitoring costs, imperfect 
information and transaction costs which reduce the donor’s ability to effectively target 
transfers. These factors may be less limiting for family (inter-household) donors since 
they would presumably benefit from more complete information and a more detailed 
knowledge of the recipient’s needs. However, family transfers may also be affected by 
existing network arrangements and the strength of an affected household’s ties to 
potential donor households. Finally, it is possible that aid flows were not allocated based 
upon Mitch damages, but upon some other criteria such as poverty level.
IV. A. Background
After Mitch, affected households received large amounts of official aid from a variety of 
sources including the Nicaraguan government, foreign governments, religious 
organizations and NGOs. A program by the Red Cross donated cash and farm equipment 
to agricultural households in Nicaragua and Guatemala. The agricultural components 
included seed, fertilizer, grain and spray pumps. The cash (US$ 30) was given to the 
wife or adult female and was intended to be used to buy other agricultural necessities or 
food. The agricultural equipment was given to the males. These disbursements were 
made to approximately 17,000 households in both countries (Peppiatt et al. 2001). 
Unfortunately there is no way of identifying overlap between Red Cross recipient 
households and LSMS households. We must assume these donations (and others) are 
captured in the LSMS questions on official aid received. In addition to official aid 
donations, households also received unofficial aid in the form of remittances from abroad 
and inter-household transfers from friends and relatives living in Nicaragua. Table 3.10 
provides descriptive statistics on the type of mean aid received.
Table 3.10: Household Mean Aid Received by Type (in cordobas)
Official: 611
Food 202
Home 194
Clothing 87
Other 128
Unofficial 143
Total 754
Source: Author’s calculations
51
As far as the distribution of aid is concerned, the disaster literature indicates that aid may 
be distributed around a number of parameters. These may include disaster damages, 
poverty level, or some combination of both. In their study on post-Mitch aid in 
Honduras, Morris and Wodon (2002) model a two-stage allocation process in which 
donors first decide whether or not to administer household aid and then decide how much 
to allocate per household. In the allocation process (first stage), aid may be targeted 
according to different relief objectives. The authors found the probability o f receiving 
aid was positively correlated to asset losses and negatively correlated to wealth, however 
when controlling for home damage both relationships disappeared. Disaster 
anthropologists have also noted the relative disadvantage of women in receiving post­
disaster aid (Blaikie 1994, Shaw 1992). In disaster stricken communities women may be 
unfavorably positioned due to existing gender relations, networks or resources constraints 
which limit their ability to obtain equivalent aid of their male counterparts. We briefly 
consider these issues before moving to a discussion of the regression framework.
Table 3.11 provides a summary of official aid transfers by poverty level. The LSMS 
groups households into one of three categories: extremely poor, poor and not poor. These 
groupings are defined by the household’s 30 day per capita expenditures.16 The data 
presents a picture of official aid as sensitive to poverty level. Family transfers were 
inversely related to poverty level. Households classified as “extremely poor” received 
nearly 70% more official aid than non-poor households and poor households received 
20% more than non-poor households. In the case of remittances and family transfers, the 
inverse relationship between poverty level and aid received does not hold. Extremely 
poor and poor households received only 42 and 82 percent, respectively of inter- 
household transfers received by non-poor households. One explanation for the low level 
o f transfers received by poor households may simply be that they are more likely to have 
less extensive networks or networks comprised of poor relatives who are less able to 
make transfers (De Weerdt 2006).
Table 3.11: Mean Aid by Poverty Level (in cordobas
Group Mean
Official
Aid
Mean
Family
Transfers
Mean
Total
Aid
Extremely
Poor
833 75 909
Poor 588 148 736
Not Poor 495 180 674
Source: Author’s calculations
16 The extreme poverty line is a mean per capita 30 day expenditure amount o f 101.32 cordoobas. 
Households below this line are classified as extremely poor. The poor poverty line is 214.47 cordobas. 
Households below this line, but above the extremely poor line are classified as poor and those households 
above the line are classified at not poor.
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From the data in Table 3.11 it appears at first glance that official donors may have used 
poverty level as a guide in distributing aid since poorer groups are recipients of higher aid 
amounts. We will subsequently explore whether this relationship holds when considering 
hurricane damages. If official aid was tied to poverty rather than hurricane damages we 
would expect a household’s poverty level to be a significant determinant of official aid. 
Table 3.11 also suggests that the family transfers decline as the poverty level decreases 
(discussed further in this section).
Based upon the Morris and Wodon findings it is also prudent to review the distribution of 
aid for households with home damage. Table 3.12 presents mean aid amounts for those 
households with and without wall damage. Whereas family transfers slightly favored 
households with no reported wall damage, official aid favored damaged households by 
nearly a three to one margin.
Table 3.12: Mean Aid by Home Damage (in cordo
Group Mean
Official
Aid
Mean
Family
Transfers
Mean
Total
Aid
Walls
Undamaged
340 175 514
Walls
Damaged
1095 110 1205
bas)
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 3.13 provides data on aid by gender o f the household head. In the survey group 
approximately 25% of the households had female heads in 1998.17 Mean aid for female 
and male headed households is equal, but this total conceals asymmetries between 
official and family transfers. Female headed households received only 71 % of the 
official aid received by male headed households, but received nearly three times as much 
in family transfers.
Table 3.13: Mean Aid by Gender of Household Head (in cordobas)
Gender of 
Household 
Head
Mean
Official
Aid
Mean
Family
Transfers
Mean
Total
Aid
Male 648 106 753
Female 459 295 754
Source: Author’s calculations
Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest that poorer, male headed households with wall 
damage tended to be greater recipients of official aid while the reverse is true for receipts
17 Data is unavailable on the gender o f the household head in 1999, but drawing the head o f household data 
from the pre-hurricane survey has the advantage o f  avoiding endogeneity problems, which may lead 
households to form in response to benefits (Edmonds et al. 2005, Duflo 2003).
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of family transfers. However, from this data it is unclear if  these characteristics are 
statistically significant determinants of transfers.
IV. B. Role of Aid in Sustaining Consumption
Before proceeding to an analysis of aid distribution, it is important to note that the 
consumption figures do not exclude transfer financed consumption. As the data in Table
3.1 demonstrates, official transfer payments alone averaged over 700 cordobas per 
household. This amount could account for a substantial component of consumption 
growth and also give a potentially misleading level of risk pooling, which may more 
appropriately be attributed to one-off post-Mitch aid transfers.
In order to consider the counterfactual, the impact of shocks on consumption without aid- 
financed consumption, we repeat the regressions from the previous section with aid 
excluded from consumption. Table 3.17 summarizes the impact of removing aid on the 
regression results. The regression results are listed in detail in Tables 3 .14-3 .16 . Table 
3.14 presents regression results for harvest losses using consumption change less total aid 
as the dependent variable. Once aid is removed harvest losses are still significant for 
consumption with some minor changes. As in the previous section harvest losses are not 
significant if we do not differentiate by loss size. Once we begin to introduce loss 
thresholds losses become significant for static households at thresholds of 1,000 cordobas 
and 2,000 cordobas at 5% and above 3,000 cordobas at 10%. The increase in significance 
from 10% to 5% for static households suggests were more reliant on aid to finance 
consumption vis-a-vis harvest losses. The removal of aid does not lead any households 
with altered composition to become significant.
Table 3.15 presents the regression results for the impact of long-term losses on 
consumption with total aid excluded from consumption. Results showed that long-term 
losses were significant at 5% for static households. When aid is removed from the 
consumption total long-term losses are no longer significant (they fall just outside the 
10% threshold). This is somewhat counterintuitive as we would expect that the removal 
o f aid-financed consumption should make damages more significant for consumption -  
not less.
Table 3.16 presents results for the remaining three shocks with aid removed from 
consumption. These results can be contrasted against those in Table 3.9 which included 
aid-financed consumption in Table 3.16. The days homeless coefficients are negative for 
the static and full samples although the coefficient is relatively unchanged for the change 
sample. All coefficients for wall damage are negative and smaller which suggests a large 
role for aid-financed consumption in mitigating the impact of wall damage. In the case of 
damage to the water supply the coefficient remains negative and becomes much smaller 
for the static sample. The coefficient remains relatively similar for the change sample 
and remains positive for the full sample, but is much smaller.
The hypothetical impact o f the removal of aid on sustaining consumption for affected 
households is summarized in Table 3.17. Overall, the results of our exercise suggest
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shocks which increased in significance had their impact most strongly mitigated by post­
disaster aid flows. In the absence of aid these shocks would have exerted a stronger 
impact on household consumption after Mitch. One such example is the case of 
households with a loss threshold of 1,000 cordobas. When aid is removed from 
consumption, significance increases from 10% to 5%. By contrast it would appear that 
other shocks were minimally reliant on aid to buttress consumption. Table 3.17 also 
suggests that the impact of aid-financed consumption does not move systematically 
across all shock types. Indeed, only for agricultural losses at the 1,000 cordoba threshold 
do we see an increase. In other cases the statistical significance was either unchanged or 
decreased when removing aid-financed consumption. This exercise suggests that poor 
agricultural households were most benefited by aid transfers.
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Table 3.14: OLS Regression of Consumption Change Less Total Aid on Harvest Losses with Village Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Household Consumption Change Per Capita 1998 -  1999 (in cordobas)_____________ _____
Harvest 
Loss Size 
(cordobas)
< 0 < -1,000 < -2,000 < -3,000
Harvest
Losses
-0.036
(0.04)
-0.019
(0.047)
-0.03
(0.035)
-0.06**
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.049)
-0.02
(0.036)
-0.072**
(0.033)
0.002
(0.051)
-0.018
(0.031)
-0.058*
(0.033)
0.001
(0.06)
-0.018
(0.033)
Constant -971.58***
(400.63)
-841.11***
(298.3)
-917.66***
(246.81)
-1097.23***
(194.23)
-533.68
(399.89)
-733.68***
(280.54)
-1010.04***
(254.66)
-120.2
(513.37)
-443.84
(280.84)
-917.99**
(341.34)
-639.93
(744.29)
-708.66*
(408.72)
Fixed
Effects
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R" 0.24 0.36 0.22 0.64 0.50 0.40 0.88 0.50 0.60 0.91 0.61 0.69
Harvest
Losses
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.03)
0.005
(0.039)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.004
(0.04)
-0.003
(0.03)
0.03
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.008
(0.03)
Constant -953.05**
(437.5)
-841.94***
(310.57)
-897.17
(270.03)
-1026.69**
(508.74)
-439.89
(426.35)
-730.75**
(336.29)
-536.97
(485.56)
-454.68
(564.99)
-489.39
(379.74)
120.28
(764.34)
-659.55
(648.11)
-269.74
(508.03)
Fixed
Effects
Included
No No No No No No No No No No No No
R' 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Hhold
Comp
Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
N = 160 161 321 107 111 218 76 88 164 63 60 123
Robust standard error in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
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Table 3.15: OLS Regression of Consumption Change Less Total Aid on Consumption Change Less Total Aid with Village
Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Household Consumption Change Per Capita 1998 -  1999 (in cordobas)
Household Composition Type
Static Change Both
Long-term Losses -.16 0.02 0.018
(0.1) (0.016) (0.022)
Constant -974.18** -722.12*** -778.61***
(394.44) (242.1) (215.05)
Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes
R“ 0.24 0.37 0.22
Long-term Losses -0.05 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 168.9 99.9 160.07
(322.62) (243.9) (196.47)
Fixed Effects Included No No No
K1 0.01 0.01 0.01
N = 160 161 321
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
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Table 3.16: OLS Regression of Household Consumption Less Total Aid on Shocks with Village Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Household Consumption Change Per Capita 1998 -  1999 in cordobas)
Days Homeless Home Damage Water Supply Damage
Shock Coefficient -40.14
(28.01)
24.71
(16.03)
-19.23
(24.94)
-1159.9
(857.39)
-401.33
(618.11)
-542.04
(498.48)
-1021.2
(988.87)
1178.83
(760.8)
193.02
(607.3)
Constant -281.71
(313.26)
-884.54
(296.25)
-531.41
(217.05)
-169.73
(318.63)
-686.57**
(323.54)
496.87**
(220.25)
-286.12
(308.78)
-1014.26***
(336.33)
-682.94***
(224.33)
Fixed Effects 
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rj 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.11
Shock Coefficient -45.25
(29.6)
20.51
(13.22)
-21.08
(27.64)
-866.59
(723.95)
55.70
(493.97)
-426.73
(459.82)
-953.95
(820.01)
1272.87**
(602.81)
89.27
(528.71)
Constant -256.3
(306.61)
-865.28***
(290.04)
-522.56**
(224.6)
-255.55
(311.44)
-798.71**
(352.15)
-527.96**
(235.09)
-300.81
(306.87)
-1032.54***
(320.88)
-661.49***
(222.23)
Fixed Effects 
Included
No No No No No No No No No
R" 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Household 
Composition Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
N = 227 218 445 227 218 445 227 218 445
61
Table 3.17: Effect of Removing Aid-Financed Consumption on Shock Significance
(When Including Village Fixed Effects)
Shock Effect Im pact
Harvest Losses 
(by Loss 
Threshold):
0 Unchanged Not Significant.
1,000 Changed Increased from 10% to 5% for static households.
2,000 Unchanged Significant at 5% for static households.
3,000 Unchanged Significant at 10% for static households.
Long-Term
Losses
Changed Decreased from significant at 10% to Not Significant.
Days Homeless Changed Decreased from significant at 10% to not significant for full sample. 
Coefficients for all samples switched sign from positive to negative.
Wall Damage Unchanged Shock not significant. Coefficients negative.
Water Supply 
Damage
Changed Significance decreased from 10% for full sample to not significant.
Having reviewed the role o f aid in sustaining consumption we now move to this section’s 
primary objective: to model aid allocation and view the distribution o f aid relative to the 
impact of shocks on consumption,
IV. C. Model
Equation 5 evaluates the relationship between shocks and aid received, while considering 
the role o f gender and poverty level as determinants of aid. The relationship is modeled 
as:
(5) Tj = a + B iSH O C K y +  B2FEM A LEj +  B3EPOORj +  B4POORj + ej;
where T is the transfer received (in cordobas) by household j  after Mitch. On the right 
hand side the SHOCK variable is impact of shock i on household j. The FEMALE 
dummy variable is included to test the hypothesis that female-headed households are 
disadvantaged in receiving aid. If female headed households were significantly 
disadvantaged in receiving aid, we would expect the coefficient on the gender dummy to 
be both negative and significant for aid. Dummy variables are used to capture a 
household’s status as extremely poor (EPOOR), poor (POOR) or non-poor.
The regression in equation 5 is repeated three times to allow for variation in the definition1 ftof the dependent variable: official aid, inter-household aid and total aid. Inter- 
household aid is used as an explanatory variable to test the responsiveness of unofficial 
aid to shocks. LSMS reports family assistance received by households after Mitch,
18 Official aid is the sum o f all types o f aid (housing, clothing, food, etc.). There were insufficient 
observations to run separate regressions using each aid category.
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which includes both domestic inter-household transfers as well as international 
remittances. It is not possible to disaggregate these using the data.19
IV. D. Results
The regression results from equation 3 are presented below in Tables 3 .18-3 .23 . Tables 
3.18, 3.19, and 3.20 focus on harvest losses. The dependent variables in these tables are 
official aid, unofficial (family) aid, and total aid received, respectively. The structure in 
these tables parallels that of the significance tests in the earlier section and facilitates a 
comparison of sensitivity between harvest losses for consumption and harvest losses for 
aid. Results for the remaining shock types are presented in Tables 3 .21-3 .23 .
Table 3.18 presents results for the regression of official aid on harvest losses. In general 
there are strong parallels between these results and those in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. In 
particular, harvest losses are significant in both tables at the same levels across identical 
thresholds and household composition types. This suggests that aid was well targeted. 
Such a finding is encouraging as there are many problems that could potentially diminish 
the efficacy of official aid donations. While problems, such as monitoring costs, 
imperfect information and transaction costs were undoubtedly present, they apparently 
did not present too great an impediment to efficient aid targeting. Moreover, examining 
the results by household composition shows that harvest losses were significant for static 
households only. These results are encouraging since the results for static households are 
unencumbered by the issue of preference shifts associated with composition change.
By contrast harvest losses were not significant determinants of family aid at any loss 
threshold. This is somewhat surprising for the reverse of the logic cited in explaining 
official aid targeting. We would expect family aid to benefit from better information 
about the recipient household than donor aid. However it is unclear if  family aid donors 
had this information and simply chose to use other criteria in distributing aid, or if 
information on losses was not as well transmitted as we would have anticipated. Since 
official aid constitutes the lion’s share of total aid it is unsurprising that harvest losses 
were also a significant determinant o f total aid (significant at 5% at 1,000 and 2,000 
thresholds). The somewhat surprising conclusion from Tables 3 .18 -3 .20  is that official 
aid was sensitive to harvest losses while family transfers were not.
Tables 3 .21-3 .23  explore aid targeting for the remaining four shocks. Days homeless 
and wall damage were significant determinants of official aid at 10%. While days 
homeless was significant only for the static group, wall damage was significant for both 
the static group and full sample. It is somewhat surprising that none o f the shocks was a 
significant determinant of family aid and it is unclear what criterion was used to allocate 
inter-household aid, particularly since the income group and female dummy variables 
were also not significant. Additional tests which modeled the number o f children in 
recipient households also failed to show significance. Finally, as expected the results for
19 In Honduras, Morris and Wodon (2003) found that remittances declined for less than 2% o f the surveyed 
households after Mitch.
63
total aid mirror those for official aid, with days homeless and wall damage again being 
significant at 10%.
Although the income groups and gender of household head are not significant there are 
some observations we can make based on the regression results. Having a female headed 
household was not a significant determinant of any aid type (discussed further in Chapter 
5). However, the regression results provide further support to the descriptive statistics on 
aid to female headed households (Table 3.13). While not statistically significant, the 
coefficient for the female dummy variable is always negative for official aid and always 
positive for family aid. This is a strange dichotomy, but since the coefficients are not 
significant we can not make any stronger claims. We can only point out the observations 
in the gender literature which describes official donors as more generous to male-headed 
households or that male-headed households were more skilled at acquiring official aid. 
The latter is more likely as female-headed households may not be inherently more 
vulnerable to disaster impact than male-headed ones but tend to have a reduced ability to 
recover from disaster impacts (Bradshaw 2004). Based on the regression results, 
however we can not find a statistical basis to support the claim. Neither poverty 
characterization (poor, extremely poor) is a significant determinant of any aid type. In 
addition to a lack of statistical significance there is no systematic distribution of 
coefficients across shock, household type or aid type. This result suggests that aid was 
not distributed based upon an anti-poverty criterion. If this had been the case we would 
have expected the poverty group to be significant, or at the very least for the extremely 
poor coefficient to be consistently larger than the poor coefficient.
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Table 3.18: OLS Regression of Official Aid Received on Harvest Losses (in thousands) with Village Fixed Effects
_________________________ Dependent Variable: Official Aid Received (in cordobas)______________ ___________
Harvest 
Loss Size
< 0 <-1,000 < -2,000 < -3,000
Harvest
Losses
30.06*
(17.03)
15.3
(14.24)
17.94*
(9.77)
26.95**
(11.64)
0.09
(11.42)
8.97
(7.31)
33.31**
(14.25)
-3.6
(13.29)
4.06
(7.01)
23.67
(17.46)
-5.96
(26.43)
-0.13
(9.7)
Female -670.59
(661.7)
-182.33
(199.22)
-364.15
(275.93)
-360.4
(274.39)
-326.45
(305.47)
-908.6
(644.01)
-363.07
(328.6)
-499.07
(461.8)
-399.62*
(235.93)
-546.11
(509.78)
-1029.7
(1044.3)
-632.73
(406.48)
Poor -159.72
(522.21)
-58.8
(290.46)
-215.82
(346.09)
-474.55
(319.4)
2.56
(295.38)
-580.75
(478.18)
-497.66
.(411.32)
7.03
(420.76)
-134.58
(208.03)
-612.53
(656.06)
-51.6
(779.15)
-269.76
(296.27)
EPoor 313.81
(596.12)
-163.3
(289.25)
-214.86
(339.58)
24.02
(276.9)
84.11
(352.56)
-208.45
(319.29)
106.59
(405.51)
35.18
(458.57)
-52.71
(240.61)
-238.6
(613.97)
216.02
(829.8)
-246.15
(355.83)
Constant 1077.8**
(462.33)
775.6***
(235.23)
1035.44
(321.77)
1247.06***
(235.07)
590.81***
(213.15)
1193.01***
(400.87)
1139.96***
(361.97)
566.5
(293.84)
764.15***
(170.12)
1276.09**
(518.6)
644.43
(555.9)
887.44
(250.59)
R- 0.15 0.28 0.11 0.97 0.34 0.34 0.61 0.36 0.38 0.63 0.40 0.38
Fixed
Effects
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Harvest
Losses
28.11
(17.92)
4.27
(10.89)
15.91
(10.67)
32.15
(28.43)
-0.66
(10.59)
16.75
(15.23)
18.05**
(7.16)
-2.30
(10.57)
6.57
(6.68)
19.25*
(11.14)
2.72
(10.6)
9.64
(7.47)
Female -543.89
(367.22)
-194.34
(153.23)
-372.55*
(197.77)
-548.58
(378.15)
-152.89
(190.62)
-393.94*
(225.9)
-404.47*
(208.07)
-225.53
(208.67)
-312.08**
(140.63)
-521.19**
(236.73)
-185.3
(319.16)
-337.97**
(172.12)
Poor -119.2
(668.49)
68.41
(245.01)
-59.89
(362.35)
-1206.04
(1144.30)
170.84
(244.9)
-451.5
(528.92)
-220.95
(328.99)
171.60
(269.39)
10.75
(193.44)
-419.59
(411.54)
243.26
(363.34)
-42.07
(257.05)
EPoor 284.05
(708.12)
26.94
(248.73)
150.04
(394.2)
-781.42
(1146.41)
131.51
(293.88)
-219.42
(510.98)
208.78
(379.87)
97.20
(367.4)
220.64
(237.15)
-189.39
(490.26)
233.4
(513.88)
73.43
(325.26)
Constant 1050.3*
(615.26)
626.16***
(215.01)
867.15**
(354.77)
1858.97
(1319.22)
479.35***
(168.70)
1117.65*
(607.63)
893.08**
(359.44)
466.22**
(192.2)
635.4***
(175.8)
1133.91**
(476.39)
523.83**
(251)
766.26***
(239.12)
Fixed
Effects
Included
No No No No No No No No No No No No
RJ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 _ j 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.02
Hhold
Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
N = 160 161 321 98 104 202 69 78 147 46 55 101
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
61
Table 3.19: OLS Regression of Unofficial (Family) Aid Received on Harvest Losses (in thousands) with Village Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Unofficial (Family) Aid Received (in cordobas) _______________________________ _______________
Harvest 
Loss Size
< 0 < -1,000 < -2,000 < -3,000
Harvest
Losses
-13.35
(11.75)
-12
(13.58)
-16.87
(11.97)
1.82
(2.31)
-3.55
(6.31)
-12.41
(11.23)
2.1
(2.68)
-3.55
(6.31)
-12.22
(11.05)
-3.96
(11.10)
-4.92
(13.84)
-8.36
(9.73)
Female 763.95
(570.9)
248.67
(291.36)
456.23
(308.34)
4.89
(44.19)
434.4
(395.28)
214.53
(244.63)
7.22
(46.62)
434.4
(395.28)
261.79
(324.35)
362.28
(246.13)
1825.59
(1394.26)
702.49
(652.63)
Poor 390.47
(344.29)
-83.51
(142.9)
211.37
(190.49)
-7.67
(15.24)
-68.36
(162.84)
36.41
(76.74)
-7.1
(17.57)
-68.36
(162.84)
56.03
(98.92)
-18.51
(214.33)
78.39
(216.8)
12.8
(150.86)
EPoor 198.96
(185.98)
-151.26
(196.66)
91.83
(124.83)
12.88
(21.29)
-397.42
(349.5)
-50.88
(107.53)
27.29
(36.29)
-397.42
(349.5)
-80.01
(180.44)
345.3
(266.48)
-1063.55
(897.58)
-267.8
(329.9)
Constant -208.41
(236.21)
174.22
(153.1)
-79.22
(139.29)
192.5
(40.36)
221.69
(139.29)
84.59
(83.71)
249 1*** 
(60.18)
221.69
(139.29)
107.72
(96.91)
298.91
(201.14)
294.89
(247.3)
197.43
(153.56)
Fixed
Effects
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R- 0.33 0.35 0.23 0.96 0.51 0.67 0.96 0.64 0.72 0.66 0.71 0.78
Harvest
Losses
-2.49
(3.29)
-16.37
(19.89)
-11.77
(11.69)
1.99
(3.99)
-21.32
(21.94)
-11.81
(12.23)
3.08
(4.98)
-19.69
(21.57)
-10.17
(12.64)
-11.99
(18.29)
3.93
(6.79)
-6.38
(12.58)
Female 623.74
(570.15)
264.56
(318.78)
427.91
(309.16)
754.49
(744.99)
510.73
(507.69)
644.74
(460.04)
853.38
(864.11)
761.18
(767.82)
831.09
(598.55)
1342.7
(1262.09)
1236.47
(1265.53)
1289.83
(918.07)
Poor 152.10
(210.11)
-200.4
(153.42)
-34.06
(122.6)
192.64
(294.18)
-112.08
(173.47)
14.89
(186.12)
294.17
(403.62)
-181.07
(259.23)
15.94
(244.08)
-364.82
(404.54)
280.7
(507.6)
-102.28
(319.94)
EPoor -120.20**
(60.87)
-248.29
(172.91)
-188.16**
(94.12)
-197.62*
(113.51)
-302.8
(244.47)
-260.05*
(141.66)
-155.89
(166.35)
-410.11
(351.43)
-322.51
(197.99)
-736.59
(564.52)
-202.53
(260.27)
-531.71*
(311.15)
Constant 24.52
(85.34)
229.61
(128.71)
118.8*
(72.08)
92.14
(118.53)
94.7
(139.07)
95.86
(94.89)
50.19
(212.66)
140.59
(167.38)
122.69
(122.42)
367.61
(275,91)
54.71
(285.57)
249.78
(175.51)
Fixed
Effects
Included
No No No No No No No No No No No No
R- 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.12
Hhold
Comp
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
N = 160 161 321 98 104 202 69 78 147 46 55 101
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
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Table 3.20: OLS Regression of Total Aid Received on Harvest Losses (in thousands) with Village Fixed Effects
_________________________Dependent Variable: Total Aid Received (in cordobas)_____________ ___________
Harvest 
Loss Size
< 0 <-1,000 < -2,000 < -3,000
Harvest
Losses
16.71
(19.13)
3.3
(19.86)
1.07
(15.31)
28.77**
(12.39)
-3.46
(12.99)
-3.44
(14.28)
35.41**
(15.15)
-7.62
(15.7)
-8.17
(13.34)
23.67
(17.46)
-10.88
(28.05)
-8.49
(14.39)
Female 93.37
(902.48)
66,34
(360.36)
92.07
(427.87)
-355.52
(292.83)
107.95
(511.51)
-694.07
(701.9)
-355.84
(347.15)
363.78
(917.21)
-137.83
(414.98)
-546.11
(509.78)
795.86
(2012.69)
69.76
(785.15)
Poor 230.76
(644.76)
-142.31
(328.28)
-4.44
(400.24)
-482.22
(323.79)
-65.8
(341.75)
-544.34
(477.96)
-504.76
(416.3)
-17.83
(460.2)
-78.54
(229.46)
-612.53
(656.06)
26.79
(815.52)
-256.96
(325.67)
EPoor 512.77
(624.13)
-314,55
(354.73)
-123.03
(361.89)
36.89
(286.61)
-313.31
(521.1)
-259.33
(336.06)
133.88
(423.92)
544.93
(770)
-132.71
(306.55)
-238.6
(613.97)
-847.52
(1374.19)
-513.94
(494.5)
Constant 869.39*
(527.29)
949.83***
(287.57)
956.22***
(354.52)
1439.56***
(242.99)
812.5***
(260.92)
1277.6***
(411.06)
1389.02***
(375.93)
799.81**
(339.16)
871.87***
(195.65)
1575.01***
(518.6)
939.32
(618.98)
1084.87***
(298.66)
Fixed
Effects
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R- 0.14 0.25 0.10 0.97 0.36 0.37 0.82 0.46 0.53 0.89 0.46 0.59
Harvest
Losses
25.62
(18.2)
-12.10
(22.91)
4.14
(15.63)
34.15
(29.76)
-21.98
(25.47)
4.95
(19.3)
21.12**
(9.15)
-21.99
(25.94)
-3.61
(14.62)
23.18
(14.61)
-9.27
(22.55)
3.26
(14.62)
Female 79.85
(669.17)
70.23
(342.12)
55.37
(361.31)
205.9
(841.88)
357.84
(516.99)
250.8
(502.05)
448.91
(875.12)
535.65
(763.74)
519.01
(600.7)
715.28
(1270.26)
1157.4
(1238.26)
951.86
(903.32)
Poor 32.9
(702.91)
-131.99
(282.84)
-93.95
(382.6)
-1013.41
(1191.28)
58.76
(293.94)
-436.61
(563.16)
73.21
(519.86)
-9.47
(362.93)
26.7
(308.31)
-138.89
(651.05)
-121.55
(525.84)
-144.35
(404.06)
Epoor 163.85
(714.69)
-221.34
(302.32)
-38.12
(406.8)
-979.04
(1161.84)
-171.29
(383.33)
-479.47
(533.85)
52.89
(417.7)
-312.91
(506.6)
-101.88
(310.5)
-391.92
(553.34)
-503.19
(754.87)
-458.29
(448.97)
Constant 1074.82*
(626.13)
855.77***
(248.78)
985.96***
(363.89)
1951.11
(1335.28)
574.05
(229.53)
1213.51
(620.16)
943.27**
(418.17)
606..81** 
(270.93)
758.09***
(220.51)
1188.62**
(550.43)
891.44**
(392.81)
1016.04
(301.36)
Fixed
Effects
Included
No No No No No No No No No No No No
R1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.04
Hhold
Comp
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
N = 160 161 321 98 104 202 69 78 147 46 55 101
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
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Table 3.21: OLS Regression of Official Aid on Hurricane Shocks with Village Fixed Effects
________________dependent Variable: Official Aid Received (in cordobas)____________ !___
Long-term Losses Days Homeless Wall Damage Water Supply Damage
Shock
Coeff
0.08
(0.09)
0.003
(0.003)
0.003
(0.005)
48.6*
(25.89)
0.15
(4.49)
33.92
(21.52)
1292.69*
(757.26)
121.18
(116.06)
741.25*
(404.27)
909.91
(809.86)
7.04
(139.16)
581.25
(460.29)
Female -662.94
(667.75)
-181.74
(199.01)
-361.04
(276.10)
-359.35
(505.04)
-98.68
(138.29)
-151.24
(206.73)
-461.79
(531.03)
-113.73
(140.69)
-188
(212.81)
-195.01
(424.93)
-112.56
(145.56)
-60.57
(167.58)
Poor -104.34
(534.59)
-18.05
(284.66)
-192.55
(346.13)
181.32
(479.73)
93.29
(183.92)
-1.61
(309.57)
116.03
(469.7)
122.73
(184.46)
-33.75
(312.73)
116.96
(474.98)
128.57
(190.58)
-36.68
(320.1)
EPoor 412.68
(604.7)
-147.14
(292.02)
-210.93
(340.93)
217.75
(332.17)
158.42
(175.04)
76.51
(228.85)
492.35
(473.07)
183.31
(175.84)
94.66
(268.46)
534.97
(449.26)
188.46
(176.12)
146.15
(255.25)
Constant 985.41**
(461.23)
693.27***
(206.57)
960.56***
(314.45)
423.38
(376.08)
327.13**
(131.3)
401.91
(260.17)
258.38
(251.29)
268.51**
(130.63)
370.38**
(179.3)
384.21
(259.21)
292.9**
(127.8)
415.38**
(179.16)
Fixed
Effects
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.15 0.27 0.11 0.23 0.24 0.15 0.18 0.25 0.11 0.16 0.25 0.10
Shock
Coeff
-0.001
(0.003)
0.05*
(0.03)
0.004
(0.004)
55.46
(24.33)
3.29
(3.01)
36.16
(22.04)
1262.28*
(676.32)
111.41
(140.75)
753.68**
(374.32)
911.61
(737.56)
-65.98
(147.76)
470.41
(411.03)
Female -192.02
(153.94)
-564.23
(375.45)
-374.98*
(200.32)
-94.6
(329.10)
-115.39
(114.21)
-139.74
(172.81)
-256.55
(358.42)
-129.36
(111.38)
-194.22
(180.31)
21.06
(278.53)
-139.01
(116.28)
-85.69
(146.34)
Poor 81.4
(237.42)
-117.89
(668.51)
-48.17
(360.86)
54.77
(431.25)
64.77
(158.66)
13.13
(242.05)
-58.87
(440.16)
110.09
(159.83)
-8.90
(252.68)
11.82
(431.31)
126.68
(158.11)
27.85
(251.21)
EPoor 35.68
(250.73)
300.24
(712.04)
148,4
(396.45)
-70.14
(378.89)
90.4
(161.79)
54.97
(217.16)
105.51
(560.38)
132.17
(157.68)
120.59
(293.37)
371.31
(522.4)
139.19
(159.34)
211.9
(284.33)
Constant 598.52***
(193.6)
991.01*
(593.14)
807.15**
(331.90)
449.94
(366.53)
344.65***
(133.45)
388.33*
(226.14)
377.86
(245.27)
292.10**
(134.47)
352.65**
(160.04)
420.18*
(225.45)
325.61**
(141.2)
403,02***
(153.61)
Fixed
Effects
Included
No No No No No No No No No No No No
R- 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Hhold
Comp
Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
N = 160 161 321 227 218 445 229 216 445 229 216 445
Robust standard error in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
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Table 3.22: OLS Regression of Family Aid on Hurricane Shocks with Village Fixed Effects
_______________ Dependent Variable: Family Aid Received (in cordobas)____________
Shock Long-term Losses Days Homeless Wall Damage Water Supply Damage
Shock -0.01 0.01 -0.0004 0.76 -0.64 0.12 -38.66 41.42 -26.09 -26.53 -109.55 -73.88
Coeff (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.53) (2.14) (0.89) (48.55) (57.02) (38.59) (59.04) (133.16) (57.33)
Female 756.07 235.11 451.19 326.82 168.81 242.66 342.35 174.94 247.95 334.49 159.56 235.22
(566.25) (301.14) (312.21) (319.97) (185.94) (182.47) (327.48) (189.32) (185.96) (331.48) (184.7) (187)
Poor 372.7 -133.38 188.66 177.16 -6.13 114.51 169.27 7.97 123.93 169.2 23.22 128.75
(336.35) (134.52) (186.74) (248.42) (94.6) (144.17) (241.82) (94.22) (143.4) (239.29) (100.64) (142.11)
EPoor 189.52 -177.36 86.37 63.64 -108.62 25.73 61.97 -94.08 33.24 60.73 -89.97 31.06
(193.9) (196.78) (122.79) (144.23) (139.05) (105.03) (140.84) (139.92) (104.75) (142.38) (140.7) (103.89)
Constant -160.75 271.97 -3.25 -0.36 182.21** 63.48 15.16 154.31 61.91 11.24 181.62* 71.18
(200.34) (125.84) (119.52) (144.08) (92.52) (93.39) (133.6) (97.98) (90.9) (148.28) (94.88) (95.57)
Fixed
Effects
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R“ 0.32 0.35 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.13 0.23 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.14
Shock -0.02 -0.001 -0.003 -0.52 -0.52 -0.64 -148.54 34.31 -63.56 -109.82** 37.11 -44.8
Coeff (0.02) (0.004) (0.004) (0.66) (2.23) (0.95) (99.7) (92.29) (63.9) (53.55) (99.26) (53.44)
Female 630.16 260.57 429.36 299.27 108.57 207.28 326.34 110.2 216.58 293.24 115.98 206.59
(569.49) (330.65) (313.17) (277.44) (169.64) (159.96) (291.24) (173.23) (165.29) (278.25) (171.36) (160.87)
Poor 148.88 -242.43 -43.1 75.87 -131.75 -16.26 85.43 -121.94 -5.98 77.3 -122.39 -8.66
(210.92) (180.4) (126.21) (153.19) (120.67) (94.92) (156.79) (123.84) (96.46) (150.39) (126.6) (95.29)
EPoor -132.23** -273.03 -187.27** -91,01 -155.59 -110.75* -67.89 -145.82 -100.4 -99.2* -144.82 -108.10
(65.09) (189.84) (93.72) (56.86) (126.72) (64.28) (60.33) (130.44) (64.44) (56.28) (131.25) (64.57)*
Constant 24.6 323.85** 163.93** 79.39 257.96** 154.92*** 107.40* 237.27** 158.78*** -99.2* 237.19** 155.58***
(81.13) (147.15) (78.17) (73.72) (100.2) (58.64) (64.81) (105.64) (57,98) (56.28) (100.89) (58.35)
Fixed
Effects
Included
No No No No No No No No No No No No
R“ 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
Hhold
Comp
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
N = 160 161 321 227 218 445 229 216 445 229 216 445
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
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Table 3.23: OLS Regression of Total Aid on Hurricane Shocks with Village Fixed Effects
_______________ Dependent Variable: Total Aid Received (in cordobas)_____________
Shock Long-term Losses Days Homeless Wall Damage Water Supply Damage
Shock
Coeff
0.07
(0.09)
0.01
(0.01)
0.003
(0.007)
49.36**
(25.58)
-0.49
(4.63)
34.04
(21.3)
1254.04*
(764.55)
162.59
(123.46)
715.16*
(408.23)
883.37
(819.28)
-102.51
(195.73)
507.37
(467.36)
Female 93.13
(897.65)
53.37
(363.77)
90.15
(426.69)
-32.53
(600.49)
70.13
(244.52)
91.41
(279.41)
-119.44
(630.39)
61.21
(250.24)
59.95
(286.78)
139,48
(539.47)
47
(248.59)
174.65
(254.16)
Poor 268.36
(645.37)
-151.43
(319)
-3.89
(397.36)
358.48
(545.48)
87.16
(207.13)
112.9
(343.64)
285.3
(534.5)
130.7
(208.21)
90.17
(347.15)
286.16
(537.21)
151.79
(217.82)
92.07
(353.48)
EPoor 602.2
(632.65)
-324.5
(357.51)
-124.56
(362.66)
281.39
(361.24)
49.8
(227.28)
102.24
(254.35)
554.32
(493.01)
89.23
(227.82)
127.9
(291.18)
595.7
(471.93)
98.49
(228.89)
177.21
(278.25)
Constant 824.67
(507.13)
965.24***
(247.42)
957.31***
(339.81)
423.01
(406.32)
509.34***
(161.48)
465.4*
(278.38)
273.54
(286.26)
422.82***
(163.86)
432.29**
(203.47)
395.44
(299.6)
474.52***
(160.43)
486.56**
(205.65)
Fixed
Effects
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R- 0.14 0.25 0.10 0.22 0.24 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.09
Shock
Coeff
0.04
(0.03)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.001
(0.006)
54.95**
(24.66)
2.77
(4.05)
35.51
(22.27)
1113.73
(688.44)
145.73
(174.01)
690.12*
(381.56)
801.79
(745.18)
-28.87
(187.05)
425.61
(417.13)
Female 65.93
(671.74)
68.55
(349.68)
54.38
(362.25)
204.67
(422.12)
-6.82
(213.16)
67.54
(235.81)
69.79
(461.97)
-19.16
(214.98)
22.36
(246.03)
314.3
(385.58)
-23.04
(214.73)
120.91
(216.69)
Poor 30.99
(703.47)
-161.02
(291.98)
-91.27
(382.01)
130.64
(459.03)
-66.99
(197.79)
-3.13
(260.23)
26.57
(470.98)
-11.85
(201.96)
-14.88
(271.5)
89.13
(459.49)
4.3
(203.1)
19.19
(269.58)
EPoor 168.01
(719.29)
-237.34
(311.65)
-38.87
(408.38)
-161.15
(384.69)
-65.19
(216.28)
-55.78
(229.85)
37.63
(567.87)
-13.65
(216.41)
20.2
(303.8)
272.10
(527.21)
-5.62
(218.22)
103.79
(294.23)
Constant 1015.61*
(603.65)
922.37***
(240.97)
971.08***
(342.81)
529.33
(376.99)
602.61***
(166.73)
543.24**
(234.95)
485.27*
(257.27)
529.37***
(171.45)
511.43***
(171.83)
523.18**
(238.98)
562.8***
(173.37)
558.6***
(165.39)
Fixed
Effects
Included
No No No No No No No No No No No No
n r ~ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Hhold
Comp
Type
Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both Static Change Both
N = 160 161 321 227 218 445 229 216 445 229 216 445
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.
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Two theories may explain the lack of any statistically significant relationship between 
inter-household transfers and hurricane losses. In the first case, it is possible that inter­
household transfers are made on the basis of unobservables, which are not easily 
quantifiable and poorly correlated with income group, hurricane damage, or gender of the 
household head. Such factors could include reputation and the strength o f the 
relationship between donor-recipient households, size and quality of the affected 
household’s networks, and the donor’s perception o f the afflicted household’s need of 
aid.
Finally, it is possible (but unlikely) that post-Mitch, inter-households transfers were 
simply distributed randomly and not significantly related to any observable or 
unobservable household characteristics. A minimal role for family transfers is not 
without precedent in the developing world. For example, Park (2001) did not find 
evidence to support an altruistic linkage for family household transfers in Bangladesh. 
Among surveyed Bangladeshi households consumption was closely correlated to 
household income even after controlling for pooled income of the donor and recipient 
households. Unfortunately, data is not available on the donor households in Nicaragua, 
which makes additional analysis of these explanations difficult.
Overall, the following statements can be made about post-Mitch aid: (i) official aid 
played a larger role than inter-household aid; (ii) official aid was sensitive to two 
observable factors: harvest losses and wall damage; (iii) having a female household head 
was not a statistically significant determinant of either aid type; and (iv) official aid was 
targeted away from the wealthiest households.
IV. E. Household Reformation as a Coping Mechanism
One possibility is that in addition to aid, households exercised other coping strategies. 
These could be cash-based activities such as loans or activities such as adding or 
dropping household members, which would not show up as a direct monetary inflow. 
Although post-Mitch survey data does not allow for statistical analysis of the credit 
market after the hurricane, survey results do not indicate that loans played a vital role in 
post-Mitch cash flow for surveyed households.
A possibility raised earlier is that household reformation (composition change) is a 
coping mechanism. It is possible that household reformation is driven by changes in 
household consumption or that it is sensitive to specific Mitch damages, or to other 
factors entirely such as poverty level or gender of the household head. To test this 
hypothesis we use the regression modelled in equation 4 below.
(4) CO M Pi =  a +  B jC O N S +  B2S H O C K  +  B3F E M A L E  +  B4PO O R  +B5EPO O R
Where COMP is the net number o f household members lost or added from 1998 to 1999, 
CONS is the change in consumption in thousands of cordobas, SHOCK is the shock 
metric used in Section III, FEMALE is a dummy for female-headed households, and 
POOR and EPOOR represent households classified as poor and extremely poor,
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respectively. Regression results (Table 3.24) suggest two interesting trends. The first is 
that consumption change is a strong determinant of composition change. With the 
exception of long-term losses, the shocks are inconsequential as determinants of 
composition. Secondly, with the exception of households affected by harvest losses and 
long-term losses, having a female-headed household is always significant for the change 
in composition at 1% or higher. Where all other coefficients are negative, the female 
dummy coefficient is always positive which indicates that having a female household 
head is a significant determinant of household composition change and that female 
households were, on average, net recipients of household members. It is interesting to 
note that female-headed households appear marginalized by official aid allocations, but 
nevertheless added members after Mitch. One possibility is that the bias o f family 
transfers towards female-headed households is related to their acceptance of new 
members. This sounds like a plausible theory which would explain the bias of official aid 
towards female-headed households. However, there is no statistical evidence to suggest a 
relationship between family and received and household composition change.20
A household’s poverty status also appears to play a role in changing household size. 
Being classified as poor was not a significant determinant of household composition 
change, however being classified as extremely poor was significant at 1% or higher for 
all shocks. The coefficient is always negative and indicates that extremely poor 
households experienced a net loss of household members. The role of changing 
household size as a coping mechanism is fully explored in the next chapter.
20 Regression results with the number o f  household members added as the explanatory variable were 
insignificant in explaining the amount o f family transfers received (p = 0.8).
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Table 3.24: OLS Regression of Household Size Change on Mitch Shocks
Results by Shock Type with Village Fixed Effects
 Dependent Variable: Change in Household Size 1998 - 1999_____
Shock
Harvest Long-term Days Wall Water
(1) Losses Losses Homeless Damage Supply
(2) (3) (4) (5) Damage
(6)
Consumption -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0 09*** -0 09***
Change ( ‘000 
cordobas)
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Shock (Shown -0.02 -0.04*** -0.001 -0.10 -0.12
in Col 2 - 6 ) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.18)
FEMALE 0.40 0.40 0.55*** 0.61*** 0.59***
(0.29) (0.29) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
POOR -0.08 -0.12 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07
(0.26) (0.26) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
EPOOR -0.70*** -0.70*** -0.64*** -0.62*** -0.63***
(0.29) (0.29) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Constant 0.30 0.33* 0.16 0.16 0.17
(0.20) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Fixed Effects 
Included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R z 0.34 0.36 0.22 0.23 0.23
Consumption -0 12*** -0 12*** -0.09 -0 09*** -0 09***
Change ( ‘000 
cordobas)
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Shock (Shown -0.01 -0.05*** 0.002 0.03 -0.22
in Col 2 - 6 ) (0.01) (0.004) (0.005) (0.16) (0.17)
FEMALE 0.42 0.46 0.52*** 0.56*** 0.53**
(0.29) (0.29) (0.2) (0.21) (0.21)
POOR -0.07 -0.04 0.008 -0.01 0.01
(0.24) (0.23) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
EPOOR -0.59** -0.55** -0.49** -0.48** -0.48**
(0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Constant 0.29 0.24 0.09 0.08 0.13
(0.19) (0.18) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Fixed Effects 
Included
No No No N o No
R z 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.11
N  = 321 321 445 445 445
*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1%
V. Conclusion
Covariate risk is a real concern for households in the developing world. In order to 
assess household response to covariate risk we exploited the LSMS dataset to analyze 
several key aspects of household response to Hurricane Mitch. At the outset we 
presented three questions concerning the shock-consumption and aid- shock
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relationships. First, which shocks proved most disruptive to consumption, and to what 
extent? Second, what was the role of aid in mitigating the disruption introduced by the 
shocks? Finally, was household composition change a coping mechanism?
In Section III, we examined the relationship between Mitch damages and household 
consumption. We divided the sample to isolate households with no composition change, 
and eliminate the impact o f preference shifts on the results. O f the five shocks surveyed, 
harvest losses and long-term losses are significant for consumption. Although the 
coefficients on these shocks approximate zero, we rejected risk pooling due to co­
movement in consumption which would arise with a highly covariate shock.
In Section IV we addressed the possibility that aid-financed consumption would impact 
the regression results modelled in Section III. We explored the counter-factual: What 
would the relationship between shocks and consumption have been if  no aid had been 
received? The results of this exercise were mixed. Harvest losses in excess of 1,000 
cordobas became more significant, while the significance levels for most other shocks 
were unaffected or affected only for the full sample. The increase in significance for 
harvest losses should tell us that we may expect to find a significant relationship between 
harvest losses and aid. Indeed this is exactly what we found. Harvest losses, days 
homeless and wall damage were significant determinants o f official aid, but no shock or 
control variable was a significant determinant of family aid. The data also showed that 
family transfers were more generous towards female-headed and wealthier households 
while official aid was comparatively stingy towards female-headed and less poor 
households.
Given that the shocks tested in Section III were frequently not significant of consumption 
of households with a composition change, we returned to explore whether household 
reformation may have served as a coping strategy after the hurricane and whether it 
impacted net aid received. These results showed that consumption change and a 
household’s classification as being extremely poor was significant for household 
composition change across all shocks.
In isolation each question gives a piece o f information about the relationship between 
household consumption, shocks and aid after Hurricane Mitch. When viewed together 
we can begin to assemble a more complete story of Mitch’s impact on Nicaraguan 
households. Overall, the story is remarkably consistent. Nicaraguan households were 
unable to smooth consumption against Hurricane Mitch damages using existing insurance 
mechanisms. Harvest losses and long-term losses caused by Mitch disrupted 
consumption. The disruption to consumption caused by these shocks was fortunately 
mitigated by post-disaster aid. Official aid was appropriately targeted using harvest 
losses, while the distribution of family aid is more ambiguous.
An underlying theme is how female-headed, poor and extremely poor households fared 
throughout this process. It appears that while female-headed and poor households were 
not inherently more vulnerable to shocks, these characteristics influenced their receipt of 
post-disaster aid and household reformation. Female-headed households were less
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fortunate recipients of official aid, but were also net recipients of new household 
members after Mitch. This generosity was not statistically associated with family aid 
received.
Overall, the results show that, as expected, households can not rely on informal insurance 
networks to mitigate damage from covariate risk. Beyond this however, they illustrate 
the vulnerability of agricultural households to Mitch damages and underscore the vital 
role of effective aid targeting in the post-disaster period. Official aid played an important 
role and appears to have been better targeted and more generous than family transfers. 
Despite these successes future post-disaster aid allocations can benefit from considering 
the plight o f female-headed households and ensuring equal access to aid resources.
Unfortunately, exogenous disaster aid can not always be counted on in such quantities in 
afflicted regions. The value of the analysis here lies in its illumination of household 
economic response to covariate risk. But it would be a mistake not to extend the analysis 
and derive policy implications to safeguard human welfare. Given that informal 
insurance networks do break down, we have shown that agricultural households are the 
most vulnerable to disasters damages. Their crops serve as their principle income- 
generating assets and coping assets and often serve as an important source of 
consumption. These crops play such a critical role in these households welfare and are 
also at high risk to destruction. Sound disaster planning must account for this 
vulnerability using either ex-ante preventive measures or allocating sufficient ex-post 
resources.
Before concluding, it should be emphasized that the results deal exclusively with the 
short-run impact of specific shocks. It is unclear if  post-hazard transfers are sufficient to 
prevent declines in household welfare over the long-term. The afflicted areas in 
Nicaragua were largely agricultural and Mitch removed topsoil and caused flooding, 
which will impact future farming. If households long-run income generation was 
reduced it is possible that funds would be diverted from human capital investments (e.g. 
education, healthcare, vocational training) to meet current needs (McKenzie 2003).
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Hurricane Mitch on 
Nicaraguan Household Size
I. Introduction
In developing countries households frequently use coping strategies to smooth 
consumption in the wake of unexpected shocks. Coping strategies may take the form of 
financial transactions such as commercial borrowing, inter-household transfers or asset 
sales. Recent work on Bangladesh, for example, (del Ninno et al. 2003) following the 
1998 floods found that private sector borrowing was an instrumental household coping 
strategy. Alternatively households may engage in non-market coping strategies to 
mitigate the impact of unanticipated shocks. One method of accomplishing this is to add 
or remove household members. Some scholars have investigated the impact of disasters 
or crises on household structure (McKenzie 2003) although the empirical literature on 
this topic remains relatively sparse. In the steady state however, economic theory offers 
an extended discussion of household formation and the intra-household allocation of 
resources.
Economic theory indicates that household size is heavily influenced by the cost of public 
and private goods consumed by members. It is intuitive to see that there are economies 
of scale to be derived from increasing household size thereby allowing the costs (per 
member) of public goods to be reduced from n for individual residence to ^/household 
size for a joint residence. In theory this relationship should allow larger households to 
enjoy higher per capita consumption of private goods such as food. This is particularly 
true for poor households that operate close to subsistence since their consumption of food 
is not easily substitutable to other goods. Assuming proportional increases in household 
size and household resources we would anticipate that a larger household, particularly in 
a developing country, would facilitate a higher per capita level of food consumption.
In practice evidence from both the developed and developing world indicates the opposite 
of what theory would predict (Deaton and Paxson 1998). In Thailand, Pakistan and 
South Africa the authors find that not only do larger households have a lower per capita 
food consumption -  but that the effect is greater for households in poorer countries. That 
is to say that the gap between the predicted per capita food consumption and the observed 
amount is greatest in poorer countries. This creates a paradox in which “larger 
households are better off at the same level of per capita resources since they have the 
option of decomposing themselves into smaller units. Yet by the most obvious indicator 
of their welfare, per capita food consumption, they are worse o ff’ (Deaton and Paxson 
1998: 899). Thus on the one hand, empirical evidence suggests that larger households in
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developing countries are worse off as measured by per capita food consumption. On the 
other hand if smaller households are better off that inspires the question of why large 
households are maintained if smaller ones can achieve higher per capita food 
consumption.
Work by Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995) explores the notion that larger families in 
developing countries are poorer on average than smaller ones. In the economic literature 
there exists considerable debate as to the direction of causality. Some argue that larger 
households are poor because they are large, while a case can also be made that 
households are large because they are poor. Using data from Pakistan Lanjouw and 
Ravallion find evidence to caution against too readily assuming a negative correlation 
between household size and welfare. Given that we can not readily assume a relationship 
between household size and welfare it is useful to consider motives for household 
formation and division outside of sharing the cost of household public goods.
Our discussion of the gains from sharing the cost of public goods assumed that all 
members were adults. Many households in the developing world include children and 
any discussion of household size and welfare must take the presence of children into 
consideration. Two of the most pronounced economic effects of having children are the 
allocation of a higher share of the budget to food and the reallocation of hours from labor 
or leisure to the children. Additional effects may include an alteration of parental 
preferences towards risk and insurance (e.g. the purchase of life insurance).
Introducing children also raises questions of comparing welfare levels across households 
with different composition. This has typically been done through the use o f equivalence 
scales which enable the user to compare different household types relative to the poverty 
line. There is sufficient variation in the approaches used however that differences in 
scales can impact conclusions (Atkinson 1987). At a basic level it could be argued that 
two households of equal size could achieve different levels of welfare by virtue of 
different amounts of children. The logic is that achieving a given welfare level is much 
easier for a child than for an adult. One example of this is lower food costs. Thus it is 
difficult to make inter-household welfare comparisons as households can differ greatly in 
their composition. We pause to consider how the household makes decisions and 
allocates resources.
Much of the economic theory of the household rests on work done by Samuelson (1956) 
and expanded upon by Becker (1981). Becker argued that households form to benefit 
from economies of scale and to produce non-market goods such as children. Although 
this chapter is unconcerned with the distribution of resources within a household we 
quickly review these models as they relate to explaining household division. A large 
portion of the literature employs a unitary model of the household to explain the 
distribution o f resources within the household. Unitary models treat the household as an 
individual whose objective is to maximize utility which is expressed as a function of 
consumption. The unitary household pools resources and information and is governed by 
a (benevolent) dictator. By contrast, collective models allow for unique preferences by 
individuals and decisions about intra-household allocation are reached, as the name
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suggests, collectively. The allocation o f resources may be bargained if the household is 
cooperative. Non-cooperative models, by definition, do not allow bargaining and the 
household may reach an allocation that is or is not Pareto efficient. The unitary model is 
powerful in its simplicity, but among other criticisms it is incapable of explaining 
household breakups.
Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) enumerate additional reasons why households would add 
members or divide and offer a collective model to analyze household division. They 
argue that households may add members to realize gains in sharing household-specific 
public goods as well as to lower barriers to information sharing (e.g. on farming 
techniques). These gains must be weighed against the amount of the public good that is 
consumed by household residents (for which some residents may have a negative 
marginal utility) and the impact on risk-sharing vis-a-vis inter-household transfers. 
Maintaining separate households provides a more diverse risk portfolio as inter­
household transfers can be used as a means of insurance. Other factors which could 
influence household division include the possibilities of diseconomies to joint production 
and that residents may derive higher utility from or have a direct preference for 
independent residence. Finally, the authors indicate that assuming households come 
together to generate a surplus households will divide when the current surplus is negative.
The work by Foster and Rosenzweig serves as a roadmap to the reduced form equations 
used in this chapter. To explain household division the authors begin from the premise 
that the utility (u) if  individual (i) in household j is a function of consumption of private 
goods (x), public goods (z), household structure (r) and a vector of the individual’s 
nuclear family characteristics (n). This is shown in the equation below.
Ui j  =  u ( x i j , Z j , n j ; n i j )
Their analysis is founded on three assumptions: 1) Decisions about joint residence in a 
given period must be made before the income shocks are realized, but consumption 
allocations in a given period are made afterwards; 2) Intra-household allocations 
conditional on residence and income realizations must be ex ante efficient (it is not 
possible for a household to improve the expected utility of one claimant) without 
reducing the expected utility of some other claimant; 3) Each claimant must be provided 
an ex ante expected utility level that is at least equal to that which he could obtain if 
separately resident. The authors assume that households will divide when the third 
condition is unsatisfied, or when there are no gains to joint residence. As an example, 
when household per capita income declines the gains from joint residence drop and there 
is an increased preference towards consumption of the private good.
Foster and Rosenzweig use a probit model to test the determinants of household division 
using the ICRISAT survey data from India. The authors find that, in accordance with 
their expectations, intra-household inequality in schooling, marriages and riskiness are 
associated with an increased probability of household division. This chapter also uses a 
probit model and the explanatory variables are tweaked to capture relevant Mitch-related 
factors and their impact on changing household size.
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While the work by Foster and Rosenzweig offers methodological guidance on testing for 
determinants of household division, it is difficult to predict household formation and 
breakups based upon on the demographic characteristics discussed elsewhere in the 
literature. We can not say that large households are on average poorer (as defined by 
higher per capita food consumption) as the veracity of this statement depends heavily on 
household composition and the elasticity of the cost of living as Lanjouw and Ravallion 
(1995) show in Pakistan. We must also consider individual utility functions and 
preferences for separate residences which are not captured in a per person cost analysis of 
public and private goods. Furthermore, any gains to household separation derived from 
risk diversification and information sharing are largely constricted to agricultural 
households.
Despite these constraints which prohibit a generalization we can examine the behavior of 
Nicaraguan households in the periods surrounding Hurricane Mitch in an effort to 
understand the factors affecting the decision to alter household size in the wake of a large 
aggregate shock. There is some precedent in the empirical literature for analyzing 
household behavior to aggregate shocks. Following the 1995 Mexican Peso Crisis, 
McKenzie (2003) found that household structure remained relatively stable. There was 
no evidence to suggest that the young postponed establishing their own households or 
that the elderly moved in with their children. McKenzie does find that children aged 5 -  
14 years were more likely to live with non-parental family members during the crisis, 
however children aged 0 - 5  and 1 5 - 1 9  were more likely to reside with their parents 
during the crisis period. There is also evidence to suggest that household fertility 
decisions were impacted by the crisis as households had fewer children during the crisis.
The anthropological literature provides examples of household division in times of crisis. 
An excellent case to consider is that of the Ngisonyoka Turkana tribe in Kenya who have 
been observed to adjust their settlement patterns to manage disaster risk (McCabe 1990, 
1987). The Turkana are a nomadic people who maintain their assets in the form of 
camels, cattle, sheep, goats and donkeys. The Turkana area o f Kenya is prone to periods 
of drought, which may last over a year. McCabe focuses on the response to a two-year 
drought period from 1979 to 1981. To cope with the drought the Turkana separate the 
human population into the smallest viable units, divide livestock into as many small herds 
as possible, move into areas considered dangerous because of proximity to tribal enemies 
and may require non-essential tribal members to seek food elsewhere such as cities or 
farms (McCabe 1987: 376-7). McCabe observes that these mechanisms were completely 
effective at preventing human death and that there was no famine relief required by the 
Turkana. There were significant losses of livestock, but by 1985 large shares of these 
losses were restored.
The Turkana case illustrates an effective response to drought in which households have 
adjusted their size to mitigate the shock’s impact. Despite the observed success it is 
unclear to what extent household division may be an effective response in a more 
sedentary society such as rural Nicaragua. For the Turkana their nomadic lifestyle allows 
them to move both themselves and their assets (livestock) to more favorable conditions. 
By contrast a sedentary, agricultural society is constrained by fixed assets (e.g. crops,
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home, irrigation network, tools, etc.) as well as land ownership or tenancy arrangements 
which makes relocating with these assets a far less viable option. The Turkana are also 
able to reduce household size by sending members to less-affected areas. This may be a 
more viable strategy in a slow-onset disaster where macro-economic factors have 
sufficient time to adjust to the drought’s impact. In the case of a sudden-onset disaster 
such as Hurricane Mitch the impact will offer virtually no similar adjustment period. 
Nevertheless, these factors do not preclude the possibility that Nicaraguan households 
may adjust size to cope with disaster impact over the short or medium term.
In the previous chapter we demonstrated the widespread impact of Hurricane Mitch on 
Nicaraguan households and in particular the strong impact of Mitch on agricultural 
households. In addition to more traditional consumption smoothing measures we also 
briefly investigated the possibility that households added or lost members to cope with 
Mitch shocks. Results showed that for certain shocks extreme poverty is strongly 
associated with a net loss of household members while having a female headed 
household is strongly associated with a net gain of household members.
These results provide a useful starting point upon which to engage the issue of whether 
Hurricane Mitch shocks were significant determinants of household division. The 
research focus in this chapter draws together threads from the informal insurance 
literature in which adjusting household size may be a non-market coping mechanism and 
economic literature on the household in which the disaster may provide a unique 
opportunity to observe household division as response to an aggregate shock. This 
chapter focuses on the following questions: (i) What was the impact of Hurricane Mitch 
on the probability of household reformation? (ii) What demographic factors affected the 
probability of Nicaraguan households to alter household size? (iii) Was the adjustment of 
household size a post-Mitch coping mechanism? (iv) Given the results here and in the 
first paper, what conclusions can we draw about post-Mitch household reformation?
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the data used and provides 
background information. Section III discusses the methodology. Section IV discusses 
the results and Section V concludes.
II. Data and Background 
II. A. Data
This paper draws on three Living Standards and Measurement Surveys (LSMS) 
supported by the World Bank and executed by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y 
Censo (INEC) in Nicaragua. The three surveys were executed in 1998, 1999 and 2001. 
The 1998 and 2001 surveys were scheduled as part of the LSMS and can be used as panel 
data with one quarter of the panel rotated off. The 1999 survey was executed in May and 
June of 1999 and covered 595 households from the 1998 panel. The purpose of the 1999 
round was to assess the various impacts of Hurricane Mitch on household indicators. In 
the previous chapter we established a baseline group of 528 households due to losses
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from attrition, split households or incomplete interviews. When we account for the 
households which were rotated off the panel in 2001 this leaves 495 households which 
appear in all three surveys.
This chapter makes use of the 2001 survey for analysis since it allows us to compare the 
rate o f change. To do three survey periods are required. By contrast the other chapters 
focus on the impact of Hurricane Mitch on a given dependent variable. Expanding the 
survey period(s) increases the scope for other exogenous shocks to accumulate and 
impact the dependent variables (Cochrane 1991). Using only two survey periods (1998 
and 1999) restricts the impact of accumulated non-Hurricane shocks to influence the 
variables of interest.
II. B. Background
The previous analysis offers some insight as to what factors may influence household 
reformation. The last chapter suggested that household consumption was sensitive to 
harvest losses and damage to income-generating assets. Given this relationship and the 
role of aid in sustaining post-Mitch consumption we may expect that these factors may 
also be significant determinants of the household decision to adjust size. In particular we 
would expect that harvest losses (and possibly long-term agricultural losses) and aid 
received would be statistically significant determinants of the decision to alter household 
size. Harvest losses would, in theory, positively increase the probability of altering 
household size, while increasing amounts of aid would decrease this probability.
Before proceeding to the econometric analysis it is useful to review observed patterns of 
household change across the survey group for the two time periods. If Mitch were an 
important factor in driving changes in household composition we would expect, ceteris 
paribus, a noticeable difference in the pattern of household composition change across 
survey periods. An initial metric o f interest is the change in mean household size over 
time. For the 495 households mean household size changed from 5.88 in 1998 to 6.04 in 
1999 to 5.79 in 2001.21 These figures suggest a bell shaped pattern in which mean 
household size increased slightly (3%) in the survey period following Hurricane Mitch 
and decreased in the following period by a similar amount (4%) to approximate pre- 
Mitch levels.
Table 4.1 below summarizes percentages of household change across survey periods. It 
is interesting to note that the ratio o f households adjusting size to those not adjusting was 
1 to 1 from 1998 to 1999. This is somewhat counterintuitive as we may expect the 
impact o f Mitch (if any) would be most pronounced in the period closest to the event.
Yet the data in Table 4.1 shows that the proportion of households adjusting their size 
increased noticeably in the 1999 -  2001 survey period, which would seem to be a 
relatively calmer period. Further analysis shows that in the 1998 - 1999 survey period the 
number of households adding members outweighs those losing members. The converse
21 Although the data can not be used as part o f the panel, mean household size in the 1993 survey was 5.51 
members.
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is true for the 1999 - 2001 period, which is to be anticipated given the observed 
movement in mean household size.
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: Summary Statistics of Householc Change Across Survey Perio
Survey Period 1998-1999 1999 -  2001
Surveyed Household 495 495
Households Adjusting Size (%) 245 (49.5%) 313 (63%)
Households Adding Members 142 152
Households Losing Members 103 161
Mean Change (All Households, in 
# of members)
0.15 -0.24
Mean Change (Change 
Households, in # of members)
0.31 -0.39
Highest Net Gain 12 9
Highest Net Loss -7 -10
N = 495 495
Source: Author’s calculations
II. B. 1. Household Size
Further analysis suggests a general trend for larger households to lose members (Table 
4.2). In particular those households which dropped members are on average two 
members larger than households that did not adjust composition or added members. 
Additional analysis in Table 4.3 indicates changes in household trends by household size. 
Several trends emerge. The first is that smaller households ( 1 - 4  members) are the only 
demographic to be consistently above the mean in terms of the percentage adding 
household members. During the 1998 -  1999 period only 7% of small households 
dropped members. By contrast nearly half of large households (9 or more members) 
dropped members in the immediate post-hurricane period. The percentage of households 
dropping members steadily increases with household size during both survey periods.
Table 4.2: Mean Household Size by Change Status for Households in 1998 and 1999
Mean 1998 Household Size Mean 1999 Household Size
Adding Members 5.32 5.18
Unchanged 5.38 5.39
Dropping Members 7.88 7.58
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 4.3: Household Size and Net Household Change Across Survey Periods
1998-1999 1999-2001
Household
Size
% Adding 
Members
% Unchanged % Dropping 
Members
% Adding 
Members
% Unchanged % Dropping 
Members
1 - 4 37 56 7 38 43 19
5 - 6 24 59 16 36 41 23
7 - 8 22 48 30 23 38 39
9 -  10 24 31 45 20 24 56
10+ 26 25 49 11 11 78
Mean 29 51 20 31 37 32
Source: Author’s calculations
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The relationship between household size and percentage of households dropping 
members appears to hold for both survey periods, however there are some interesting 
distinctions. First, households were much less active in 1998 -  1999 in their 
modifications of household size. Of the 495 households in the panel 245 (49% of the 
panel) adjusted size in 1998 -  1999 while 313 (63%) adjusted household size in the 1999 
-  2001 period. This behavior is true in both nominal and percentage terms. For example, 
the trend for the percentage dropping members to rise with household size holds in both 
periods, but the percentages are always larger for the latter survey period.
We can also observe that the percentage of households leaving size unchanged is always 
greater in the first period than in the second. This holds true irrespective of household 
size. If we attempt to explain household reformation as a possible coping mechanism to 
Mitch damages this pattern is somewhat counterintuitive. We would expect the 
immediate post-Mitch period to be more active for adjusting household size rather than 
less. Instead it appears that the dominant response in the post-Mitch period was to leave 
household size unchanged.
The results in Table 4.3 are inclusive of changes to household size as a result o f births 
and deaths during the survey periods. The decision to have children during the first 
survey period increases household size and is exogenous of any hurricane impact since 
the survey concluded before Mitch. Of the 495 households 60 had children between the 
1998 and 1999 surveys while 133 had children between the 1999 and 2001 surveys. To 
gain a more complete picture of household size increase we should factor out births. This 
information is presented in Table 4.4 below. The figures indicate that some of the 
increase in household size is explained by births, although the large majority of the 
increase, 83% for the first survey period and 70% for the second survey period, is 
explained by non life-cycle reasons.
Table 4.4: Addition ol* Household Members Explained by Child Birth
Survey Period Households
Adding
Members
(1)
Households 
with Births
(2)
Number of 
Households with 
Births Accounting for 
Full Increase
(3)
% of Households 
in Column 1 with 
Births Accounting 
for Full Increase 
(4)
1998- 1999 142 60 24 17%
1999-2001 152 133 45 30%
Source: Author’s calculations
Households also lost members due to mortality reasons. There were 13 deaths among the 
sampled households during 1998 -  1999. During the 1999 -  2001 survey period 15 
households suffered the death of a family member. Checking the drop in household 
members against deaths will indicate what percentage of the adjustment in household size 
is due to mortality reasons. This information is presented below in Table 4.5. From the 
data in Table 4.5 we see that deaths were much less frequent than births for the surveyed 
households and in only a small percentage o f cases (< 1%) did they completely account 
for the drop in household size.
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Table 4.5: Remova of Household Members Explained )y Death
Survey Period Households
Dropping
Members
(1)
Households
with
Deaths
(2)
Number of 
Households with 
Deaths Accounting 
for Full Decrease
(3)
% of Households 
in Column 1 with 
Deaths 
Accounting for 
Full Decrease 
(4)
1998- 1999 103 13 0 0%
1999-2001 161 15 3 <1%
Source: Author’s calculations
II. B. 2. Household Characteristics
In addition to life cycle changes it is also useful to consider the relationship between 
other household characteristics and adjustments in household size. Table 4.6 provides 
data on the movements in household size by various household types. In the 1998 -  1999 
survey period we see that female headed households were very active in adding members. 
They did so at double the rate of their male counterparts. Most o f the other household 
characteristics are fairly close to the mean percentages for the full sample. One exception 
is households classified as extremely poor. A third of extremely poor households lost 
members which is 13 percent higher than that of the mean loss. Only 22 percent of 
extremely poor households added members which is the lowest percentage for any 
category except for male-headed households. In the 1999 -  2001 survey period the 
behavior of female-headed households is much closer to the sample mean. Most 
noticeably the percentage of female households dropping members increases from 16% 
to 40%. This suggests that the initial adding of members by some female headed 
households was a temporary measure.
For most other household types we see a noticeable decrease o f typically 10 to 20 
percentage points in the number households leaving size unchanged from 1998 -  1999 to 
1999 -  2001. One interpretation is that households may have actually intended to adjust 
household size prior to Mitch but postponed this decision. For the most part it appears 
that the drop in the percentage of households leaving size unchanged is evenly distributed 
between the addition and subtraction o f members. Most percentages in the 1999 -  2001 
period are reasonably close to the mean, which suggests no clear trend specific to any 
household type.
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Table 4.6: Percentages of Household Change by Household Characteristic
Survey
Period
1998- 1999 1999-2001
Household
Type
% Adding 
Members
% Unchanged % Losing 
Members
% Adding 
Members
% Unchanged % Losing 
Members
Female
Headed
44 40 16 32 28 40
Male Headed 22 53 22 30 39 31
Agricultural 29 51 20 32 36 34
Non-
Agricultural
28 50 22 29 39 32
Urban 30 53 17 36 31 33
Rural 28 50 22 29 39 32
Extremely
Poor
22 45 33 32 29 39
Poor 35 46 19 26 38 36
Non-Poor 27 59 14 35 40 25
Full Sample 29 51 20 30 33 37
Source: Author’s calculations
II. B. 3. Harvest Losses
Given the large role of harvest losses in the previous chapter it is also useful to explore 
patterns of household change by harvest loss size (Table 4.7). If harvest losses due to 
Mitch have a significant bearing on the alteration of household size we would expect the 
percentage of dropped members to increase as the loss threshold increases. Between the 
1998 and 1999 surveys the percentage of households dropping members does increase 
with the loss threshold, but not noticeably. What is more notable are the high 
percentages of households sustaining agricultural losses that make no change in 
household size. The tabulated percentages for 1999 -  2001 are closer to our initial 
suspicions of household adjusting immediately. Those households with losses in excess 
of 2,000 cordobas show 38% dropping members compared with only 25% of those with 
less than 1,000 cordobas in losses dropping members.
Table 4.7: Percentages of Household Change by Mitch Harvest Loss Size
1998- 1999 1999-2001
Harvest Loss 
(in cordobas)
% Adding 
Members
% Unchanged % Losing 
Members
% Adding 
Members
% Unchanged % Losing 
Members
< 1,000 30 52 18 35 40 25
1 ,0 0 0 -2 ,0 0 0 22 61 17 31 38 31
2,001 -4 ,0 0 0 28 48 24 36 36 28
4,001 -6 ,0 0 0 31 50 19 28 38 34
Source: Author’s calculations
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II. B. 4. Aid
Household aid also played a strong role in sustaining consumption in the previous 
chapter. If altering household size was a response to Mitch damages we may expect that, 
ceteris paribus, households which were recipients o f post-disaster aid would be 
demonstrate a lower frequency of adjusting household size. Table 4.8 shows the 
percentages of household change by households by aid received. Those which received 
aid exhibited a slightly greater frequency of adding members (4%) in the immediate post- 
Mitch period (1998 -  1999) although the difference between the two groups is not 
particularly large.
Table 4.8: Percentages of Household Change by Total Mitch Aid Received
1998- 1999 1999-2001
By Aid % Adding 
Members
% Unchanged % Losing 
Members
% Adding 
Members
% Unchanged % Losing 
Members
No Aid 26 55 19 31 40 29
Aid 30 48 22 31 35 34
Source: Author’s calculations
II. C. Consumption per Capita and Household Size
As discussed earlier the predicted relationship between household welfare (as indicated 
by per capita consumption) and household size is difficult to define. With the 
Nicaraguan data we can utilize figures on per capita consumption and changes in 
household size to test this relationship. Figures 4.1 -  4.3 plot the relationships between 
household size and per capita consumption.
In all three years the plots show a negative relationship between household size and per 
capita consumption which suggests that larger households on average have a lower per 
capita consumption. To develop a better understanding of whether households adjusted 
size as a coping mechanism it would be useful to analyze movements in per capita 
consumption of those households that change size. In general we would expect that 
households would drop (add) members to achieve a higher (lower) per capita 
consumption. We can analyze this pattern in Table 4.9 (below) and graphically in Figure 
4.3.
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f i g u r e  4.1: 1998 P er  Capita Consum ption by Household Size
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cfigure 4.2: 1999 P er  Capita Consum ption by Household Size
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Figure 4.3: 2001 Per Capita Consum ption by Household Size
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Table 4.9: Mean Change in Per Capita Consumption by Change in Household Size
Change in 
Household Size
1998- 1999 1999-2001
Mean Change in Per 
Capita Consumption 
(in cordobas)
Mean Change in Per 
Capita Consumption 
(in cordobas)
-7 3260.5 4670.2
-5 2620.7 1550
-3 933.1 2813
-1 1349.7 1922.3
1 -956.2 139.4
3 -1422.2 406.8
5 3492.3 -1286.8
7 2709.8 5722.3
9 -3278.4 -23592
Source: Author’s calculations
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Before drawing conclusions based upon the mean changes in per capita consumption we 
must caution that some of the values for a change in household size rely on as few as one 
observation. For households that changed size from 1998 to 1999 (dashed line) there is a 
pattern of higher per capita consumption growth for households which range between 
dropping 7 and adding 3 members. However, this relationship breaks down as we move 
to an addition of 5 and 7 members and then reverses at 9 members. There is no clear 
relationship in the second period as there is tremendous fluctuation in per capita 
consumption based upon the net change in size. This information is evident graphically 
in Figure 4.4 as we see the mean change in per capita consumption in the first period 
(blue line) begin to increase at a net change of 3 members and then decrease again at a 
net change of 5 members. The second period (solid line) shows an upward trend at a net 
change of 5 members and then a sharp decline at 7. Based upon these data we would 
expect to find perhaps limited evidence in the first period of households decreasing size 
to increase per capita consumption and no evidence of such a relationship in the second 
period. In the next section we model a relationship to test this hypothesis.
II. D. Summary
A basic review of descriptive statistics suggests some directions for analysis in the next 
sections based upon the following observations:
• Contrary to initial suspicions it appears that the immediate post-Mitch period 
was actually less active than the subsequent 1999 -  2001 period for adjusting 
household size;
• The percentage of households adding (dropping) members decreases (increases) 
with household size during both periods;
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• A higher percentage of households left size unchanged in the first survey period 
regardless of size;
• A higher percentage of female headed households added members in the first 
survey period than any other household type;
• The alteration of household size over either survey period appears relatively 
insensitive to the size of harvest losses;
• There is an inverse relationship between household size and per capita 
consumption.
The next section sets out our strategy for testing these relationships more rigorously.
III. Methodology
Based upon the descriptive statistics there are a few hypotheses that we can explore. The 
first is that certain household types are more likely to alter household size. The second 
and third hypotheses are to evaluate which factors are associated with an increase and 
decrease in household size, respectively. All three of these hypotheses test for factors 
that affect the probability of a change in household size. These hypotheses are valuable 
but do not directly engage the question of whether adjusting household size was a coping 
mechanism. If households adjusted size as a coping mechanism then households with 
Mitch damages would have both a decrease in household size and an increase in per 
capita consumption (all else equal). This forms the basis for a fourth hypothesis: do 
Mitch-damaged households that decrease size witness an increase in per capita 
consumption?
III. A. Econometric Background
The discussion of household reformation from the previous chapter can be advanced by 
several modifications. We modify the model to include household characteristics which 
were not relevant for risk pooling and aid allocation, but which may be important as the 
household processes its decision to adjust household size. We also expand the analysis to 
do a joint significance test for shocks. This allows us to detect the possibility that each 
individual shock does not exert a strong influence on household reformation, but their 
aggregate impact does. Finally, we utilize a binary choice model.
Structuring the analysis around a binary choice (dichotomous outcome) model instead of 
a linear probability model is appropriate when examining dichotomous outcome variable, 
in this case, the probability of changing household size. In order to model the household 
decision to adjust composition the variable of interest is defined as a dichotomous 
outcome variable (Y). Where Y is the decision of household i to not adjust (Y = 0) or 
adjust (Y = 1). In the previous chapter we used an OLS regression to test for a 
statistically significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In 
this case the dependent variable is constrained between 0 and 1 since a traditional linear 
model could well predict a probability o f less than 0 or greater than 1. An additional 
concern is that a linear OLS model assumes that the error term or disturbance term p to
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be normally distributed. However, Y can only take two values (0,1) and this assumption 
no longer holds as the data takes a different distribution. These are not the only
22econometric reasons for abandoning the linear model, but two of the most apparent.
To address these concerns a common alternative is to use either a logit or probit model.
In brief, these models account for the different distribution of data that the linear model 
does not adequately handle.23 In practice the logit and probit models yield similar results 
although there are certain cases where one may be preferable.
III. B. Modeling the Decision to Adjust Household Size
In the previous section we identified several explanatory variables which are either 
associated with Hurricane Mitch or which are demographic characteristics. These factors 
include (but are not limited to) household size, gender of household head, poverty 
classification, household location, harvest losses due to Mitch and post-disaster aid 
received. In constructing a model a backwards selection process was used to eliminate 
variables which do not add explanatory value to the model. The list of variables 
considered is contained in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Potential Determinants of the Decision to Adjust Household Size
Variable Abbreviation Variable Type
Household Size in 1998 HH98 Quantitative
Household Size in 1999 HH99 Quantitative
Female Household Head FEMALE Qualitative
Rural Household RURAL Qualitative
Classified as Poor POOR Qualitative
Classified as Extremely Poor EPOOR Qualitative
Not Poor NONPOOR Qualitative
Children Aged 5 or Younger KIDS Qualitative
# of Children Aged 5 or Less NKIDS Quantitative
Mitch Harvest Losses HARV Quantitative
Mitch Long-Term Losses LTLOSS Quantitative
Total Mitch Agricultural 
Losses (Harvest + Longterm)
AGRLOSS Quantitative
Days Homeless due to Mitch DAYS Quantitative
Home Damaged by Mitch HDMG Qualitative
Water Supply Damaged by 
Mitch
WDMG Qualitative
Post-Mitch Official Aid OAID Quantitative
Post-Mitch Family Aid FAID Quantitative
Post-Mitch Total Aid TAID Quantitative
Engaged in Agriculture AGR Qualitative
22 For further discussion please refer to Gujarati 2003, p. 580 - 595
23 Ibid., Chapter 15.
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It is somewhat surprising that many of the variables do not add explanatory value to the 
model. In particular, the literature on household composition and children discussed in 
the introduction suggested that the number of children may be an important variable to 
consider. In addition to considering the number of children Browning (1992) finds that it 
is wise to include a dummy variable for children due to non-linearity in the effects of 
adding additional children. However neither the number of children nor a dummy 
variable adds explanatory value to the model.
In the equation 1 we consider the relevant factors enumerated in Table 4.10 with one 
modification. We first model we consider all households since a significant share of the 
sample is not engaged in agriculture. Thus including agricultural loss data would 
prematurely restrict the sample size.
(1 ) Pi =  F(a +  B]H H 98i +  B2FEM ALEj +  B3A G R i +  B4POORj +  B5EPO O Ri +  ft6R U R A Lj +  
l^TAIDi + pi)
Pi is the probability that household / will adjust composition, increase size or decrease 
size (as determined by the relevant equation). Pi is determined by a function (F) which is 
comprised of several explanatory variables. After different iterations of the model, the 
following factors were found to be most strongly associated with the probability that a 
household would adjust composition: household size at the beginning of the survey 
period (HH98/HH99), have a female household head (FEMALE), whether a household is 
engaged in agriculture (AGR), whether a household was classified as poor (POOR) or 
extremely poor (EPOOR), whether a household was located in a rural area (RURAL) and 
total aid received (TAID). Official aid and family aid were also tested, but their inclusion 
does not enhance the model and total aid is used instead.
For agricultural households the model is altered slightly to include the agricultural loss 
variables (AGRLOSS) and the AGR dummy variable is dropped. The amount o f 
agricultural losses is defined as the sum of harvest losses and monetary damages to 
farming equipment (e.g. livestock, tools, irrigation networks, etc.). During the model 
selection process total agricultural loss was found to perform better than harvest losses or 
long-term losses individually. This makes the model more parsimonious without 
sacrificing loss data and yields the model in equation 2.
(2) Pj =  F (a +  B ,H H 98i +  B2FEM ALEj +  B3A G R L O SSj +  B4PO O R i +  B5R U R A L i +  
B6EPOORj + ByTAIDj + pj)
In our interpretation of the results we would expect that variables whose coefficients are 
positive and significant are associated with an increase in the probability of adjusting 
household size while those variables with negative, significant coefficients are associated 
with a decrease in the probability of adjusting household size. In other words, a negative 
significant coefficient indicates an increase in the probability o f leaving household size 
unchanged.
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In formulating the model we also tested the possibility that the measured Mitch shocks 
were jointly significant for household change, additions or subtractions of members. We 
tested this using a linear probability model, which sacrifices some precision. However as 
a rule of thumb, if the results of the linear probability model are not statistically 
significant they are unlikely to be so in a binary choice model. Equation 3 models 
hurricane damages with various iterations of the dependent variable to reflect a change, 
increase, or decrease in household size in either of the two periods.
(3) Y it = a + Bi AGRLOSS* +  B2D A Y S i +  B3H D M G i +  B4W D M G j +  p*
In equation 3 Y is the change in household size for household / in time period t. The 
AGRLOSS remains the same from the previous equation and days homeless (DAYS), 
home damage (HDMG) and damage to the household’s water supply (WDMG) are also 
included. The results of this test reject the hypothesis that all Mitch shocks are jointly 
significant for any alteration of household size in either period.24
III. C. Adjusting Household Size as a Coping Mechanism
The final avenue to explore is that of household size adjustments are a means of coping 
with Mitch shocks. Based upon the plotted relationship in Figures 4.1 -  4.3 one motive 
for reducing household size may be to increase per capita consumption. In theory such a 
relationship would function as follows: a household which suffers Mitch losses would, 
absent other coping mechanisms, drop members to increase welfare as measured by per 
capita consumption. However if this hypothesis were true we would expect to see a 
steady increase (decrease) in per capita consumption as households drop (add) members. 
The relationship depicted in Figure 4.4 showed that the gains to dropping members 
begins to reverse when the net change in members reaches a given number. In order to 
test this relationship more rigorously we use the model in equation 4.
(4 ) ? C i = a + ? Si +  ? M i +  ? A j +  D A Y S i +  W A LLi +  W A TER j + u*
The change in per capita consumption (? C ) for household i from t to t+J is a function of 
the net change in household size (? S) across periods as well as the net change in Mitch 
losses (? M) and aid transfers (? A). Since Mitch losses and aid transfers are zero in time 
t, this value is equal to the nominal amount for each variable. It is straightforward to see 
that the changes in Mitch losses and aid will be zero for the second survey period and the 
equation effectively will simplify to a bivariate regression (not shown). For the same 
reason household variables across periods demographic characteristics will reduce to zero 
as nearly all demographic variables remain unchanged between survey periods.
Equation 4 includes a variable for agricultural losses (M) and in doing so excludes non- 
agricultural households from the sample. Modifying this variable to a dummy 
(AGRLOSS) which is set to 1 if the household experienced agricultural losses allows us 
to include non-agricultural households. This modification produces the model in 
equation 5.
24 F =  1.72; P rob>F  = 0 .1469
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(5) ? Q  = a + ? Si + ? Mj + ? Ai+ AGRLOSSj + u;
The next section presents regression results for the relationships modeled above.
IV. Results
Results from the models in equations 2 and 3 are presented in Tables 4.11 -  4.16. Each 
regression is repeated twice: once using the full sample and again excluding observations 
whose change in household size is fully explained by life cycle reasons. Those 
households which had changes in size entirely attributable to births and deaths during the 
survey periods are excluded. Given the relatively small number of households whose size 
adjustments are fully explained by life cycle reasons, it is reasonable to expect little 
variation in the results when these are excluded. Nevertheless, in the interest of 
completeness and for comparative purposes these results are also detailed. Tables 4.11 
and 4.12 present the results for the probability of changing household size. Tables 4.13 
and 4.14 follow with results for the probability of adding members. Probit results for 
dropping members are contained in Tables 4.15 and 4.16.
Based upon the probit results we can compute the probability of changing, increasing or 
decreasing household size for a given value o f any variable of interest. Tables 4.17 -  
4.19 illustrate the probabilities for changing, increasing or decreasing household size 
associated with specific variables. Results from the regression model o f a change in 
household size as a coping mechanism (equation 4) are presented in Table 4.20.
IV. A. Probability of Adjusting Household Size
IV. A. 1. 1998- 1999
During the immediate post-Mitch period three variables are shown in Tables 4.11 and 
4.12 to have a statistically significant impact on the probability o f adjust household size. 
The variables of interest are household size in 1998 (significant at 1%), having a female 
household head (significant at 1%) and being classified as poor (significant at 10%). All 
three variables have positive coefficients. Households with these characteristics had, 
ceteris paribus , a higher probability of adjusting household size. The results indicate that 
as household size increases the probability of adjusting size also increases, which 
supports the descriptive statistics. Female headed households are more likely to adjust 
size than male-headed ones, which again reinforces the conclusions from the previous 
section. The same is true for poor households relative to extremely poor and non-poor 
households.
Narrowing the sample to agricultural households allows us to consider on agricultural 
losses caused by Mitch. Agricultural losses (harvest losses plus long-term losses) are 
statistically significant at 5%. This finding is not surprising particularly given the impact 
of harvets losses on consumption discussed in the previous chapter. As with the full
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sample, having a female household head and household size in 1998 are also significant 
(at 10%). One difference compared with the full sample is that the rural household 
dummy variable is also significant. This is interesting, but not wholly unsurprising as we 
would expect that agricultural households are also, by definition, rural households as 
well. Eliminating households whose changes are fully explained by life cycle reasons 
does not appreciably affect significance levels.
IV. A. 2. 1999-2001
During the second period three variables are statistically significant over the full sample. 
Household size at the beginning of the period (HH99) is significant (at 1 %), having a 
female household head is also statistically significant (at 5%) and a household being rural 
is significant at 10%. It is interesting to note the inverse relationship between the signs 
on the coefficients during the two periods. For example, the POOR and RURAL 
coefficients changes from positive to negative and the AGR and TAID coefficients 
change from negative to positive. The negative sign on the RURAL coefficient indicates 
that over the full sample being a rural household had a significant impact on the 
probability of adjusting household size and that rural households were actually less likely 
to adjust size.
The significance of agricultural losses appears short-lived as AGRLOSS is no longer a 
significant determinant of adjusting household size from 1999 to 2001. The rural 
household dummy variable also loses significance as we move across survey periods. 
Although none of the other explanatory variables were statistically significant it is 
interesting to note that the EPOOR coefficient is consistently negative and the FEMALE 
household is consistently positive. The TAID coefficient and RURAL coefficients both 
switch signs across survey periods, however total aid is not found to be significant in 
either instance.
Excluding households with only life cycle changes causes some variation in the statistical 
significance o f certain variables. When are all households are included the rural dummy 
is significant at 10% for affecting the probability of impacting household change. 
However, when we remove households with only life cycle changes the rural dummy 
variables is no longer significant although the coefficient remains negative. The second 
difference occurs with the female dummy. Over both groups the female dummy 
increases in significance, from 5% to 1% for the full sample and from not significant to 
significant at 10% for agricultural households. This is expected as the households which 
are removed are predominantly male-headed. All three households with deaths were 
male headed and only 5 of the 45 households with births were female headed.
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Table 4.11: Probit Results for Change in Household Size
Dependent Variable: Adjusting Household Size
Survey Period
1998- 1999 1999--2001
Constant -0.695*** - 1 .1 2 1 *** -0.095 -0 .1 1
(0.182) (0.259) (0.183) (0.253)
Explanatory
Variables:
HH98 0.081***
(0 .0 2 2 )
0 .1 1 1 ***
(0.029)
- -
HH99 - - 0.08***
(0.023)
0.093***
(0.029)
FEMALE 0.468*** 0.508** 0.359** 0.305
(0.151) (0 .2 2 2 ) (0.156) (0.232)
POOR 0.259* 0.192 -0.046 -0.214
(0.136) (0.183) (0.137) (0.183)
EPOOR 0.138 -0.225 0.136 -0.039
(0.166) (0 .2 2 2 ) (0.167) (0.217)
AGR -0.082
(0 .1 2 2 )
- 0.073
(0.124)
-
AGRLOSS - 0 .0 2 2 **
(0 .0 1 1 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
(0 .0 1 )
RURAL 0.083 0.308* -0.227* -0.072
(0.13) (0.179) (0.134) (0.18)
TAID (in thousands 
of cordobas)
-0.035 
. (0.032)
-0.028
(0.035)
0.006
(0.026)
0.004
(0.028)
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05
N = 495 298 495 298
Probit coefficients are displayed in the table with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% *Significant at 10%
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Table 4.12: Probit Results for Change in Household Size
Dependent Variable: Adjusting Household Size
(Households with Only Life-Cycle Changes Excluded)
Survey Period
1998- 1999 1999--2001
Constant -0.803*** -1.256*** -0.343*** -0.583***
(0.188) (0.269) (0.194) (0.282)
Explanatory
Variables:
HH98 q  Q 0 * * * 0 .1 2 1 *** - -
(0.023) (0.03)
HH99 - - 0.099*** 0 .1 2 ***
(0.023) (0.03)
FEMALE 0.459*** 0.532** 0  4 4 4 *** 0.443*
(0.156) (0.23) (0.161) (0.239)
POOR 0.233* 0.15 -0.055 -0 . 2 1 1
(0.139) (0.189) (0.143) (0.192)
EPOOR 0 . 1 1 2 -0.293 0.084 -0 . 1 2
(0.17) (0.229) (0.173) (0.23)
AGR -0 .1 1 - 0 . 0 1 2 -
(0.125) (0.13)
AGRLOSS - -0.024** - -0.008
(0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 )
RURAL 0.109 0.314* -0.16 0.091
(0.133) (0.185) (0.141) (0.196)
TAID (in thousands -0.03 -0.025 0 . 0 1 2 0.016
of cordobas) (0.032) (0.035) (0.027) (0.029)
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.06
N = 471 282 447 264
Probit coefficients are displayed in the table with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% *Significant at 10%
IV. B. Probability of Increasing Household Size
By redefining the dependent variable as Y = 1 if the household added members and Y = 0 
if the household did not add members we can test which factors significantly affected the 
probability of adding members. These results are presented below in Table 4.13 for the 
full sample. Table 4.14 contains the results with increases attributed solely to births 
factored out.
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Table 4.13: Probit Results for Increasing Household Size
_________ Dependent Variable: Increasing Size_________
Survey Period
1998 - 1999 1999-2001
Constant -0.565*** -0.804*** 0 . 2 0 2 0.569**
(0.19) (0.265) (0.188) (0.264)
Explanatory
Variables:
HH98 -0.05**
(0.024)
-0.015
(0.029)
- -
HH99 - - -0.118***
(0.026)
- 0  11  *** 
(0.032)
FEMALE 0.52***
(0.153)
0.471**
(0.223)
0.008
(0.155)
-0 . 0 2 1
(0.232)
POOR 0.328** 0.252 -0 . 1 2 -0.251
(0.143) (0.189) (0.144) (0.193)
EPOOR 0 . 0 1 2 -0.170 0.23 0.285
(0.181) (0.234) (0.172) (0.223)
AGR 0.146
(0.131)
- 0.187
(0.13)
-
AGRLOSS (in 
thousands of
* -0.019*
(0 .0 1 1 )
“ 0.035**
(0.015)
cordobas)
RURAL -0.035 0.155 -0.209 -0.261
(0.136) (0.188) (0.135) (0.185)
TAID (in thousands 
of cordobas)
-0.027
(0.033)
-0.005
(0.032)
0 . 0 0 1
(0.026)
-0.008
(0.028)
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
N = 495 298 495 298
Probit coefficients are displayed in the table with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% ^Significant at 10%
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Table 4.14: Probit Results for Increasing Household Size 
Dependent Variable: Increasing Household Size 
(Households with Birth Only Increases Eliminated)
Survey Period
1998 - 1999 1999-2001
Constant -0.803*** -1.256*** -0.108 -0.008
(0.188) (0.269) (0.206) (0.3)
Explanatory
Variables:
HH98 -0 09*** 
(0.023)
-0 .1 2 1 ***
(0.03)
- -
HH99 - - -0.099***
(0.028)
-0.081**
(0.034)
FEMALE 0.459*** 0.532** 0.127 0.197
(0.156) (0.23) (0.164) (0.242)
POOR 0.233* 0.15 -0.167 -0.284
(0.139) (0.189) (0.157) (0 .2 1 2 )
EPOOR 0 . 1 1 2
(0.17)
-0.293
(0.229)
0.119
(0.187)
0.081
(0.0247)
AGR -0 .1 1
(0.125)
- 0 .1
(0.141)
-
AGRLOSS (in 
thousands of
" -0.024**
(0 .0 1 1 )
“ 0.026*
(0.015)
cordobas)
RURAL 0.109 0.314* -0.119 -0.06
(0.133) (0.185) (0.15) (0.213)
TAID (in thousands 
of cordobas)
-0.03
(0.032)
-0.025
(0.035)
0.007
(0.027)
0.009
(0.028)
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04
N = 471 282 450 266
Probit coefficients are displayed in the table with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% *Significant at 10%
IV. B. 1. 1998- 1999
Over the full sample it is interesting that household size is statistically significant with a 
negative coefficient. This result supports the earlier descriptive statistics which indicate 
that larger households are less likely to add members. Having a female household head is 
significant at 1% and is strongly associated with an increased probability of adding 
household members from 1998 to 1999. The other variable of interest is the poor dummy 
variable (POOR) which is significant at 5%. This is unusual as we may anticipate that 
poor households would be less likely to add members. Instead we find that poor 
households were in fact more likely to add members over this time. Again we find this 
relationship is brief as the poor coefficient is both negative and not significant in the 
subsequent period. Finally, the dummy variable AGR is not significant in either period.
When the sample is restricted to the households engaged in agriculture several results 
change. During the 1998 -  1999 period the coefficient on household size remains
101
negative, but the variable is no longer statistically significant. The presence o f a female 
household head continues to be significant at 1% with a positive coefficient. Agricultural 
losses are statistically significant at 10% during the immediate post-Mitch period. As 
losses increase the probability of household adding members decreases. This relationship 
sounds intuitive.
IV. B. 2. 1999-2001
In the second period household size is also significant (at 1%) with a negative coefficient. 
We also observe that the increased probability of adding members associated with having 
a female household head in the first period appears short-lived as the female dummy is no 
longer significant over the 1999 to 2001 period. Over the full sample none o f the other 
variables are statistically significant however it is interesting to note that the coefficient 
on poor households has switch signs from positive to negative. This suggests that being a 
poor household was likely to increase the probability of adding members in the first 
period, but less likely to do so in the second period.
The negative relationship between harvest losses no longer holds during the second 
survey period. The amount of agricultural losses due to Mitch is significant at 5% with a 
positive coefficient. This indicates that as losses sustained due to Mitch increase, 
affected households had a higher probability of adding members between the 1999 and 
2001 surveys. This sounds unusual, but a possible explanation is that the impact of these 
damages was brief and households are simply adding back members they lost 
immediately after Mitch. A review of the results in Table 4.14 will allow us to explore 
this possibility further.
IV. C. Probability of Decreasing Household Size
IV. C. 1. 1998- 1999
In the immediate post-Mitch period only two variables are statistically significant for the 
probability of decreasing household size. Household size is significant at 1% with a 
positive coefficient. Being an agricultural household is significant at 5% with a negative 
coefficient. Based upon these results it appears that immediately after the hurricane 
agricultural households were much less likely to drop members relative to urban 
households. Following this conclusion it is unsurprising that agricultural losses were not 
significant during the same period. The coefficient on aid received is negative, but never 
significant. Despite the lack of statistical significance the coefficient’s sign suggests that 
the probability of dropping members decreased as aid received increase. In addition we 
would not expect a female headed household to be significant for dropping members 
since they are also significant for adding members in this period. This is indeed what we 
find. Finally, there are no households whose loss of members is entirely attributable to 
deaths in this period. Therefore the regression results in Table 4.16 are only for the 
second survey period.
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IV. C. 2. 1999-2001
During the second period household size is also significant at 1%. This supports the view 
that as household size increases the probability of dropping members from the household 
increases. Having a female household head is significant (at 5%) with a positive 
coefficient during 1999 -  2001. Female-headed households were more likely to drop 
members during this time. When we compare this result to the propensity of female 
headed households to add members in the first period it appears that the addition of 
members was a temporary measure.
When we restrict the sample to agricultural households, household size continues to be 
significant at 1%. However, having a female household head is no longer significant, 
which implies that the female headed households who dropped members in this period 
may have been predominantly non-agricultural households. The amount o f total 
agricultural loss is also statistically significant at 1%. The negative coefficient indicates 
the decrease in probability of dropping members associated with agricultural losses 
sustained during Mitch. Adjusting the sample to exclude the dropping of members for 
life cycle reasons does not alter the results.
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Table 4.15: Probit Results for Decreasing Household Size
Dependent Variable: Decreasing Household Size_____
Survey;5eriod
All HHs Agricultural
HHs
All HHs Agricultural
HHs
1998 - 1999 1999-2001
Constant -1.832***
(0 .2 2 2 )
-2.163***
(0.324)
-1.677***
(0.205)
-2.077***
(0.298)
Explanatory
Variables:
HH98 0.165***
(0.026)
0.172***
(0.033)
- -
HH99 - - 0.185***
(0.024)
0.194***
(0.03)
FEMALE -0.077
(0.185)
0.08
(0.267)
0.38**
(0.157)
0.315
(0.237)
POOR 0.139
(0.156)
-0.007
(0.226)
0.154
(0.147)
0.096
(0.198)
EPOOR 0.196
(0.187)
-0.077
(0.256)
0.006
(0.171)
-0.225
(0.228)
AGR -0.296**
(0.144)
- -0 .1 1
(0.133)
-
AGRLOSS (in 
thousands of 
cordobas)
-0.007
(0 .0 1 2 )
-0.028***
(0 .0 1 1 )
RURAL 0.139
(0.156)
0.228
(0.216)
-0.034
(0.139)
0 .2 1 1
(0.194)
TAID (in thousands 
of cordobas)
-0.03
(0.045)
-0.079
(0.075)
0.013
(0.026)
0.017
(0.028)
Pseudo R2 0 .1 1 0 . 1 0 0.13 0.16
N = 495 298 495 298
Probit coefficients are displayed in the table with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% *Significant at 10%
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Table 4.16: Probit Results for Decreasing Household Size 
Dependent Variable: Decreasing Household Size 
(Households with Decrease Explained by Deaths Removed)25
1999--2001
Constant -1.702*** -2.156***
(0.207) (0.305)
Explanatory Variables:
HH99 0.188** 0.199***
(0.024) (0.031)
FEMALE 0.397** 0.341
(0.157) (0.238)
POOR 0.129 0.05
(0.148) (0 .2 )
EPOOR -0.015 -0.237
(0.171) (0.229)
AGR -0.114 -
(0.134)
AGRLOSS (in thousands - -0.029***
of cordobas) (0 .0 1 1 )
RURAL -0.024 0.258
(0-14) (0.198)
TAID (in thousands of 0.015 0.019
cordobas) (0.026) (0.028)
Pseudo R2^ 0.07 0.09
N = 492 296
Probit coefficients are displayed in the table with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% *Significant at 10%
IV. D. Probability of Household Change by Household Characteristics
In addition to tests for statistical significance we can further analyze those factors that are 
important for changes in household size. Holding all other factors constant, we can test 
the probability a household characteristic will have on a household changing, increasing 
or decreasing size. Tables 4 .17 -4 .19  indicate the respective changes in probability 
associated with household size, agricultural losses and gender of the household head.
With household size it is interesting to note that the probability of changing, increasing or 
decreasing household size is related the number of members. In the case of changing 
household size, a household with two members in 1998 had, ceteris paribus, a 38% 
probability of changing household size. This probability increases by 3% per member at 
which point a household with 10 members in 1998 had a 62% probability of changing 
size. The relationship for households from 1999 -  2001 is different in two respects. One 
noticeable difference is that the initial probability of change is higher at 51% for a two 
person household in this period. A second key difference is that the probability of 
adjusting size by number of members increases at a more rapid rate. There is not much 
change as we increase the members from two to four however the probability o f change
25 Regression results are identical to those reported earlier for the 1998 -  1999 period since there were no 
households which lost members due to death during this time.
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increases quite rapidly to 63% for a household of six members. A household of six 
members is slightly above the mean household size in 1999 and this suggests that a key 
inflection point during this period lies at mean household size. When households exceed 
mean household size the probability of changing size increases quite rapidly at a rate of 
about 2.5% per additional member to a probability of 75% for a household of ten.
The probabilities associated with an increase in household size decrease at about 2%  per 
additional member in 1998 -  1999. There is also a decrease o f about 3.5% per member 
in 1999 -  2001. The difference in the rate of decrease across periods means that smaller 
households (of less than 6 members) were less likely to add members in 1998 -  1999 than 
in 1999 -  2001. By the same token larger households (of 6 members or more) were less 
likely to add members in 1999 -  2001 than in 1998 -  1999.
The relationship probability of decreasing household size in both survey periods is shown 
in Table 4.17. In absolute terms households of any size are less likely to drop members 
in 1998 -  1999 than in 1999 -  2001 although the probabilities are nearly equal for a 
household of ten members. All relationships are presented graphically in Figure 4.5.
Table 4.17: Probability of Household Size Adjustment by Number of Members,
Ceteris Paribus
1998- 1999
# of 
Members
Changing 
Household Size
Increasing Household 
Size
Decreasing 
Household Size
2 38% 36% 6%
4 44% 32% 11%
6 50% 28% 19%
8 56% 25% 29%
10 62% 21% 41%
1999-2001
# of 
Members
Changing 
Household Size
Increasing Household 
Size
Decreasing 
Household Size
2 51% 45% 11%
4 53% 37% 20%
6 64% 30% 31%
8 69% 23% 44%
10 75% 18% 42%
Source: Authors’s calculations o f  probability based upon probit coefficients in Tables 4 .11 ,4 .13 ,4 .15 .
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Figure 4.5: Probability of Household Size Adjustment
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Source: Table 4.17
A second variable of interest in our model is the gender of the household head (Table 
4.18). In absolute terms female headed households are both more likely to change 
household size and increase household size in both survey periods. They are also less 
likely to decrease household size in either period. In relative terms we see that female 
headed households were 23% more likely than male headed households to change size in 
the second period compared to only 13% more in the first period. It appears the greater 
propensity to adjust size is mostly reflected in decreasing household size. Female 
headed households were 15% more likely to drop members in the second period 
compared to their male counterparts versus a difference of only 5% in the first period. 
Finally, there is a small drop in the difference of the probability of adding members 
between the genders (16% in the first period versus 12%) although this change is not 
exceptionally large. Most of the change is reflected in an increased propensity of male 
headed households to add members.
Table 4.18: Probability of Household Size Adjustment by Gender, Ceteris Paribus
1998- 1999
Gender Changing 
Household Size
Increasing Household 
Size
Decreasing 
Household Size
Female 60% 41% 27%
Male 47% 25% 22%
1999-2001
Gender Changing 
Household Size
Increasing Household 
Size
Decreasing 
Household Size
Female 84% 42% 46%
Male 61% 30% 31%
Source: Authors’s calculations o f  probability based upon probit coefficients in Tables 4.11, 4.13, 4.15.
When examining the role of agricultural loss size in the probability of changing 
household size a surprising theme emerges. The results in Table 4.19 suggest that the 
size of the loss is rather immaterial insofar as probability of household change is
—   ----------------------------------
—
• — Change Period 1 
Increase Period 1 
Decrease Period 1 
Change Period 2 
Increase Period 2 
! —*— Decrease Period 2
107
concerned. Any loss from 100 cordobas upwards to 5,000 is associated with only an 
incremental change in probability. The mean loss is 4,708 cordobas with a standard 
deviation of 7,300 cordobas. Even as we reach loss sizes which are two standard 
deviations from the mean (approximately 18,000 cordobas) the associated change in 
probability is negligible. A loss threshold of 18,000 cordobas includes 278 of the 298 
agricultural households. Extending this threshold by an additional standard deviation to 
24,000 cordobas does not alter the pattern of incremental probabilistic change despite 
capturing nearly all o f the sample. It appears that only in the extreme tail o f the 
distribution for the largest loss sizes (e.g. 63,000 cordobas) do we observe a large shift in 
the associated probability.
Table 4.19: Probability of Household Size Adjustment by Agricultural Losses,
Ceteris Paribus
1998- 1999
Losses in Changing Increasing Household Decreasing Household
Cordobas Household Size Size Size
100 45% 26% 19%
1,000 46% 27% 19%
2,000 47% 27% 19%
3,000 47% 28% 20%
4,000 48% 28% 20%
5,000 49% 29% 20%
11,000 54% 32% 21%
18,000 60% 37% 22%
63,000 (max loss) 88% 65% 29%
1999-2001
Losses in Changing Increasing Household Decreasing Household
Cordobas Household Size Size Size
100 64% 37% 28%
1,000 64% 35% 29%
2,000 64% 34% 30%
3,000 64% 33% 31%
4,000 64% 32% 32%
5,000 64% 31% 33%
11,000 65% 24% 39%
18,000 67% 17% 47%
63,000 (max loss) 73% 1% 88%
Source: Authors’s calculations o f probability based upon probit coefficients in Tables 4.11, 4.13,4.15.
The results also reinforce earlier findings that the second survey period was a more active 
one for adjusting household size. What is particularly striking is that for the large loss 
households (e.g. those with 11,000 cordobas or more of losses) the probability of adding 
members is much lower in the second period than in the first. For households with 
smaller losses the reverse is true.
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IV. E. Changing Household Size as a Coping Mechanism
The results from equation 5 are presented below in Table 4.20. The regression is run 
three times. The results in the left-hand column for each period use all households 
including non-agricultural ones. In addition, some null values in the survey limit the 
sample size to 417 households. The central column in each period contains all 
agricultural households less those excluded for having null values for other shock 
variables for a total o f 257 households. The right column in each period captures all 298 
agricultural households, which comes at the cost of dropping the qualitative Mitch 
damage indicators. Dropping these variables is not preferable since we decrease our 
sample size, but none are statistically significant.
If the change in per capita consumption is independent of Mitch losses and purely a 
function of changing household size we would expect that Mitch losses would not be 
statistically significant for the change in consumption, while the change in size would be. 
The household’s objective is to maximize per capita consumption we would expect that 
changing household size would be a significant determinant.
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Table 4.20: OLS Regression Results for Per Capita Consumption Change 1998 -
1999
Dependent Variable: Household Per Capita Consumption Change 1998 - 1999
All
Surveyed
Households
(1)
Households 
Surveyed with 
Agricultural Losses 
and Wall/Water 
Supply Damage 
(2)
Households 
Surveyed with 
Agricultural Losses 
(3)
Net Change in 
Household Size
-666.72***
(131.15)
-564.44***
(161.8)
-457.38***
(113.9)
Agricultural 
Loss (Dummy)
219
(392.32)
“ -
Days Homeless 8.74
(13.27)
10.84
(13.79)
-
Wall Damage -142.31
(471.5)
-646.11
(551.92)
-
Damage to 
Household 
Water Supply
127.12
(507.61)
371.59
(569.52)
Agricultural 
Losses (in 
thousands of 
cordobas)
-48.06
(31.81)
-47.12*
(26.85)
TAID (in 
thousands of 
cordobas)
204.66**
(84.76)
180.15
(83.24)
187.04**
(73.08)
Constant -179.88
(321.99)
-88.18
(311.73)
-148.76
(244.99)
0.08 0.08 0.08
N = 417 257 298
♦♦♦Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% *Significant at 10%
Over the full sample results (Column 1) suggest that the net change in household size was 
statistically significant at 1% for the change in household per capita consumption 
between 1998 and 1999. The coefficient is negative which is unsurprising given the 
distribution of per capita consumption by household size plotted in Figure 4.1. In 
addition we observe that none o f the variables measuring Mitch damages are statistically 
significant. Based upon this result it would appear that the change in per capita 
consumption was independent of the indicated Mitch damages. Again this is not wholly 
unsurprising considering the results in the previous chapter which showed that 
consumption was relatively unaffected Mitch damages outside of agricultural losses. 
Finally, we see that aid is statistically significant for the change in per capita 
consumption (at 5%) with a positive coefficient. Again this is unsurprising given the 
results in the previous chapter.
The second variant of the model captures as many surveyed agricultural households as 
possible which were exposed to all measured types of hurricane damages. For this
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variation of the model the results (Column 2) net composition change is also significant 
at 1% with a negative coefficient. None of the Mitch damage variables are statistically 
significant at any level. Aid is also not statistically significant. These results also 
suggest that the change in per capita consumption was independent of any Mitch 
damages. One disadvantage of this regression is that in order to capture all Mitch 
damages we reduce the sample of agricultural households by 41 (from 298 to 257 or 
roughly 14%). This provides the benefit of capturing additional shock data, however 
most of these have been shown to be unimportant with the exception of agricultural 
losses.
Dropping variables without explanatory value from our model allows us to capture the 
excluded 14% of agricultural households for which we have data on agricultural losses. 
This variation of the model (Column 3) captures all agricultural households and makes 
the model more parsimonious by excluding other Mitch damage indicators, which are 
shown to be not significant for the change in per capita consumption. In this model net 
change in household size is also significant at 1%. Agricultural losses are statistically 
significant (at 10%) with a negative coefficient and aid is significant (at 5%) with a 
positive coefficient. These results indicate that for agricultural households change in 
size, agricultural losses and aid received were all statistically significant determinants of 
a change in consumption per capita. The coefficients on all three have the expected sign 
and suggest that households which experienced agricultural losses, even with aid, 
adjusted size to realize an increase in consumption per capita among household members.
V. Conclusion
At the outset we enumerated four questions for analysis in order to assess the possible 
role of household reformation as a coping mechanism to a large aggregate shock - 
Hurricane Mitch. Specifically, we asked (i) is the rate at which households adjust size in 
the 1998-1999 pre and post Mitch periods different than in the 1999 -  2001 period? (ii) 
What impact do Mitch shocks have on the probability of a household’s decision to adjust 
size? (iii) What impact do factors unrelated to Mitch have on the probability of adjusting 
household size? (iv) Do households adjust size as a post-Mitch coping mechanism?
Prior to any statistical analysis it was suggested that we would expect the 1998 -  1999 
period to be an active one in terms o f households adjusting size due to the stress placed 
on traditional household coping mechanisms by Hurricane Mitch. Theory was unclear, 
however, on whether we would expect households affected by Mitch to add or lose 
members. The model of household division put forth by Foster and Rosenzweig suggests 
that households will divide when members derive a negative marginal utility from shared 
housing. In short, the household will divide when the economic gains from living apart 
exceed those from living jointly. The converse is true for household addition.
One of the benefits of separate residences is risk diversification. Separate households 
tend to have income streams that are less correlated. This is particularly true for 
agricultural households as different plot locations provide some hedge against
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idiosyncratic variations in yield. Unfortunately for Nicaraguan households, the expansive 
reach of Hurricane Mitch negated many of the benefits of risk diversification and risk 
pooling as hurricane damages afflicted entire regions. On one hand it is reasonable to 
anticipate that affected households would add members in order to reduce the marginal 
cost of household public goods. On the other hand if households had their income 
streams and consumption sufficiently disrupted that the costs of leaving household size 
unadjusted exceeded the gains from adding members we would expect households to 
drop members.
V. A. Is the Rate at Which Households Adjust Size in the 1998-1999 Pre and Post 
Mitch Periods Different Than in the 1999 -  2001 Period?
Initially we posited that the period immediately following Mitch would be more active in 
terms of households adjusting size in response to Mitch’s impact. Instead we found that 
the opposite was true. Roughly 50% of households adjusted household size in the 1998 -  
1999 period, while 66% adjusted household size in the 1999 -  2001 period. Further 
analysis showed that in addition to the second survey period being more active there were 
also noticeable differences in household adjustments. Perhaps most striking is the 
tendency of households to leave household size unchanged in the immediate post-Mitch 
period. Instead of households adjusting rapidly to the impact o f Mitch it appears that 
most household types did not adjust household size until well after the hurricane. In this 
respect, it appears that a principal impact of Mitch was to delay adjustments in household 
size by more than 6 months (roughly the amount of time between Mitch and the 1999 
survey).
V. B. What Impact Do Mitch Shocks Have on the Probability of a Household’s 
Decision to Adjust Size?
We measured the impact of Mitch shocks while deriving the model presented in section 
III and the only ones that added explanatory value to the model were total agricultural 
losses. This makes intuitive sense based upon the results in the previous chapter. Given 
that agricultural losses did not affect all households we also introduced an agricultural 
dummy variable. A household’s designation as agricultural and the amount of 
agricultural losses were first tested for their impact on the probability of adjusting size (in 
either direction) and then for their respective impact on the probability of adding or 
dropping members.
Results showed that a household being agricultural was associated with a lower 
probability o f changing size in 1998 -  1999 and a higher probability in 1999 -  2001, but 
was not statistically significant in either period. However, when we isolate households 
which dropped members results indicate that being an agricultural household was a 
statistically significant determinant of dropping household members. Agricultural 
households were much less likely to drop members than non-agricultural households 
during 1998- 1999.
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When we restrict the sample to agricultural households, we can focus on agricultural 
losses, which were statistically significant in all periods. The probit results indicate that 
as losses increased the probability of adjusting household size in 1998 -  1999 also 
increased. Rising agricultural losses decreased the probability of adding members 
decreased in 1998 -  1999, but increased it in 1999 -  2001. Agricultural losses did not 
significantly impact the probability of dropping members in 1998 -  1999, but rising 
agricultural losses decreased the probability o f dropping members in 1999 -  2001.
V. C. What Impact Do Factors Unrelated to Mitch Have on the Probability of 
Adjusting Household Size?
We surveyed a range of factors and two were consistently significant across the probit 
analyses: household size at the beginning of the survey period and having a female 
household head. These factors tend to be significant whether we are considering the 
probability of household change or the probability of change in a specific direction.
From the descriptive statistics and probit analysis we can draw several conclusions about 
which types of households were most likely to adjust size and add or remove members in 
a given period.
One factor which is remarkably consistent across all analysis is household size. Both 
descriptive statistics and econometric results indicate that smaller households are more 
likely to add members and larger households are more likely to drop members. This 
relationship holds across the full sample and for the isolated sample of agricultural 
households. We also found that for two households of equal size, the household in the 
latter survey period is more likely to change or decrease size. However, with regards to 
increasing size households of more than six members are more likely to add members in 
the earlier survey period, while households of less than 6 members are more likely to add 
members in the latter survey period.
The additional variable which significantly impacted the probability of household change 
in different sample groups and survey periods was whether or not the household had a 
female head. In absolute terms, we found that households with a female head were more 
likely to change, increase and decrease household size in both survey periods. In relative 
terms we showed that female headed households were more likely to change or decrease 
household size in the latter period and equally likely to add members in both periods.
V. D. Is Household Change a Coping Mechanism for Mitch Damages?
The response to this question is largely contextual based upon whether we isolate 
agricultural households. Over the full sample, the answer appears to be no. While we 
find evidence of a linkage between household size and the change in household per capita 
consumption, there is limited evidence of a comparable linkage between Mitch shocks 
and per capita consumption. An analysis of all households shows no relationship, nor 
does a more narrow analysis of agricultural households. Only when we consider all 
agricultural households do we find evidence of a relationship between Mitch damages 
and the change in household per capita consumption. Based upon these results it would
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appear that a change in household size was a viable non-market coping mechanism for 
agricultural households, even when we consider the positive impact o f post-disaster aid.
V. E. Concluding Remarks
At the outset we raised the issue of adjustments in household size after Hurricane Mitch 
and the factors which affected the probability of a change. We also introduced the 
alteration o f household size as a possible coping mechanism to aggregate shocks. Based 
earlier work by Foster and Rosenzweig we discussed potential determinants of household 
division, however it was unclear what the impact, if any, of Mitch on Nicaraguan 
households would be as economic theory was unclear as to how households would 
behave.
Econometric analysis showed that while other sub-themes emerge, agricultural 
households play an integral role in our analysis. We identified an inverse relationship 
between household size and per capita consumption and demonstrated differences in 
patterns o f changing household size in the two survey periods after Mitch. In general we 
observe that households were less likely to adjust household size in the 1998 -  1999 
period. We also find that smaller households are more likely to add members while 
larger households are more likely to drop members. We also show differences in the 
patterns o f changing household size between female and male headed households, with 
females being more likely to add members in the immediate post-Mitch period.
A constant theme across the analysis is the behavior of agricultural households after 
Mitch. The descriptive statistics their pattern of household change across survey periods 
was relatively in line with the entire sample. However, the probit results showed the 
probability o f adding members decreased with agricultural losses in the first period. The 
probability o f dropping members decreased with agricultural losses in the second period. 
Whether or not a household was engaged in agriculture also reduced the probability of 
decreasing members in the first period. Further interpretation of the probit results 
showed that it appears to be the incidence rather than the amount of losses, which was 
significant for agricultural households changing their household size. Increasing the loss 
amount by entire standard deviations results in only a negligible increase in the 
probability o f altering size. Regression results also suggest (with the aforementioned 
caveats) that agricultural losses are the only Mitch related damages that exert are 
important for changing household per capita consumption -  even after controlling for 
changes in household size and aid received. This suggests a coping relationship in the 
change in household size and agricultural losses significantly impact household per capita 
consumption.
In sum, we find evidence to suggest that suffering agricultural losses caused by Mitch 
strongly affected the probability of adjusting household size and that a coping 
relationship exists in which the change in harvest losses and household size consequently 
leads to an increase in household per capita consumption. The findings are consistent 
with those in the previous chapter and underscore the impact o f agricultural losses on 
Nicaraguan households as well as the difference in response to Mitch by female and male
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headed households. The next chapter focuses on the impact o f Mitch on female headed 
households and their response.
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Chapter 5
Poverty, Vulnerability and Response of 
Nicaraguan Female Headed Households 
to Hurricane Mitch
I. Introduction
The development literature has extensively documented the economic, social and 
political inequalities that women face (UN 2006, World Bank 2002). Within 
development economics a body of evidence exists to support a relationship between 
having a female household head and poverty in the developing and developed world. If 
female headed households (FHHs) are marginalized in everyday economic activities it 
stands to reason that they are more vulnerable to risk and less equipped to respond to 
unexpected shocks by using traditional coping mechanisms (both formal and informal).
Despite institutional and political gender discrimination which may negatively influence 
official transfers to FHHs many studies in the economic literature have found that private, 
inter-household transfers are positively targeted towards women. In their study of urban 
households, Cox and Jimenez (1998) show that Colombian inter-household transfers are 
favorably targeted to FHHs in urban Cartagena. In Peru Cox et al. (1998) find that a 
disproportionate share of child-to-parent transfers is allocated to female headed 
households. In El Salvador Kaufman and Lindauer (1986) find that transfers to female 
headed households are roughly 2.5 higher than those to male headed households even 
after adjusting for income levels. Evidence from the Philippines (Cox et al. 2004) also 
shows that female headed households receive higher private transfers than male headed 
ones. Female headed households are also more likely to receive remittances from abroad 
which lends support to the theory that these transfer levels are driven by migrant 
husbands. If these transfers contain a risk sharing component we would expect them to 
continue to be targeted to female headed households in the post-disaster environment.
Their may be at least two reasons to explain a targeted distribution of inter-household 
transfers to FHHs. One is a structural function of a divided household when the husband 
moves abroad or to an urban area and sends remittances. The second is of a behavioral 
nature and has been noted in intergenerational studies. In these situations transfers are 
payments for in-kind services such as child rearing or household work (Cox and Jimenez 
1998). The authors also indicate that women have fewer opportunities in the labor 
market and thus have higher income risk.
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Women and female headed households can also disproportionately impacted by disasters 
(ECLAC 2003). Female headed households may incur direct and indirect losses. Direct 
losses include damage to the home, its furnishings and appliances. The loss of productive 
appliances that are used in home workshops or small business can be particularly 
crippling. Indirect losses are classified by four groupings: (i) loss of external productive 
employment and income; (ii) loss of household production and income; (iii) an increase 
in women’s reproductive work and (iv) other indirect damages (ECLAC 2003). The loss 
of external productive employment includes becoming unemployed or underemployed 
following the disaster. Loss of household production and income occurs as a female 
headed household’s home based entrepreneurial activity is disrupted. This activity may 
often be in the informal sector and estimates are not captured by official statistics. 
Increased reproductive work refers to time devoted to tasks such as securing food, 
shelter, medical supplies and survival necessities that entail an opportunity cost.
Examples would be time spent seeking aid, preparing meals and household reconstruction 
and repairs. These tasks do not have a monetary value, but are necessary and are often 
performed by women even in male headed households. Finally other types of indirect 
damages may include the loss or destruction of assets the female headed household has 
borrowed or disruption to income flows the household needs to repay any loans (ECLAC 
2003).
This chapter focuses on the allocation of post-disaster aid to FHHs and the behavior of 
FHHs after Mitch. It explores three questions: (i) whether FHHs, and in particular 
agricultural FHHs, were disadvantaged in receiving official aid (ii) if  FHHs were targeted 
for inter-household transfers based upon the gender of the household head and (iii) why 
some FHHs are more likely to increase household size after Mitch.
I. A. Why Are Female Headed Households Poor?
Many studies have found a relationship between female headship and poverty. Buvinic 
and Gupta (1997) review 61 studies on the relationship between female headship and 
poverty: only eight of these (13%) found no evidence of greater poverty for FHHs. 
Buvinic and Gupta cite three factors why FHHs may be poorer. First, although female 
households are smaller, they have a greater dependency ratio. That is to say that the ratio 
of non-workers to workers to workers is higher in FHHs. It should be noted that the 
elderly are not included as dependents since they may have their own savings or assets 
with which to support themselves (or still be employed). A second factor is existing 
inequalities within the labor market. If females in general have lower average earnings in 
the economy having the household head’s wages reduced by this amount increases the 
probability of a female headed household being poor. Finally, household structure and 
wage differences can combine to contribute to poverty. This is because female household 
heads must also attend to domestic responsibilities which can lead them to taking jobs 
which are less than optimal from a wage perspective although they afford working hours 
or proximity to the home which allows domestic duties to be more easily fulfilled.
In addition to these reasons Vecchio and Roy (1998) propose two additional explanations 
which have exacerbated the status of FHHs in the developing world over the long-term.
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Citing Kottis (1990) the authors indicate that changes in women’s participation in the 
labor force is U-shaped. That is to say as the economy industrializes and grows women 
are last to be employed in periods o f growth and first to be laid off during a 
contractionary or slow growth period. As industrialization proceeds and the economy 
expands the relative share of agriculture and the informal sector will decline and it is 
these latter sectors which are more likely to employ women.
A second theory is that FHHs are vulnerable to negative externalities from the depletion 
of public goods. This theory draws on work by Dasgupta and Heal (1979) on the 
importance of recognizing renewable environmental resources as economic goods. In the 
developing world FHHs are more dependent upon common property resources (CPRs) 
than men. This is because environmental resources such as drinking water and firewood 
may hold more relative importance for FHHs. As these resources are depleted or 
rendered unusable (e.g. through pollution) the impact of this loss is felt disproportionately 
upon FHHs. The authors find evidence of commercial operators depleting waters in India 
which deprives women of a primary income source (prawn larvae).
While poverty amongst females and FHHs has received much attention in the 
development literature an initial lack of empirical data led to a heavy reliance on 
anecdotal accounts of female poverty (McGuire and Popkin 1990). The United Nations 
has stated that as much as 70 percent o f those in poverty are women (UN 1996). The UN 
figures assume 1.3 billion in poverty of which 900 million are women. These figures 
suggest that there are more women in poverty than men (by 500 million), although some 
scholars have questioned the exact size of this gap (Quisumbing et al. 2001).
Quisumbing et al. investigate whether females and FHHs contribute disproportionately to 
overall poverty. The authors examine poverty measures and their sensitivity to the use of 
per-capita and per-adult equivalent units as measures of poverty and different definitions 
of the poverty line. Poverty measures are generally higher for FHH, but the difference 
between FHH and male headed households is significant in less than a third of the 
datasets. FHHs also contribute a low share to aggregate poverty since they represent a 
smaller share o f the population. Only in Ghana and Bangladesh do the authors find 
significant differences between poverty of male and FHHs.
I. B. What is a Female Headed Household?
Despite empirical evidence over the past decade on the link between FHHs and poverty 
and no lack of theory as to explain why, we must caution against painting FHHs with too 
broad of a brush. The classification of FHHs can include widows, divorced women, 
single women, abandoned women and women whose husbands are migrant workers 
(Joshi 2004). The reason behind the household’s formation may have implications for its 
welfare. For example, an elderly widow is a female headed household by all counts, but 
she may have access to bequests from her late husband or transfers from children. By the 
same token, wives of working migrant husbands often receive remittances. These 
classifications illustrate the difficulty in defining a female household and caution against 
assuming homogeneity among FHHs. To complicate matters further disparities in the
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economic definition of a household and of a household head complicate inter country 
comparisons of FHHs.
I. C. Targeting Female Headed Households to Reduce Poverty
If FHHs are overrepresented among the poor it is logical to ask if  targeting aid transfers 
to females and, in particular, FHHs may be an effective means of anti-poverty allocation 
(Buvinic and Gupta 1997). Some arguments for targeting transfers towards FHHs are 
that FHHs are poorer, they suffer gender discrimination and they do not have a partner to 
help support the household. In addition to the immediate benefits of poverty reduction 
there are long-term benefits that are chiefly associated with the welfare o f children in the 
household. For example, if it can be shown that the benefits of anti-poverty transfers 
extend to the nutrition and education of children in FHHs there is a stronger argument for 
directing transfers towards FHHs (Buvinic and Gupta 1997).
With any targeting program there are concerns of leakage and missed targeting. In the 
case of leakage female headship is not always correlated with poverty and there would be 
screening costs to eliminate non-poor FHHs. It is also possible that FHHs which are poor 
would be missed due to differences that arise when trying to consistently define female 
household headship. Another concern is issues of incentives and endogeneity which arise 
when transfer programs explicitly target FHHs. This creates circumstances in which 
households could form in order to receive transfer benefits. Recognizing these issues 
“[u]sing female headship as a targeting criterion is, in principle, attractive because o f the 
association between female headship and poverty. Targeting these households may be 
especially useful when there are no other reliable ways to identify poor households and 
when their prevalence is not too high” (Buvinic and Gupta 1997: 270).
Transfer targeting based upon female headship has been implemented in Chile since 1991 
with encouraging results. The program was unique in the sense that there were no direct 
transfers o f cash or benefits redeemable for food. The project also entailed participation 
costs for the members in the form of attending training sessions. Leakages in the project 
were minimal and results suggest that the benefits of the program were directed to those 
households in need. The Chile program is notable in that it has minimal screening costs 
since the households largely self-screen based upon the transaction costs the household 
incurs by participating (Buvinic and Gupta 1997).
I. D. Female Headed Households and Natural Disasters
Gender roles may also contribute to variations in post-disaster recovery. In a study of the 
rebuilding process following the 1991 Oakland firestorm Hoffman (1999) finds evidence 
to support a relatively disadvantaged post-disaster position for females. From her 
findings she argues that in general “women are more prone to post-disaster disease. 
Women tend to lose conflicts over scarce resources . . .  After disasters, in many societies 
women are more likely to end up on government handouts or permanently dependent on 
aid” (Ibid.: 188). Her analysis is supported by the work of Blaikie et al. (1994) who also 
argue that women are relatively disadvantaged in the post-disaster prevention and
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response processes. Furthermore, women may be adversely affected by natural disasters 
in a manner, which may not show up in aid distribution surveys. In Bangladesh, for 
example, “a particularly damaging flood, however, has more serious consequences for 
women than for men. In addition to women’s work being confined and undervalued by 
men, wives in poor homes are perceived as a burden and finally deserted by their 
husbands during the severe impoverishment, which is the long-term consequence of flood 
disasters for the very poor” (Shaw 1992: 210).
The socio-economic effects of Hurricane Mitch have been analyzed using a gender 
approach by Bradshaw (2004) and we briefly summarize the key findings here. The most 
important direct and indirect impacts of Mitch can be classified as time, safety, income 
and production. Time represents the additional hours devoted to community work which 
entails an opportunity cost for productive work that could be done. Migration by men 
after Mitch meant that women’s household responsibilities also increased. Bradshaw also 
cites the emotional impact of Mitch as a factor which raised feelings of fear and 
insecurity which contributed to higher violence, some of which was directed towards 
women. Income was also sacrificed by rural households who saw a decline in productive 
sowing capacity and lost income in the period after Mitch. Finally, hurricane damages 
may have disrupted the production of homegrown food as well as reproduction decisions.
I. £ . Analytical Focus
This chapter builds upon work in the economic literature which identifies linkages 
between female headship, poverty and aid targeting as well as accounts of FHHs in the 
post-disaster environment in the anthropological literature. Using panel data from 
Nicaraguan households we can first test poverty levels of FHHs and analyze their 
behavior following the hurricane. Based upon field work accounts from disaster 
anthropologists we would expect that FHHs would be disadvantaged in receiving official 
post-disaster aid. It is unclear what relationship would hold for family transfers.
In the previous chapters we demonstrated that FHHs responded differently to Mitch than 
their male counterparts. In the first chapter we showed that FHHs were received less 
post-disaster aid, but more inter-household transfers. At that time we speculated that 
FHHs may have been discriminated against or partially excluded from official aid 
transfers. We will see if this conclusion is accurate. In the second chapter results showed 
that FHHs were more likely to add members after Mitch. These findings differentiated 
between male and FHHs. Due to heterogeneity among FHHs it is premature to conclude 
that any uniformity in behavior existed amongst FHHs. We examine the decision of 
some FHHs to increase household size, while others of comparable welfare do not.
Before proceeding it is important to state that we are only concerned with economic or 
otherwise observable indicators of Mitch. There is evidence in the literature (e.g. 
Bradshaw 2004) which details that FHHs (and women in general) often suffer in non- 
quantifiable ways after a disaster. Examples include being the victims of violence, the 
emotional stress of living through the disaster and the demands o f maintaining a full 
household if the male becomes an economic migrant after the storm. This list is not
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exhaustive, but illustrates factors which are clearly important in completely evaluating 
welfare comparisons. Bearing these factors in mind, we focus on welfare which is 
measured using quantifiable economic indicators, recognizing this is likely an imperfect 
picture of welfare post-Mitch for FHHs.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the data set and relevant 
descriptive statistics associated with FHHs. Section III details the methodology used to 
test the behavior of female households after Mitch. Section IV discusses the results. 
Section V concludes.
II. Data and Background 
II. A. Data
This chapter also uses the LSMS data set. The specifics of the data set have been detailed 
in the previous chapters. We use the 1998 and 1999 surveys for this chapter, which have 
detailed information on household characteristics. These surveys contain 528 households 
for analysis. Of the 528 households 103 are female headed.
II. B. Background
In the Nicaragua LSMS the household head is the “head” as defined by the household 
itself using its own definitional criteria.
II. B. 1. Demographic Characteristics by Gender of Household Head 
II. B. 1.1 Poverty
Before we move to an analysis of the impact of Mitch on FHHs and their response it is 
useful to begin with an analysis of poverty levels among female households. The LSMS 
classifies households as either poor, extremely poor or non-poor. Table 5.1 gives the 
percentages of households by poverty classification for the full sample and for FHHs.
The initial results are somewhat surprising since FHHs are equally represented among the 
extremely poor and are underrepresented among the poor.
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Table 5.1: 1998 Poverty By Household Type
Poverty Level All Households 
(n = 528)
Male Headed 
Households 
(n = 425)
Female Headed 
Households 
(n=103)
Extremely
Poor
24% 24% 24%
Poor 37% 39% 31%
Non Poor 39% 37% 45%
Mean Per 
Capita 
Consumption
4,746 4,585 5,410
Source: Author’s calculations
Since these classifications are rather broad we can use more specific details on household 
per capita consumption to compare welfare levels o f FHHs against the full sample. Mean 
per capita household consumption in 1998 was 4,746 cordobas for the full sample and 
was 5,410 cordobas for FHHs. One female household has per capita consumption of 
40,000 cordobas. Even when this outlier is excluded the mean figure is 5,065 cordobas. 
In contrast to the common relationship between female headship and poverty, for the 
surveyed Nicaraguan households no such link appears to hold. FHHs are less likely to be 
poor and are actually better off (as measured by household per capita consumption).
II. B. 1.2 Household Location
The impact of Mitch was most strongly felt in the Nicaraguan departments of Chinandega 
and Leon. Table 5.2 shows the percentage of female headed households in these 
departments compared with less affected areas. Chinandega and Leon have a higher 
percentage of FHHs than the rest of the country. If differences in aid distribution or 
patterns of changing household size emerge it is worthwhile considering this may be a 
regional phenomenon in which FHHs are overrepresented.
Table 5.2: Female Headed Households by Department
Department Female Headed 
Households
Chinandega 2 2 %
Leon 23%
Other 17%
Source: Author’s calculations
In regards to the differences in welfare levels, urban households have a higher mean 
consumption per capita (5189 cordobas) than rural households (4578 cordobas). One 
reason for the higher welfare o f FHHs may be that a greater proportion of them are urban 
households. Table 5.3 shows the percentages of urban and rural households for the whole 
sample and by gender.
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Table 5 3 : Location of Households by Gender of Head
Location Full Sample Male Headed Female Headed
Urban 27% 26% 34%
Rural 73% 74% 6 6 %
Source: Author’s calculations
Thus far we have demonstrated that FHHs actually had higher consumption per capita 
than those households with male headships. This relationship is associated with a greater 
percentage of FHHs being located in urban areas and not being engaged in agriculture as 
rural, agricultural households have lower consumption per capita than urban households. 
However, it is also worthwhile to compare the welfare o f urban households by gender of 
the household head. It may be that urban households with a female head are indeed 
worse off (from a welfare perspective) than those with a male head. Instead we find the 
opposite as shown in Table 5.4. The same is also true for rural households with a female 
headship.
Table 5.4: Consumption Per Capita* for Household Type by Gender of Head
Location Male Headed Female Headed
Urban 4815 6125
Rural 4478 5042
N = 425 103
Source: Author’s calculations 
*Figures are mean consumption in cordobas.
Data indicates that female households have a higher consumption per capita than male 
headed ones regardless o f whether the household is located in an urban or rural area.
This is somewhat surprising although this discrepancy could be explained if a high 
percentage of the FHHs have migrant husbands who send remittances or if  the household 
receives some other type of transfer. Unfortunately the 1998 and 1999 surveys do not 
have data specifically linked to remittances.26
II. B. 1.3 Agriculture
Earlier we found that agricultural households were the most vulnerable to Mitch. The 
lower percentage of rural households among FHHs naturally implies that there will also 
be a lower percentage of agricultural households with female headships. These data are 
presented in Table 5.5 and shows that a much lower percentage of FHHs are engaged in 
agriculture.
26 Funkhouser (1995) surveys households in the Managua and San Salvador and finds Nicaraguan 
households remit less than El Salvadoran households. Funkhouser’s findings however do not enable us to 
advance our theory o f  why FHHs have higher consumption per capita levels.
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Table 5.5: Agricultural Households by Gender of Head
Full Sample Male Headed Female Headed
Agricultural 61% 65% 42%
Non-Agricultural 39% 35% 58%
Source: Author’s calculations
II. B. 1.4 Household Size
Two other characteristics of FHHs in the literature are that they are typically smaller and 
have a higher dependency ratio. If these are true for the surveyed households in 
Nicaragua we would expect that FHHs will be smaller and have more children. In the 
previous chapter we found that smaller households have a higher consumption per capita 
than larger ones. Data thus far shows FHHs to have a higher per capita consumption. 
Evidence from the literature indicates we would expect them to also have smaller 
households. Using data on household size we can see if this relationship holds.
In 1998 mean household size was 6.05 members for male headed households and 5.04 
members for FHHs. FHHs are smaller, by one member on average. Table 5.6 
summarizes these figures along with the number o f dependents (aged 15 or younger) and 
the dependency ratio. In contrast to what the literature suggests the number of 
dependents (defined as children aged 15 or younger) is lower for FHHs by approximately
0.7 per household.
Table 5.6: Household Size and Dependency by Gender of Head
Full Sample Male Headed Female Headed
Mean Household 
Size
5.85 6.05 5.04
Mean Number of 
Children Aged 15 
or Younger
2.7 2.82 2.18
Dependency Ratio 1.24 1.25 1 .2 1
Source: Author’s calculations
II. B. 2. Mitch Damages and Gender of Household Head
When comparing hurricane damages by gender the impacts appear to be fairly mixed
based upon gender of the household head (Table 5.7). In the case o f agricultural losses
(harvest and long-term losses) there are 321 households surveyed. Of these 278 are male
headed and 43 are female headed. In comparison to some of the earlier demographic
indicators male headed households suffered larger harvest losses, although the difference
is negligible. By contrast mean long-term losses for male headed household are more
than three times those for FHHs. It is important to note that this figure may simply be a
reflection of male headed households having more assets and consequently more to lose.
The non-monetary indicators (wall damage, water supply damage and days homeless) are
fairly gender neutral with the exception of damage to the water supply. Only seven
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percent of FHHs experienced damage to the water supply compared with 24 percent for 
male headed households. This is likely related to a higher percentage of FHHs residing 
in urban areas. FHHs were homeless 0.7 days less than male headed households.
Table 5.7: Mitch Damages by Gender of Household Head
Male Headed Female Headed
Surveyed Households on 
Agricultural Losses
278 43
% of Households with 
Agricultural Losses > 0
90 84
Mean Harvest Losses 
(in cordobas)
3870 3838
Mean Long-term Losses 
(in cordobas)
1507 479
Surveyed Households on 
Wall / Water Damage
361 84
With Walls Damaged 
(%)
26 30
With Water Supply 
Damaged (%)
24 7
Mean Days Homeless 4.91 4.23
Source: Author’s calculations
II. C. Post-Mitch Aid
Based upon a review of the literature and the findings o f the previous two chapters it was 
reasonable to expect that FHHs would both be more vulnerable to Mitch damages and be 
more heavily impacted by the hurricane. Instead we found evidence to the contrary. At 
worst it appears that female households were equal to male headed ones in nearly all 
respects.
Given the results in the first chapter we know that harvest losses were a statistically 
significant determinant of aid. For this reason it is useful to view mean aid received for 
agricultural and non-agricultural households. If aid was allocated based upon harvest 
losses we would expect mean aid for agricultural households to be approximately equal 
for male and FHHs engaged in agriculture.
Table 5.8 provides data on aid by gender of the household head. The difference in mean 
official aid is 189 cordobas in favor of male headed households, and 189 in favor of 
FHHs for family transfers. FHHs received only 71% of the official aid received by male 
headed households, but received nearly three times as much in family transfers.27
27 The difference in means o f  official aid received is statistically significant. The z statistic is an enormous 
149.75 and the p-value is nearly 0.
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Table 5.8: Mean Aid by Gender of House lold Heac (in cordobas'
Gender of 
Household 
Head
Official
Aid
Official Aid 
for
Agricultural
Households
Official Aid 
for Non- 
Agricultural 
Households
Family
Aid
Family Aid 
for
Agricultural
Households
Family Aid 
for Non- 
Agricultural 
Households
Male 648 820 321 106 101 115
Female 459 463 457 295 519 134
Source: Author’s calculations
Male headed agricultural households received 77% more aid than female headed ones. 
This figure is particularly alarming since mean agricultural losses for male headed 
households (5377 cordobas) are only 25% greater than those for female headed 
agricultural households (4317).28 With a strict distribution of official aid by harvest 
losses only male and female headed agricultural households should receive 
approximately equal amounts of aid. Instead there is an “extra” 52% of aid going to male 
headed agricultural households. Section III explores possible determinants for this 
discrepancy and whether gender of the household head is a viable explanation.
II. D. Adjusting Household Size Post-Mitch
In the previous chapter we found that FHHs were more likely to add members in the 
immediate post-Mitch period than male headed households and that the alteration of 
household size may have been a post-Mitch coping mechanism for certain households. 
Based upon the descriptive statistics in this section FHHs had a higher welfare and 
experienced fewer damages (in general) than male headed households. As such social 
insurance arrangements would dictate that those households with excess resources would 
add members.
Before proceeding to inferential analysis it is worthwhile to review the data on FHHs and 
see what patterns emerge. This information is presented in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: Female Headed Households and Changing Household Size 1998 - 1999
Total HHs N = 
103
HHs 
in %
Mean HH 
Consumption
Mean HH 
Size
HHs in 
Agriculture
Mean
Agricultural
Loss
Mean
Official
Aid
Mean
Family
Aid
Adding
Members
45 44% 5,883 4.1 17 5260 304 231
No
Change
41 40% 5,891 4.9 18 4164 648 374
Dropping
Members
17 16% 2,997 7.8 8 2565 414 274
Source: Author’s calculations
28 These figures are the summation o f  mean harvest losses and long-term losses from Table 5.7.
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Table 5.9 (Continued)
Total HHs % of HHs 
with Wall 
Damage
Mean Days 
Homeless
Mean Home 
Reconstruction 
Expenditure
Mean
Dependents
Dependency
Ratio
% With 
Children (Aged 
5 or Younger)
Adding
Members
18% 5.09 1755 1.87 1.04 16%
No
Change
34% 3.87 944 2.29 1.14 1 0 %
Dropping
Members
18% 3.21 1 2 0 2 2.71 1 .8 6 1 2 %
Source: Author’s calculations
From Table 5.9 it is easy to see a gulf between those FHHs dropping members and those 
adding or remaining neutral. Those households dropping members have a lower per 
capita consumption, larger household size, more dependents and a higher dependency 
ratio. What is more striking are the similarities between the groups of households adding 
members and those leaving household size unchanged. There is no clear distinguishing 
factor to separate the two groups or identify why one group would add members while 
the other would not.
FHHs which did not change composition received 113% more official aid and 62% more 
family aid than those households adding members. This occurs despite comparable 
welfare levels and lower agricultural loss amounts. Even when considering Mitch 
damages no clear pattern emerges. Those households adding members were homeless 
longer and had higher agricultural losses. In the case of wall damage, it could be that 
those households with structural damage to the home (wall damage) were reluctant to 
take in additional members on grounds of safety or overcrowding. Households adding 
members also spent more money on home reconstruction. Households adding members 
had fewer dependents and a lower dependency ratio. The most distinguishing factors for 
those adding members are the smaller household size, fewer dependent and the lower 
dependency ratio. The next section explores why some FHHs added members after 
Mitch while others with comparable levels of welfare and hurricane damage did not.
III. Methodology
This section details methodology for empirically testing: (i) whether FHHs, and in 
particular agricultural FHHs, were disadvantaged in receiving official aid (ii) if  FHHs 
were targeted for inter-household transfers based upon the gender of the household head 
and (iii) why some FHHs are more likely to increase household size after Mitch.
III. A. Post-Mitch Aid Allocations by Gender of Household Head
Based upon the results in the first chapter an initial reaction was that official aid was 
allocated to male headed households in a discriminatory manner. Since FHHs received 
less aid this conclusion seemed plausible based upon the disaster anthropology literature
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which indicates that FHHs may be disadvantaged in the post-disaster environment. 
However, the descriptive statistics in the previous section give pause for thought. The 
welfare figures indicate that FHHs had a higher welfare before the hurricane and a 
conclusion of discrimination seems premature. At the same time an analysis o f mean aid 
(Table 5.8) shows that official aid transfers to agricultural households still favored those 
with male headship even after we account for the relatively higher losses they incurred.
There are three possibilities that can explain the discrepancy in mean aid received. The 
first is that aid was directly discriminatory. If this were true we would expect FHHs to 
receive less aid simply for having a female head. In this case a dummy for having a 
female head would likely be statistically significant in a regression framework. A second 
possibility is that aid was indirectly discriminatory. In this case official aid would be 
targeted based around household characteristics which favor male headed households. 
Although the gender o f the household head may not be statistically significant other 
explanatory factors have a strong relationship to headship may be statistically significant. 
The final possibility is that aid was neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory.
From our review of the literature and the results in the first chapter the following factors 
merit consideration in devising a model:
• Gender of the Household Head;
• Welfare (Per capita household consumption);
• Household Size;
• Children (Aged 5 or Younger);
• Number of Dependents (Aged 15 or Younger);
• Dependency Ratio;
• Size o f Agricultural Losses;
• Geographic Location of the Household.
III. A. 1. Agricultural Households
We start with the inclusion of a dummy for a FHH (FEMALE). If having a female 
household head led to receiving less aid we expect the female dummy will remain 
statistically significant as we control for other factors. We expand the model to include 
the explanatory factors enumerated in Table 5.10. This model is presented in equation 1.
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Table 5.10: Explanatory Variables Considered
Explanatory Variable Variable Name Type
Female Household Head FEMALE Qualitative
Total Agricultural Losses 
(Harvest + Long-term 
Losses) in thousands of 
cordobas
TLOSS Quantitative
Engaged in Agriculture AGR Qualitative
Per Capita Household 
Consumption in 1998 
(in thousands of 
cordobas)
CONS98 Quantitative
# Dependents of Aged 15 
or Younger
DEP Quantitative
Children Aged 5 or 
Younger
KIDS Qualitative
Members Aged 16 or 
Older
ADULTS Quantitative
Ratio of Dependents to 
Adults in Household
DEPRATIO Quantitative
Household Size in 1998 HH98 Quantitative
Located in Chinandega CHIN Qualitative
Located in Leon LEON Qualitative
(1) OAIDj = a + FEMALE* + HH98; + CONS98i + DEP; + DEPRATIO; + KIDS; + TLOSS; + AGR; + 
CHIN; + LEON; + ^
Equation 1 models official aid (OAID) received by household i after Mitch as a function 
of the gender of the household head, household size in 1998, the number o f dependents, 
the dependency ration, the presence of children and residence in Chinandega or Leon. 
Variables for total agricultural losses and being engaged in agriculture are also included 
as appropriate. We can also repeat this process with family aid (inter-household 
transfers, FAID) received as the dependent variable (results are presented in the next 
section) in equation 2 .
(2) FAID; = a + FEMALE; + HH98; + CONS98i + DEP; + DEPRATIO; + KIDS; + TLOSS, + AGR; + 
CHIN; + LEON; + n;
Some terms in equations 1 and 2 are necessarily excluded as we isolate agricultural and 
non-agricultural households. These alterations are made clear in the results section.
III. B. Change in Household Size
If home damage (or another factor) is the dominant reason for why some FHHs added 
members and others did not it is reasonable to assume that this can be shown empirically. 
Four variables emerged from the descriptive statistics which could explain the decision of
129
otherwise similar FHHs to add members, while others chose not to do so. We use a 
probit model with the decision to add members set equal to 1 and the decision not to add 
set to 0 (equation 3).
(3) Yj = Zj(a + HH98;+ KIDS; + DEPRATIOj + CONS98j + OAID, + WALLDMG, + pO
The sample contains the 8 6  FHHs that either added members or kept household size the 
same. Additional variables were considered, but they did not add any explanatory value 
to the model.
IV. Results
IV. A. Gender of the Household Head and Aid Received
The results of the models in equations 1 and 2 are presented below in Tables 5.11 and 
5.12, respectively. The regression results in Table 11 are those with official aid as the 
dependent variable. Table 12 presents the regression results with family aid as the 
dependent variable. Each regression is run on three groupings: agricultural households, 
non-agricultural households and all households. Results from equation 3 are presented in 
Table 5.13.
IV. A. 1. Official Aid
Having a female household head is the only explanatory factor which is statistically 
significant for the distribution of official aid to agricultural households. Even after 
controlling for total agricultural losses, household per capita consumption, other 
demographic variables and location of the household having a female headship remains 
significant at 10% with a negative coefficient. These results suggest that among 
agricultural households those with a female head were disadvantaged in receiving official 
aid transfers.
For non-agricultural households the gender bias is eliminated and the female coefficient 
is positive (but not significant). Being located in the Chinandega department is the only 
factor which is statistically significant (at 1 0 %) for official aid distributions to non- 
agricultural households. Over the full sample the gender bias is also eliminated even 
though the female coefficient is negative. For the full sample three factors are 
statistically significant determinants of aid received. The number of dependents and 
being engaged in agriculture are both significant at 10% with positive coefficients. Being 
located in Chinandega is again significant at 10% with a negative coefficient. These 
findings open several avenues for discussion.
Before discussing the results in Table 5.11 it is important to note that in this regression 
that neither the total loss (TLOSS) nor the consumption (CONS98) variables are 
significant. This is in contrast to the findings in Chapter 3 which indicate that family aid 
was targeted to the hardest hit and poorer households. The difference in these results is 
driven by the model specification. The model in this section was structured to answer the
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question of whether household demographic characteristics beyond gender of the 
household head may impact the receipt of family aid by female headed households. By 
contrast the aid regression in Chapter 3 was structured (based upon risk pooling theory 
and literature) whether shock values damages and household welfare were statistically 
significant determinants of family aid. In response to these questions consumption and 
agricultural losses are significant in the former but not the latter.
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Table 5.11: OLS Regression Results for Determinants of
Official Aid Received
Dependent Variable: Official Aid Received (in cordobas)
Sampled Households
Explanatory
Variables:
Agricultural Non-Agricultural All
FEMALE -367.21* 207.55 -92.73
(216.35) (181.96) (146.18)
HH98 -137.04 53.89 -57.31
(89.5) (41.06) (54.17)
CONS98 -13.66 -8.33 -14.94
(in thousands) (33.15) (7.26) (12.28)
DEP 155.92 47.21 94.39*
(97.88) (54.65) (54.45)
DEPRATIO 121.23 -45.58 39.61
(95.54) (36.52) (48.9)
KIDS -102.06 -28.38 -39.44
(298.26) (222.14) (186.82)
TLOSS -7.79
(6.59)
- -
AGR - - 348.76*
(186.84)
LEON 269.46 61.73 186.15
(513.43) (196.88) (303.48)
CHIN -247.19 -310.76* -226.47*
(240.15) (161.38) (136.92)
Constant 1155.12*** 87.73 520.98***
(418.56) (136.83) (195.49)
R^ 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
N = 321 207 528
*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1%
Statistics on the distribution of official aid to agricultural households indicated an “extra” 
52% o f aid going to male headed households. However, based upon higher mean per 
capita consumption for FHHs it could have been argued that the lack of aid received by 
agricultural FHHs was in relation to their higher welfare level and independent of their 
gender. If this were the case we would have expected per capita household consumption 
to be statistically significant and the female dummy not to be significant. Instead the 
opposite is true. The regression results indicate a gender bias in the distribution of aid for 
agricultural households, but results do not tell us why. A subsequent exploration of the 
anthropological findings may help put the results in Table 5.11 into context.
Work by Bradshaw (2004) draws parallels between the situation of women in post-Mitch 
El Salvador and Nicaragua. In El Salvador the dominance of men may have played a 
large role in the disparity in aid received:
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[w]omen in El Salvador also noted differences between the tasks performed by them and 
by men: women distributed emergency aid, but it was the community board, made up o f  
men, which decided who would benefit from it. In other words, women were involved in 
the physical distribution, but not in the decision-making process. This situation occurred 
not only in the communities, where it is perhaps more difficult to envision changes in 
traditional roles, but also in shelters, new and distinct environs.
In other words, cultural and institutional factors which affect gender relations such as 
traditional machismo or men’s domination of the political or legal institutions can also 
contribute to an unequal distribution of aid. These factors would not necessarily show up 
in our regression framework although their effects would be captured.
IV. A. 2. Family (Inter-household) Aid
If the distribution of official aid was male-dominated this provides a more logical reason 
as to why inter-household (family) transfers to agricultural households favored FHHs 
(Table 5.8). Family transfers can bypass any formal male dominated allocation authority 
and also benefit from more complete information. Table 5.12 presents regression results 
with family aid received as the dependent variable.
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Table 5.12: OLS Regression Results for Determinants of
Family Aid Received
Dependent Variable: Family Aid Received (in cordobas)
Sampled Househo ds
Explanatory Variables Agricultural
Households
Non-
Agricultural
Households
All
Households
FEMALE 436.61
(311.71)
26.67
(53.42)
218.26
(150.89)
HH98 -9.54
(2 1 .2 )
34.37
(28.58)
8.72
(16.18)
TLOSS 6.46
(6.99)
- -
DEP 35.06
(28.86)
-35.69
(28.61)
3.36
(18.97)
DEPRATIO 152.76
(135.48)
0.56
(22.67)
69.06
(62.97)
KIDS -117.38
(81.5)
-119.28*** 
(37.19)
-113.72***
(49.03)
CONS98 17.93 
(16.02) •
-1.13
(2.31)
5.44
(4.82)
AGR - - 88.09
(83.22)
LEON 73.08
(93.32)
59.1
(64.4)
60.67
(62.34)
CHIN -55.74
(113.05)
-65.47
(49.58)
-38.3
(58.57)
Constant -220.57
(170.85)
32.03
(99.07)
-119.3
(117.74)
R 2 0.08 0.03 0.04
N = 321 207 528
*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1%
Regression results with family aid as the dependent variable show that having a female 
head ceases to be a statistically significant determinant of inter-household transfers 
received. For agricultural households no factor is a statistically significant determinant of 
inter-household transfers. For non-agricultural households the presence of children aged 
five or younger was highly significant at 1%. Surprisingly the coefficient is negative.
This is also true for the full sample. This relationship is counterintuitive since it indicates 
that inter-household transfers were directed away from households with children. For all 
three groupings the female coefficient is positive in all cases.29
29 The results o f all regressions are presented using robust standard errors. Using uncorrected standard 
errors the FEMALE and DEPRATIO variables are statistically significant at 1% for the agricultural and full 
sample. The large discrepancy in the standard errors suggests heteroscedasticity in the data set.
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IV. B. Female Household Size
The results from equation 3 (Table 5.13) are surprising since none of the factors 
highlighted in the previous section is statistically significant. The explanatory variables 
are not jointly significant in either regression.30 With the exception of the presence of 
children in the household (KIDS) the variables have the expected sign, but leave us no 
closer to an explanation for the decision of some FHHs to increase household size after 
the hurricane.
Table 5.13: Probit Results for Female Households Adding Members 1998 - 1999 
______________ Dependent Variable: Increasing Household Size______________
Explanatory Variables: FHHs with no Decrease in Those in Column 1
Size Surveyed on Wall Damage
0 ) (2 )
HH98 -0.09 -0.07
(0.06) (0.07)
DEPRATIO -0.03 -0.08
(0 .1 2 ) (0.14)
WALLDMG - -0.4
(0.36)
KIDS 0.54 0.58
(0.45) (0.49)
CONS98 -0 .0 2 -0 .0 1
(in thousands of cordobas) (0.03) (0.03)
OAID -0 .2 -0.36
(in thousands of cordobas) (0 .2 ) (0.33)
LEON -0.04 -0.42
(0.36) (0.4)
CHIN 0.37 -0.06
(0.41) (0.48)
Constant 0.63 0.65
(0.41) (0.47)
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.07
N = 8 6 71
Probit coefficients are displayed in the table with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%
This conclusion is more surprising given the results of the identical regressions on male 
headed households (Table 5.14). For male headed households the decision to add 
members or leave size unchanged is strongly influenced by the presence o f children 
under 5 in the household and the dependency ratio. The presence o f a child aged 5 or 
younger is statistically significant at 1%. The relationship for dependency ratio is weaker 
(significant at 10%). The sign is positive as expected. As the ratio of workers to non­
workers increases the probability of adding members increases as well. Although male 
headed households were less likely to add members after Mitch identifiable determinants
27 Prob > 2 2 -  0.344 for Column 1 and 0.398 for Column 2.
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of their decision can be found, but not for FHHs. We considered welfare, various 
indicators of household composition and hurricane damage as well as post-Mitch aid 
(both official and family aid). None of these factors significantly affected the probability 
of FHHs adding members.
Table 5.14: Probit Results for Male Households (MHHs) Adding Members 
____________ Dependent Variable: Increasing Household Size____________
Explanatory Variables: MHHs with no Decrease 
in Size 
( 1)
Those in (1) Surveyed on 
Wall Damage 
(2 )
HH98 -0.0006 -0.003
(0.03) (0.03)
DEPRATIO 0 .1 2 ** 0 .1 2 *
(0.06) (0.07)
WALLDMG - 0.08
(0.18)
KIDS 0  7 *** 0.81***
(0 .2 2 ) (0.24)
CONS98 -0.004 0.003
(0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 )
OAID -0 .0 2 0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
CHIN -0.24 0.24
(0.19) (0 .2 2 )
LEON 0.31 -0.15
(0 .2 ) (0 .2 1 )
Constant -0.64*** -0.75***
(0 .2 2 ) (0.25)
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05
N = 330 279
Probit coefficients are displayed in the table with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%
V. Conclusion
On the whole, the gender of the household head was not a significant factor in the 
distribution of official aid after Mitch. Agricultural households were most in need of aid 
after Mitch. When we focus on agricultural households we find evidence that having a 
female headship was a significant factor which led to FHHs receiving less aid. This 
phenomenon appears to be isolated to agricultural households. Regression results tell us 
that having a female headship was an important contributory factor for receiving less aid. 
At the same time the results are limiting in that they illustrate the end and not the process 
o f aid allocation. To fill in the gaps we turn to anthropological work after Mitch which 
emphasizes the role of cultural and institutional factors that marginalized women to the 
periphery of decision-making of aid allocation following Mitch.
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The decision of FHHs to increase household size following Mitch appears to follow no 
clear pattern. Isolating two comparable groups of FHHs no discemable characteristics 
emerge to explain why some FHHs added members after Mitch while others did not. By 
contrast the decision of MHHs to add members is related to the dependency ratio and the 
presence of children aged five or under in the household. While FHHs are more likely to 
increase household size after Mitch, it is unclear why certain FHHs do so while others do 
not.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Global disaster trends may indicate that the rate of losses over time is not subject to rapid 
increase. Nevertheless, for millions of the world’s poor natural disasters continue to have 
a profound impact on their livelihood. In addition to potential loss of life, many of the 
world’s poor have incomes that are not captured in official figures which are vulnerable 
to disaster damage. Development economists have identified many non-market 
mechanisms that households in the developing world use to cope with risk, uncertainty 
and unanticipated shocks to income and consumption. The viability of these mechanisms 
is often predicated upon certain assumptions. For example, the functionality of informal 
insurance arrangements is conditional upon a low percentage of the risk pooling network 
being simultaneously affected.
Idiosyncratic shocks such as job loss, illness or injury allow us to observe the workings of 
non-market mechanisms in their usual environment. The incidence of large-scale 
disasters creates a covariate shock and places coping mechanisms under increased stress 
since assets which could ordinarily be used to cope can often be destroyed. Disasters also 
generate claims for scarce resources in the post-event period, which may lead to 
allocations based upon existing power relations instead of need. The focus of this 
dissertation has been to analyze the household response to a covariate shock (Mitch) vis- 
a-vis non-market mechanisms as well as the distribution of aid in the post-disaster 
environment, with particular reference to female headed households.
An overview of Mitch damages in Chapter 2 indicated that we could expect agricultural 
households to be the most strongly affected. Chapter 2 also accentuated the importance 
o f post-disaster aid for affected households and suggested that aid would play an 
important role in maintaining household welfare post-Mitch. The findings subsequent 
chapters reiterated these suspicions.
In Chapter 3 we found a strong relationship between household consumption and harvest 
losses. The principal findings from Chapter 3 are the following:
• As theory would predict households can not rely on informal insurance networks 
to mitigate damage from covariate risk;
• Agricultural households are particularly vulnerable to Mitch damages;
• The inability of informal mechanisms to cope with damages emphasizes the need 
for effective aid targeting in the post-disaster period;
• Official aid played was instrumental in sustaining post-Mitch welfare and was 
better targeted and larger in nominal terms than family transfers.
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Chapter 4 shifted focus to adjusting household size as a post-Mitch coping mechanism. 
Results from this chapter showed noticeable behavioral patterns in the alteration of 
household size after Mitch. The key observations are summarized below.
• A household suffering agricultural losses was more likely to adjust household 
size;
• A coping relationship exists in which the change in harvest losses and household 
size consequently leads to an increase in household per capita consumption;
• Female households were more likely to increase household size after Mitch.
Finally in Chapter 5 analyzed the distribution of official and private, inter-household aid 
along gender lines. This chapter also examined the decision of female headed households 
to increase household size after Mitch. Results showed the following:
• Over the full sample having a female household head was not a statistically 
significant determinant of receiving official aid;
• For agricultural households female headship was a statistically significant 
determinant of receiving less official aid;
• There was no evidence to indicate why some FHHs increased household size 
while others kept size constant.
Chapter 5 also specified a model to test whether household demographic characteristics 
in addition to gender of household head were determinants of family aid. As a result the 
model in Chapter 3 was expanded to include static household characteristics that were not 
relevant for risk pooling tests carried out earlier in the dissertation. In Chapter 3 and in 
our risk pooling tests household consumption (welfare) and agricultural losses (shocks) 
were significant determinants of family transfers, but not in Chapter 5 due to the 
difference in model specification detailed in Chapter 5.
On the whole the findings show that informal coping mechanisms were insufficient to 
safeguard household consumption after Mitch and that relief aid was well targeted and 
played a key role in maintaining household welfare. Agricultural households were 
particularly vulnerable to Mitch damages. One coping mechanism for agricultural 
households was to reduce household size. By contrast other segments of the population 
such as female headed households were the most likely to increase size, which suggests 
this may have operated as a risk pooling arrangement of sorts. Official aid was well 
targeted and used agricultural losses as a determinant for allocation. Although aid was 
effectively targeted among agricultural households those with a female household head 
were statistically shown to receive less aid. Overall, the evidence suggests that informal 
mechanisms were insufficient but aid transfers and non-market coping mechanisms such 
as adjusting household size played a role in coping with Mitch damages.
The dissertation touches on several topics in the development economics literature 
including risk coping, aid effectiveness and gender. The dissertation has contributed to 
the literature by utilizing a data set and shock that has not been previously studied for risk 
coping implications. Unlike previous studies in the literature which have focused on
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different shock types we have researched the impact of a natural disaster shock which, 
unlike other shocks, entails exogenous aid transfers as well as the possible destruction of 
physical assets which could ordinarily be used as part of a coping strategy. The 
dissertation has also drawn together threads from the disaster anthropology, gender and 
development economics literature to analyze non-market coping mechanisms and the role 
gender played in post-shock recovery. The disaster anthropology literature uses 
qualitative analysis and the empirical testing here contributes toward theories that being a 
female headed household is a significant disadvantage in the post-disaster setting.
From a policy perspective the results indicate the impact of hurricanes on agricultural 
households in developing countries can be potentially quite severe. Since the occurrence 
of natural disasters can not be prevented these results suggest that increased attention 
should be given to constructing mitigation measures to minimize flooding associated with 
heavy hurricane rainfall. Much of the harvest losses were attributable to topsoil washed 
away. Additional preventive measures may include investing in roads and bridges that 
are less prone to flooding as well as implementing policies at the macro-level to minimize 
erosion which often exacerbates flood damage. In addition the establishment of official 
ex-ante relief funds could facilitate the recovery process for agricultural households.
This is particularly important in areas which lack developed credit markets. It is also 
important to recognize that the impact of natural disasters is heterogenous. For example, 
the impact of an earthquake on agricultural households would be fairly mild since 
croplands would be unaffected. Thus it is important to consider the hazard type when 
formulating an appropriate policy response.
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